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The tension between the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule (articulated in the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf) and the Equitable Principles-Relevant 
Circumstances rule (declared in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases of the 
International Court of Justice) prevented the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea from stipulating a specific method for the delimitation of the EEZ or the continental 
shelf. For this reason, the role or status in maritime delimitation of the equidistance method, 
equitable principles, and relevant circumstances must generally be determined by reviewing 
the decisions of international courts and tribunals. 
The equidistance method has been employed in international case-law as a means of 
constructing a ‘provisional’ line. Analysis of international case-law also shows that the 
current rule governing maritime delimitation is the ‘achievement of an equitable solution’ in 
and of itself. The concept of equity in maritime delimitation is therefore only relevant to the 
equitability of the ‘result’ to be reached. Thus, the argument that equitable principles 
applicable to the examination of relevant circumstances are ascertainable and meaningful in 
maritime delimitation should be dismissed. Guaranteeing the equitability of principles or 
processes does not necessarily lead to the achievement of an equitable result. 
The remaining concept of significance to the delimitation process is that of ‘relevant 
circumstances’, which must be taken into account in order to reach an equitable result. The 
patterns or processes involved when the delimitation rule is applied by taking account of 
relevant circumstances are not predictable. The achievement of an equitable solution in 
maritime delimitation is preceded by the flexible consideration of relevant circumstances. 
The increasing importance of relevant circumstances to the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries is proven by two practical instances. One is the establishment of a single 
maritime boundary, which constitutes one typical maritime boundary; the other is the 
delimitation of the outer continental shelf, which has recently been included in international 
case-law. 
In brief, this thesis will show how best to arrive at an equitable solution by drawing 
attention to the demise of equitable principles and the dominant role of relevant 
circumstances. The clarification of taking into account relevant circumstances enables us 
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1. The Meaning of a Maritime Boundary 
 
“The land dominates the sea” is a well-known maxim in international law.
1
 It refers to the 
fact that a State can retain rights to maritime areas adjacent to its own land territory. One 
practical application of this principle is that maritime rights cannot be separated from land 
territory when the cession of a State’s territory takes place.
2
 In the context of the ‘classic’ 
international law of the sea, therefore, which recognised only two maritime zones (the 
territorial sea and the high seas),
3
 one of the major concerns of a State was how far its 
territorial sea could extend. The further its territorial sea extended, the larger the maritime 
spaces over which the State could exercise sovereignty. The boundary of the territorial sea, 
which represented the limit of State jurisdiction, was thus as important as any land boundary, 
even in ‘traditional’ international law. It is, however, observed that classic international law 
supporting a dichotomy between the territorial sea and the high seas did not specify maritime 
boundaries except for the boundary of the territorial sea. 
Since the 1945 Truman Proclamation, coastal States have actively claimed new 
maritime zones with boundaries different to those which define their territorial seas. Such 
claims have led to the development of novel concepts in international law, such as the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (hereafter referred to as “EEZ”), the Exclusive Fishery Zone 
(hereafter referred to as “EFZ”), or the continental shelf.
4
 As a result, the boundary of the 
territorial sea no longer functions as the one and only type of maritime boundary. Currently, 
a State can, in theory, establish several maritime boundaries, such as the boundary of the 
territorial sea or the boundary of the continental shelf. 
                                            
1
 I.C.J. Reports 2001, p.97, para.185. 
2
 See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6
th
 ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
pp.499-500, fn.65. 
3
 This thesis uses the term ‘classic’ or ‘traditional’ international law to denote public international law 
prior to 1945. 
4
 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3
rd
 ed. (Manchester: Manchester University 







At this point, it is important to acknowledge that a maritime boundary is different 
from a maritime limit.
5
 The latter refers to the limit of maritime spaces over which a State 
can exercise relevant jurisdiction. A State can establish its own maritime limits relating to the 
territorial sea or the EEZ under the principles and rules of international law. For the purpose 
of distinguishing between the establishment of a maritime limit and the making of a 
maritime boundary, the former will be termed ‘delineation’, and the latter ‘delimitation’. 
Once established, a maritime limit has a ‘unilateral’ character.
6
 By contrast, a maritime 
‘boundary’ reflects the division of relevant maritime areas in relation to another State. It is 





2. The Meaning of Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
 
2.1. The Need for Maritime Delimitation 
As a ‘primary’ subject in international law, each State can exercise ‘sovereignty’ or 
‘sovereign rights’
8
 over its own territory or maritime areas. Under the principles and rules of 
international law, it can establish its own maritime limits (except for the outer limits of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (hereafter referred to as “NM”)) in the absence 
of adjacent or opposite States. However, the ‘overlapping’ of maritime entitlements to the 
EEZ or the continental shelf between two or more States is almost inevitable, because the 
majority of States (except for land-locked or isolated island States) have adjacent or opposite 
States in relation to their maritime areas. A State is also highly likely to define and claim its 
maritime zones for the purpose of furthering its interests.
9
 Given the probability of 
overlapping maritime entitlements and the resulting conflicts of interests between States, 
there is a clear need for maritime boundary delimitation determining the oceanic scope of 
each State’s jurisdiction. 
                                            
5
 Nuno Marques Antunes, Towards the Conceptualisation of Maritime Delimitation (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), pp.6-7. 
6
 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation (Portland: Hart 




 The concept of ‘sovereign rights’ is found in Articles 56 and 77 of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Such rights are regarded as ‘sovereign’ in a relevant maritime area 
‘insofar as natural resources, artificial islands and installations, marine scientific research or marine 
environment are concerned’. Therefore, sovereign rights are considered to be inferior to territorial 
sovereignty. See Churchill and Lowe, supra note 4, pp.151-156, 166-169. 
9







In addition, it should be noted that the delimitation of maritime boundaries 
effectively guarantees a State’s sovereignty or sovereign rights within its delimited spaces. 
For example, it may be argued that the issue of maritime delimitation must be settled in order 




2.2. The Characteristics of Maritime Delimitation 
First, ‘delimitation’ refers to the process of establishing a maritime boundary between two or 
more States and results from the overlapping of maritime entitlements between two or more 
States. In the absence of such an overlap, we would only be interested in delineation: the 
establishment of a maritime limit. For this reason, it is said that maritime boundary 
delimitation is ‘international’ in nature.
11
 
Second, the delimitation of maritime boundaries is ‘constitutive’.
12
 The aim of 
international courts and tribunals dealing with maritime delimitation is not to ascertain a sole 
delimitation line, but to arrive at an equitable solution (or equitable result).
13
 This indicates 
that there could be several delimitation lines at sea. Attention should be drawn to the fact that 






3. Attempts to Develop the Rules Governing Maritime Delimitation 
 
3.1. Law-making by Treaties in Relation to the Rules Governing Maritime 
      Delimitation 
The delimitation of maritime boundaries has generally been carried out through ‘bilateral’ 
agreements between the States concerned. There are many bilateral agreements dealing with 
maritime delimitation.
15
 However, comprehensive analysis of these agreements in search of 




 I.C.J. Reports 1982, pp.66-67, para.87; Tanaka, supra note 6, p.8. 
12
 Antunes, supra note 5, p.7; Tanaka, supra note 6, pp.12-14. 
13
 The terms ‘equitable solution’ and ‘equitable result’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
14
 Antunes, supra note 5, p.9. 
15
 Malcolm D. Evans, “Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Where Do We Go from Here?”, in David 
Freestone, Richard Barnes, and David M. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.137; Bilateral agreements regarding maritime delimitation 
are collected in International Maritime Boundaries (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993-







customary international law has proven unfruitful. Firstly, there is no generally accepted rule 
for maritime delimitation between adjacent States.
16
 Secondly, even in the case of 
delimitation between opposite States, it is not easy to identify the existence of opinio juris.
17
 
Lastly, and more importantly, States are reluctant to consider a specific rule to be obligatory; 
they argue instead for the peculiarity of circumstances, including geographical factors, in the 
course of negotiations to reach a delimitation agreement.
18
 
Given the difficulty of determining the rules governing maritime delimitation by 
researching bilateral delimitation agreements, attention should instead be paid to 
‘multilateral’ agreements. States have endeavoured to establish the rules dealing with 
maritime delimitation by means of multilateral treaties, such as the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf or the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(hereafter referred to as “UNCLOS”). The International Court of Justice (hereafter referred 
to as “ICJ”) was reluctant to admit, however, that the rules governing maritime delimitation 
included in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf had become customary 
international law.
19
 Moreover, the 1982 UNCLOS appears only to state that the final goal of 
maritime delimitation regarding the EEZ or the continental shelf is to achieve an ‘equitable 
solution’, despite lengthy discussion at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (hereafter referred to as “Third Conference”). This prompts the question of whether 
multilateral agreements are as unhelpful as bilateral agreements to those seeking to 





3.2. Law-making by International Courts and Tribunals in Relation to the Rules 
      Governing Maritime Delimitation 
For the reasons listed above, it may be argued that the finding or making of the rules with 
regard to maritime delimitation has been performed by international courts and tribunals 
rather than through State practice or treaties.
21
 That the uncertainty of maritime boundaries 
                                            
16
 Tanaka, supra note 6, pp.134-136. 
17
 Antunes, supra note 5, p.412; Tanaka, supra note 6, pp.137-138. 
18
 Prosper Weil, “Geographic Considerations in Maritime Delimitation”, in Jonathan I. Charney and 
Lewis M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993), Volume I, pp.123, 130. 
19
 See I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp.43-46, paras.75-82. 
20
 It will be demonstrated in Chapter II that the phrase ‘to achieve an equitable solution’ functions as 
the rules governing maritime delimitation. 
21







prevents States from pursuing their economic interests is a plausible reason for their 
willingness to refer the task of maritime delimitation to international courts and tribunals, 
even when these States have failed to reach delimitation agreements. In other words, States 
have usually turned to the international dispute-settlement system in order to delimit their 
own maritime boundaries clearly, instead of trying to avoid being engaged in such disputes.
22
 
As a result, many international judgments or arbitral awards have been made since the 1969 




However, the making (beyond finding) of the rules by international courts and 
tribunals may attract considerable criticism, because the role of international courts and 
tribunals is to determine the interpretation and application of law in a specific case.
24
 
Nonetheless, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ seemed to declare the 
rules governing the delimitation of the continental shelf, despite the absence of customary 
international law to govern maritime delimitation. 
An initial task of this thesis is to identify clearly the rules governing maritime 
delimitation, as the thesis intends to show that the current delimitation rule has accelerated 
the marked decline of the ‘equitable principles’ concept, and the rise of ‘relevant 
circumstances’. Whether or not international courts and tribunals make the rules governing 
maritime delimitation will be demonstrated by analysing the decisions of international courts 
and tribunals, and this will be carried out in the second chapter. 
 
3.3. Two Irreconcilable Rules 
As shown above, there have been considerable attempts to establish the rules governing 
maritime delimitation. Regrettably, however, these attempts have led to the formation of two 
rules which do not appear to be reconcilable: the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule
25
 
                                                                                                                           
American Journal of International Law, Volume 88 (1994), p.228. 
22
 Ibid., p.227. 
23
 The Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua/Colombia) case and the Maritime Dispute 
(Peru/Chile) case. The former was submitted to the ICJ on 6
th
 December 2001 and the latter was 
submitted to the ICJ on 16
th
 January 2008. Visit http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1. 
24
 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), pp.266, 272. 
25
 With respect to the configuration of relevant coasts, Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf divided the lines to be drawn by the application of the equidistance method into two 
groups: the equidistance line and the median line. However, this thesis intends to avoid using the 
terms the ‘median line’ and the ‘Median Group’, because it finds no reason to make a distinction 







articulated in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, and the Equitable 
Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule stated by the ICJ in the 1969 North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases.
26
 The conflict between these two rules has interfered with consistent State 
practice, and made it difficult to identify opinio juris. Until recently, international courts or 
tribunals dealing with referred cases have tried to clarify the position of the two rules and 
their relationship to one another in international law. 
Indeed, the making of the clear rules governing maritime delimitation was one of the 
chief objectives of the Third Conference. Ultimately, however, the aim was not met. During 
the Third Conference, one group (known as the ‘Equidistance Group’) fervently supported 
the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule, while another (known as the ‘Equitable 
Principles Group’) strongly upheld the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule.
27
 
Despite lengthy debate, the two groups could not reach a shared conclusion (see Chapter II 
for a further discussion). The tension between the two rules resulted from a disagreement 
over the obligatory construction of a provisional equidistance line. Consequently, the 
President of the Conference had no choice but to propose a new formula which referred to 
neither ‘equidistance’ nor ‘equitable principles’ with regard to the delimitation of the EEZ or 
the continental shelf.
28
 The formula only established the final goal of maritime delimitation, 
which it termed the ‘achievement of an equitable solution’. Therefore, what is now left to us 
is the phrase ‘to achieve an equitable solution’, as articulated in the 1982 UNCLOS. 
Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the achievement of an equitable 
solution currently acts as the one and only delimitation rule. 
 
 
4. The Approach of International Courts and Tribunals to the Conflict 
    between the Two Delimitation Rules 
 
4.1. The Provisional Construction of an Equidistance Line 
The question raised by the disagreement at the Third Conference which resulted in the 
irreconciled conflict between the two rules, was whether or not the ‘equidistance method’
29
 
                                                                                                                           
line. 
26
 Evans, supra note 15, pp.143-147. 
27
 Tanaka, supra note 6, pp.44-46. 
28
 Antunes, supra note 5, p.87. 
29







is obligatory in the process of carrying out maritime boundary delimitation. Whereas the 
Equidistance Group maintained that the equidistance method was compulsory, the Equitable 
Principles Group was opposed to its obligatory use. The position of the Equidistance Group 
led to the widespread misunderstanding that the equidistance method takes priority in 
maritime delimitation. For the purpose of refuting the mandatory use of the equidistance 
method, this thesis seeks to determine both why the current delimitation rule (to achieve an 
equitable solution) should be applied, and how this delimitation rule is applied. When the 
equidistance method is taken to be provisional rather than obligatory, the rules governing 
maritime delimitation become more flexible. For this purpose, it is necessary to show that 
the current delimitation rule does not mandate the compulsory use of the equidistance 
method, and that the ways of applying the present rule are uncertain. 
How have international courts and tribunals dealt with the conflict between the 
Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule and the Equitable Principles-Relevant 
Circumstances rule when seeking to apply the delimitation rule? In the 1993 Greenland/Jan 
Mayen case (in which the applicable law was, in part, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf), the ICJ seemed to acknowledge the special status of the equidistance 
method.
30
 In other words, the Court applied this method ‘provisionally’ to the ‘first’ stage of 
this case, and then took account of special or relevant circumstances in order to adjust the 




In the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case in 
which the 1982 UNCLOS was the applicable law, the ICJ stated that: 
 
 “[T]he equidistance/special circumstances rule, which is applicable in particular to the 
                                                                                                                           
method as the ‘principle’ of equidistance, because it regarded the concept of equidistance as one of the 
elements composing the rules for maritime delimitation. During the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases, however, the ICJ stated that the equidistance method (despite its advantages) had not been 
transformed into the equidistance principle. See I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.23, para.23. This thesis will 
intentionally avoid the expressions, the ‘principle of equidistance’ and the ‘equidistance principle’. 
The reason for this is that this thesis does not accept the obligatory character of the equidistance 
method. 
30
 I.C.J. Reports 1993, pp.58-59, para.46; I.C.J. Reports 1993, pp.62-63, para.56. 
31
 Speech by His Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, 
to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Visit http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pr=81&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1. Judge Guillaume, the President of the ICJ, 
stated that “[a] new stage was then reached with the Judgment delivered on 14 June 1993 in the case 
between Denmark and Norway concerning the maritime delimitation in the area between Greenland 







delimitation of the territorial sea, and the equitable principles/relevant circumstances rule, 
as it has been developed since 1958 in case-law and State practice with regard to the 





Acknowledging this statement, Judge Guillaume, the President of the ICJ, confirmed the 
‘provisional’ use of the equidistance method when he delivered his speech at the Sixth 




 The most 
recent delimitation case, the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar 
in the Bay of Bengal case of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (hereafter 





4.2. The Demise of Equitable Principles and the Importance of Relevant 
      Circumstances to Maritime Delimitation 
Although the provisional employment of the equidistance method is generally accepted and, 
has strengthened predictability in maritime delimitation, several questions must be asked 
concerning the attitude of the ICJ itself and the President of the ICJ to the 2001 Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case. What is the meaning of the 
ICJ’s statement that the two delimitation rules are “closely interrelated”? Where can we find 
out equitable principles? Are relevant circumstances no more than circumstances used to 
adjust a provisional equidistance line, as Judge Guillaume explained during his speech at the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations? This thesis plans to answer 
the above questions. 
The assumption that the two rules are closely interrelated does not necessarily mean 
that the construction of a provisional equidistance line is one application of the concept of 
equitable principles. Thus, we need to clarify the issue of equitable principles and redefine 
the key role of relevant circumstances. The subject of relevant circumstances has received 
thorough examination, particularly by Malcolm D. Evans in the late 1980s. In his valuable 
                                            
32
 I.C.J. Reports 2001, p.111, para.231. 
33
 Speech by His Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, 
to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Visit http://www.icj-
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book, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation, Professor Evans focuses his 
attention on the ‘application’ of equitable principles.
35
 In other words, he states that 
“[a]pplication implies process”.
36
 On the premise that the application of equitable principles 
indicates the delimitation ‘process’ ‘in and through’ relevant circumstances,
37
 Professor 
Evans turns his interest towards relevant circumstances. He argues that equitable principles 
in themselves are ‘applied’ in all the relevant circumstances of a given case, making it 
unnecessary to provide concrete examples of equitable principles. His argument is persuasive 
primarily because he shifts the emphasis in maritime delimitation from equitable principles 
to relevant circumstances. 
However, the issue of equitable principles today is not the same as in the 1980s 
when the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule was in place, because the 
assimilation of the two delimitation rules has since been accomplished. Since the Equitable 
Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule can be assumed no longer to apply, the devaluation 
of equitable principles is an inevitable result. This task will be preceded by defining the 
current delimitation rule, as will be shown in Chapter II. 
Does the term ‘equitable principles’ still have a place in maritime delimitation? 
While Professor Evans recognises the ineffectiveness of this term,
38
 he does not renounce it 
altogether. Instead, he argues that the application of equitable principles indicates the 
application of an equitable process.
39
 However, this thesis does not intend to prove the 
equitability of the delimitation process. In other words, if the rules governing maritime 
delimitation dictate the equitability of the ‘result’ achieved, we can dispose of the term 
‘equitable principles’ altogether. 
After proving that ascertainable equitable principles do not exist in maritime 
delimitation, or else that so-called equitable principles do not play a pivotal role in delimiting 
maritime boundaries, this thesis aims to show that the sole remaining concept of significance 
to the delimitation process is that of ‘relevant circumstances’.
40
 It follows that only the 
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consideration of all relevant circumstances will lead to the achievement of an equitable 
solution. Since the only concept connected with equity is that of an equitable result or 
solution, as will be shown in Chapter III, the appropriate examination of all relevant 
circumstances is only meaningful for the purpose of producing an equitable solution. In 
order to achieve an equitable result, all relevant circumstances must be identified and 
weighed up. In addition, the practical method(s) indicated by these relevant circumstances 
should be applied. Therefore, the argument that relevant circumstances are either used for the 
purpose of shifting a provisional equidistance line, or objects to which equitable principles 
should be applied, is not persuasive. 
One point to note here is that the careful consideration of all relevant circumstances 
will not produce an arbitrary result. In order to secure an equitable solution, international 
courts and tribunals have arrived at three-phase decisions, as will be described in Chapter IV. 
Moreover, it is evident that previous decisions as to the identification and weighing-up of 
relevant circumstances could be helpful guides for international courts and tribunals. 
However, such tools cannot be imperative, because an equitable result can only be achieved 
by taking account of all relevant circumstances reflecting the unique characteristics of each 
delimitation case. Hence, an emphasis on relevant circumstances increases the flexibility of 
application of the rules governing maritime delimitation. 
The increased importance of relevant circumstances to maritime delimitation is 
evident from two practical instances: the establishment of a Single Maritime Boundary 




5. Practical Cases Proving the Importance of Relevant Circumstances 
    to Maritime Delimitation 
 
5.1. Practical Issue (1): The Establishment of a Single Maritime Boundary 
In essence, the EEZ (or the EFZ) and the continental shelf are different from each other.
41
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According to the relevant articles of the 1982 UNCLOS, however, the limits of the EEZ and 
the continental shelf of a State may coincide at a distance of 200NM. While this does not 
mean that the limits of the two maritime areas are necessarily the same,
42
 a State is likely to 
claim a single 200NM limit from its baselines in order to further its own interests.
43
 
In addition, the assumption that maritime boundaries should ideally be singular has 
influenced the forming of maritime boundaries between two or more States. States have 
begun to ask international courts and tribunals to establish SMBs on their behalf, even 
though the maritime boundaries of the EEZ and the continental shelf between the States 
involved could, in theory, be different. 
There are a number of cases establishing an SMB, beginning with the 1984 Gulf of 
Maine case of the Chamber of the ICJ. This new trend in maritime delimitation was not 
anticipated by the UNCLOS. However, it is difficult to imagine that international courts and 
tribunals would fail to establish an SMB even when the States concerned do not request a 
single line,
44
 although the ICJ briefly stated, in the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and 




In the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber of the ICJ had great difficulty in 
finding the legal basis for an SMB, since the concept itself had not previously existed. The 
Chamber was thus unable at this time to identify State practice or multilateral treaties which 
related to the establishment of an SMB. As a consequence, the Chamber sought to clarify the 
‘fundamental norm’ for the purpose of dealing with all future delimitation cases, along with 
‘neutral factors’ commonly relevant to the delimitations of both the EFZ and the continental 
shelf, rather than to look for the legal basis of an SMB. 
The ultimate objective of the fundamental norm is to ensure an equitable result, and 
this applies to all delimitation cases, including those which seek to establish an SMB.
46
 
However, the fundamental norm does not adopt a specific method. Therefore, the issue of 
how relevant circumstances affect the entire process of maritime delimitation is more 
important than the application of a certain method in establishing an SMB. 
Furthermore, international courts and tribunals have tried to take into account factors 
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common to the delimitations of two maritime spaces. These factors are termed ‘neutral 
factors’. The first port of call in discovering neutral factors is the ‘geography’ of the coasts 
concerned, which is the basis of titles to the EEZ (or the EFZ) and the continental shelf. As a 
result, one might argue that relevant circumstances could be confined to geographical factors 
in establishing an SMB. Does this lead to the predictable application of the rules governing 
maritime delimitation? How can non-geographical circumstances be taken into account with 
regard to the establishment of an SMB? This thesis will argue for the flexible consideration 
of the relevant circumstances of each case, despite the preference of taking into account 
neutral circumstances in drawing an SMB. 
In sum, this thesis intends to answer two questions. First, what impact does the 
concept of the fundamental norm have on the significance of relevant circumstances? 
Second, how does the dominant role of relevant circumstances affect the preference of 
neutral circumstances? These questions will be addressed in Chapters II and V. 
 
5.2. Practical Issue (2): The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Beyond 
      200NM 
Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf defined the continental 
shelf according to its ‘exploitability’. The ambiguity of this definition, however, made it an 
inappropriate legal concept.
47
 The subsequent formation of a new definition during the Third 
Conference gave us Article 76 of the 1982 UNCLOS, which provides a clear legal definition 
of the continental shelf.
48
 
According to the dictates of the UNCLOS, a State can lay claim to the continental 
shelf extending up to 200NM from its baselines, unless the issue of delimitation arises.
49
 In 
other words, it can possess the continental shelf up to 200NM regardless of the shape of the 




In addition to the inner continental shelf, a State may obtain the continental shelf 
beyond 200NM from the baselines concerned, subject to conditions set by Article 76 of the 
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 The limits of the outer continental shelf proposed by coastal States can only 
become final and binding on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereafter referred to as “CLCS”).
52
 However, the CLCS will 
not examine a submission if a maritime boundary dispute exists, according to Paragraph 5(a) 
of Annex I of the Rules of Procedure of the CLCS.
53
 As a result, if a dispute arises between 
the States concerned regarding the outer continental shelf, it must be dealt with by an 
international court or tribunal, and not the CLCS. 
The UNCLOS’s providing of a means by which States might acquire the continental 
shelf beyond 200NM potentially leads to claims by the States concerned over the outer 
continental shelf, and/or disputes over this shelf between two or more States. States, such as 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia, have laid claim to the continental shelf 




Which relevant circumstance plays an important role in delimiting the continental 
shelf beyond 200NM? This is the concept of ‘natural prolongation’. The ICJ’s use of this 
concept provides a further issue to consider with regard to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf beyond 200NM. In the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, although the 
criterion of distance had been decisive in confirming the continental shelf for each of the 
States concerned, the Court did not completely renounce the concept of natural 
prolongation.
55
 According to the ICJ’s reasoning, a State can retain its own continental shelf 
up to 200NM without regard to the physical conditions of the continental margin, yet it must 
still manifest natural prolongation in order to claim the continental shelf beyond 200NM.
56
 
The concept of natural prolongation thus enlarges the range of issues which international 
courts and tribunals may wish to consider with regard to maritime delimitation. In turn, this 
may foster a greater flexibility of application of the rules governing the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200NM.
57
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It is not fixed in international law how relevant circumstances in determining the 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200NM are taken into account. Plainly, however, 
an equitable solution must also be ensured in the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 
200NM. This will be dealt with in Chapter VI. 
 
 
6. A Concluding Remark 
 
Following the ruling of the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
(Qatar/Bahrain) case, and the subsequent speech of Judge Guillaume, the President of the 
ICJ, at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2001, it is 
now time to declare the demise of the concept of equitable principles. This concept is not 
relevant to the ultimate goal of maritime delimitation. Equitable principles cannot mark their 
right place in the current delimitation rule itself or the delimitation process. The current 
delimitation rule (which arose from the assimilation of the two delimitation rules) only 
identifies the final aim of maritime delimitation as an equitable solution, which can be 
achieved through the consideration of all relevant circumstances. 
This thesis intends to show that the one and only meaningful concept connected with 
equity in maritime delimitation is the concept of an equitable solution. To this end, it will 
definitively declare the demise of the concept of equitable principles to which the 1945 
Truman Proclamation first referred. For the purpose of reaching an equitable solution, the 
concept of relevant circumstances dominates the whole delimitation process, from the 
drawing of a provisional equidistance line to the achievement of a final solution. 
Although the beginning of the conflict between the two delimitation rules was the 
deadlock between the compulsory use of the equidistance method and, in opposition, the 
application of equitable principles, international courts and tribunals have produced equitable 
outcomes within the analytical framework of taking into account all relevant circumstances. 
As a result, relevant circumstances are not used simply to adjust a provisional equidistance 
line. Rather, they dominate the entire delimitation process. 
The issues of the establishment of an SMB and the delimitation of the continental 
shelf beyond 200NM are by no means hypothetical. The making of an SMB to be made 
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known in international law, starting from the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, has become very 
common in practice. This is proven by the fact that there is no decision of international 
courts and tribunals regarding the delimitation of only one between the EEZ and the 
continental shelf since the 1990s. Likewise, it is obvious that there is a high chance of 
international disputes’ being raised with respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf 
beyond 200NM, because, generally speaking, a State wishes to acquire as much as it can of 
its outer continental shelf. 
Therefore, this thesis intends to research into how relevant circumstances dominate 
the whole delimitation process, bearing in mind that an equitable solution should be reached 
















Did the ICJ make or find out the rules governing maritime boundary delimitation in the 1969 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases? There has been controversy among international law 
scholars regarding the question of whether the Court made or discovered the rules in these 
cases. 
The Court implied, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, that a rule of 
customary international law governing maritime delimitation included the concept of 
‘equitable principles’. This rule, as defined by the ICJ, differed from the delimitation rule 
stipulated in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. Have international 
courts and tribunals chosen and applied one of these two rules? Or have they applied an 
altogether different delimitation rule? 
Of fundamental importance to understanding maritime delimitation is the question of 
which delimitation rule is applied in international courts and tribunals. If we corroborate the 
current delimitation rule in international law, we can easily ascertain why equitable 
principles have fallen in importance and the significance of relevant circumstances has been 
acquired in maritime delimitation. In order to do this, this chapter will show which rule has 
been applied in delimitation cases by international courts and tribunals. 
 
 
2. Two Rules Governing Maritime Delimitation 
 
Continuous discordance of viewpoints in making the clear rules governing maritime 
delimitation resulted in the formulation of the two delimitation rules: the Equidistance-
Special Circumstances rule and the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule.
1
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2.1. The Equidistance-Special Circumstances Rule 
 
2.1.1. Pre-1945: Efforts for the Progressive Codification of the Equidistance 
         Method 
During the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the equidistance method was found in a 
number of treaties and the opinions of some international law scholars.
2
 However, the 
equidistance method was not the only method used in international legal documents during 
this period. Rather, delimitation was carried out using five lines: the equidistance line (or the 
median line), the line perpendicular to the general direction of the coasts concerned, the 
prolongation of the land boundary, the Thalweg, and the common-zone.
3
 Therefore, it is 
noted that the equidistance method has made room for much discussion since an attempt to 
codify international law led by the League of Nations (hereafter referred to as “LN”). 
The LN highly encouraged the ‘progressive codification’ of international law, and 
began by calling for the establishment of the Committee of Experts (for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law) in 1924.
4
 Until 1927, this Committee identified and 
examined subjects ‘sufficiently ripe’ for progressive codification, out of which the League 
Assembly finally selected three subjects: Nationality, Territorial Waters, and Responsibility 
of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners.
5
 
At the moment, the Committee of Experts sought to split the rules of delimitation 
into two categories: the rules governing the delimitation of adjacent States and those 
governing the delimitation of opposite States. In the case of adjacent States, the prolongation 
of the land boundary (or a line drawn perpendicular to the coast from the point at which the 
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frontier between the two States meets that coast) was a preferred method of delimitation.
67
 
By contrast, in the case of opposite States, the equidistance method seemed to be regarded as 
a primary method.
8
 At that time, the delimitation between opposite States was mainly 
discussed in relation to the delimitation of the ‘strait’ because the width of the territorial sea 
was narrower than at present. 
Beginning in 1927, both the Harvard Law School and the Preparatory Committee 
had independently prepared materials concerning the second subject (Territorial Waters) for 
the 1930 Conference for the Codification of International Law at The Hague.
9
 Article 9 of 
the 1929 Draft Convention on Territorial Waters, prepared by the Research in International 
Law of the Harvard Law School, stated that: 
 
“In the absence of special agreement to the contrary, where two or more states border upon 
a strait, the territorial waters of each state extend to the middle of the strait in those parts 




Moreover, Basis of Discussion No.16 on Territorial Waters (drawn up for the Codification 
Conference by the Preparatory Committee) stated that “when two States border on a strait 
which is not wider than twice the breadth of territorial waters, the territorial waters of each 
State extend in principle up to a line running down the centre of the strait” [emphasis 
added].
11
 These preparatory works seemed to envisage the application of the equidistance 
method with respect to the delimitation of the strait. 
However, Annex II of the Report of the Second Committee (Report of the Second 
Sub-Committee) in the Final Act of the 1930 Conference stated that: 
 
“[I]t has been thought better not to draw up any rules regarding the drawing of the line of 
demarcation between the respective territorial seas in straits lying within the territory of 
                                            
6
 League of Nations C.44.M.21.1926.V., Questionnaire No.2 Territorial Waters; reproduced in Shabtai 
Rosenne (ed.), The Progressive Codification of International Law [1925-1928] (New York: Oceana 
Publications, Inc., 1972), Volume II, pp.91, 97. 
7
 However, the rules concerning the delimitation between adjacent States were not dealt with during 
the 1930 Conference for the Codification of International Law at The Hague. 
8
 League of Nations C.44.M.21.1926.V., Questionnaire No.2 Territorial Waters; reproduced in 
Rosenne (ed.), supra note 6, pp.69, 97, 98. 
9
 Dhokalia, supra note 5, pp.68-69, 120-121. 
10
 Article 9 of the 1929 Draft Convention on Territorial Waters; reproduced in The American Journal 
of International Law, Volume 23 Special Supplement (1929), pp.243-244. 
11
 Basis of Discussion No.16 on Territorial Waters by the Preparatory Committee; reproduced in The 







more than one Coastal State and of a width less than the breadth of the two belts of 




The Committee resisted codification, because several States raised some issues concerning 
the application of the equidistance method during the 1930 Conference.
13
 This outcome 
prevents us from clarifying what the view of the traditional international law of the sea was, 
with regard to the delimitation of the strait with a width not exceeding twice that of the 
breadth of the territorial sea. 
 
2.1.2. Post-1945: The Codification of the Equidistance Method 
As soon as the Truman Proclamation was issued in September 1945, States began to strongly 
claim ‘jurisdiction and control’ over the continental shelf extending off their coasts.
14
 With 
specific reference to the delimitation of the continental shelf, this Proclamation expressed 
that “the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in 
accordance with equitable principles”.
15
 With the emergence of the continental shelf in the 
international law of the sea, States had to ascertain what the concept of ‘equitable principles’ 
was in the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
The International Law Commission (hereafter referred to as “ILC”), which has 
played an important role in the codification and progressive development of international 
law, was established by the United Nations in 1947.
16
 In 1949, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, in collaboration with Hersch Lauterpacht, completed the preparatory work 
necessary to help the ILC undertake the difficult task of codifying international law.
17
 This 
preparatory work, which was named Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of 
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Codification of the International Law Commission (hereafter referred to as “Lauterpacht 
Survey”), led the ILC to select fourteen topics for codification.
18
 The Lauterpacht Survey 
drew attention to the proclamations (about the continental shelf) of some States with respect 
to the regime of the high seas.
19
 This prompted the ILC to raise the issue of the continental 





 meeting (on 17
th
 July 1950) of the ILC, it was questioned how the 
continental shelf should be delimited where the shelves – or contiguous zones, as the case 
may be – of the different States overlap.
21
 However, the members of the meeting could not 
arrive at a conclusion because the rules delimiting the continental shelf did not exist at that 
time.
22
 In 1951, the ILC resumed discussions regarding the delimitation of the continental 
shelf. A line perpendicular to the coasts at the point where the frontier between two States 
reached the sea, a line perpendicular to the general coastlines, and a prolongation of the 
boundary line of the territorial sea were presented.
23
 Although the equidistance method was 
advanced by Samuel Whittemore Boggs, in an article published in 1951,
24
 the chairman of 
the 115
th
 meeting (on 2
nd
 July 1951) thought that the delimitation of the continental shelf was 
“a matter of geography rather than of law”.
25
 In fact, the members of the ILC could not find 
out the rules governing the delimitation of continental shelf, because even the legal notion of 
the continental shelf had not clearly been defined at that time. Therefore, they concentrated 
their efforts on discussing the ways of settling disputes, as opposed to forming the rules 
regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf.
26
 
Furthermore, the General Assembly requested the ILC to include the regime of the 
territorial sea in its list of priorities in 1949.
27
 Subsequently, the ILC decided to study the 
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regime of the territorial sea as well.
28
 The ILC also dealt with whether or not the equidistance 
method may be employed to delimit the territorial sea. The members of the 171
st
 meeting (on 
24
th
 July 1952) discussed the application of the equidistance method in the case of the 
delimitation of the territorial sea between adjacent States.
29
 However, they concluded that the 
technical advice of experts was necessary to discuss this issue further,
30
 and hesitated to 
regard maritime delimitation as a matter of establishing ‘legal’ rules. 
In April 1953, Professor François, Special Rapporteur of the ILC, brought together 
five experts (called the Committee of Experts) for the purpose of discussing technical issues 
concerning the regime of the territorial sea.
31
 At the discussion, the Committee of Experts 
concluded that, in relation to the delimitation of the territorial sea, the equidistance method 
should be a general rule, but should take into consideration ‘special’ reasons.
32
 Furthermore, 
the five experts suggested that the equidistance method may also be employed for the 
delimitation of the continental shelf.
33
 Following their advice, the 1953 Report of the ILC (to 
the General Assembly) stated that the equidistance method should be a general rule, qualified 
by special circumstances, in the delimitation of the continental shelf.
34
 At this point, it must 
be noted that, with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf, there were some 
disagreements during the meeting of the ILC with respect to defining what should be 
regarded as special circumstances.
35
 In other words, even in the period of its emergence, the 
equidistance method was closely connected with the existence of special circumstances. 
By 1953, whereas the rules governing the delimitation of the continental shelf were 
clarified to some extent, the rules in relation to that of the territorial sea were not established 





 July 1954), the ILC decided that the equidistance method should be applied in the 
delimitation of the territorial sea, but its ‘hesitation’ was shown by the fact that, with regard 
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to the delimitation of the territorial sea between adjacent States, the equidistance method was 
adopted by 4 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions.
36
 
Until 1955, the ILC had taken the view that the equidistance method should be the 
rules governing the delimitations of the territorial sea and the continental shelf. Here, some 
critical points can be summarised. Firstly, it was a very difficult task to discover or make the 
rules governing the delimitations of the territorial sea and the continental shelf, because the 
breadth of the territorial sea was not fixed, and the legal concept of the continental shelf was 
indeterminate. Secondly, many members of the ILC sought to acquire the technical advice of 
experts rather than to express their own opinions, because they considered technical issues to 
be fundamental to developing the law of maritime delimitation. Lastly, and more 
importantly, it must be noted that the concept of flexibility emerged. For instance, the 
chairman of the 205
th
 meeting (on 30
th
 June 1953) of the ILC noted that: 
 
“Mr. Lauterpacht considered that the words “as a rule” deprived the text of its juridical 
significance, whereas Mr. François considered that they were necessary in order to ensure 




Closing this debate, the ILC chose the phrase ‘except where special circumstances call for 
some other solution’, instead of ‘as a rule’ as of 1953.
38
 In other words, special 
circumstances were regarded as partially constituting the rules, not as exceptions to the 
rules.
39
 It follows that the rules governing maritime delimitation were intended to flexibly be 
applied whilst predictability (that was reflected in the equidistance method) marked its own 
place in the application of the rules in maritime delimitation. In spite of the foregoing issues 
or problems in the legal context, the rules governing maritime delimitation were entering a 
stage of substantial formulation. 
 
2.1.3. The Formulation of the Equidistance Method 
In 1956, the ILC adopted the Draft Articles regarding the law of the sea.
40
 These Draft 
Articles were under review at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
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held in Geneva from 24
th
 February 1958 to 27
th
 April 1958. Articles 12 and 14 of the 1956 
Draft Articles dealing with the delimitation of the territorial sea were debated at the First 
Committee of the Conference, and Article 72 of the 1956 Draft Articles governing that of the 
continental shelf was discussed at the Fourth Committee. 
The First Committee did not cast doubts on the application of the equidistance 
method with respect to the delimitation of the territorial sea. To allow flexibility to some 
extent, a great deal of discussion was devoted to the issue of whether or not the reference to 
‘special circumstances’ was needed within the articles which referred specifically to the 
delimitation of the territorial sea. Representatives of Yugoslavia and Norway argued that the 
reference to special circumstances should be deleted,
41
 while Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice of the 
United Kingdom stated that “special circumstances did exist which, for reasons of equity or 
because of the configuration of a particular coast, might make it difficult to accept the true 
median line as the actual line of delimitation between two territorial seas”.
42
 
In this context, it must be noted that Yugoslavia’s and Norway’s reasons for 
objecting to the inclusion of the reference to special circumstances were different from each 
other. Yugoslavia, on the one hand, was deeply afraid that States would claim special 
circumstances for reasons of self-interest.
43
 Norway, on the other hand, argued that several 
circumstances could affect the delimitation of the territorial sea.
44
 What Norway was, in fact, 
apprehensive of was that a State could have an ‘extra’ territorial sea through the strict 
application of the equidistance method, because the breadths of the territorial sea of States 
were not identical.
45
 Norway would not have brought forward its proposal if the breadth of 
the territorial sea had been concluded at the Conference. This meant that even Norway did 
not oppose the adoption of the equidistance method and the existence of special 
circumstances. Therefore, at the 61
st
 meeting of the First Committee, Norway made room for 
special circumstances although it objected to the reference to these circumstances.
46
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After all, during the meetings of the Conference, the equidistance method was 
introduced without explicit criticisms, in the case of the delimitation of the territorial sea. 
Rather, States were, in actuality, concerned about exceptions to the application of the 
equidistance method. 
In addition, the Fourth Committee, which dealt with the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, also accepted the equidistance method without serious disputes. However, 
there was heated discussion about whether or not the strict application of the equidistance 
method would be excluded if special circumstances existed.
47
 From this, it should be noted 
that the most important task of the meetings (of the Fourth Committee) was to pursue 
flexibility in the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
In spite of no difficulty during the meetings of the Fourth Committee, two facts 
should be observed. Firstly, around one-third of States chose abstentions at the adoption of 
the text. Secondly, the German Representative stated that “his delegation would have 
preferred the adoption of the Venezuelan amendment”.
48
 The Venezuelan amendment 
suggested that “the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be 
determined by agreement between them or by other means recognized in international 
law”.
49
 These two points suggest a certain opposition to the equidistance method since the 
1960s, including the German contentions of the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 
After all, originally a mathematical or geometrical concept, the equidistance method 
was first stipulated in the field of maritime delimitation in the 1958 Geneva Conventions.
50
 
For instance, Article 6(2) of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf declared that: 
 
“Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the 
boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the 
absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of 
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each State is measured” [emphases added]. 
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The equidistance method was destined to be connected with the consideration of ‘special 
circumstances’ in the absence of agreement between the States concerned. In other words, 
this method cannot be employed without taking into account special circumstances. This is 
the reason why the rule which employs the equidistance method has been called the 
Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule.
51
 However, it is, regrettably, true that the ICJ 
focused on the advantages and disadvantages of only the equidistance method in the 1969 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, although the ILC had kept in mind the combination of the 
equidistance method and special circumstances, as stated above. Ultimately, in the 1977 
Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, the Arbitral Tribunal confirmed that the two elements 
(the equidistance method and special circumstances) were combined.
52
 In other words, it was 
concluded that the two elements of this rule were inseparable through the reasoning of the 
1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case. 
 
2.2. The Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances Rule 
 
2.2.1. The 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
The term ‘equitable principles’ first appeared in the 1945 Truman Proclamation. The 
Proclamation stated that: 
 
“In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared 
with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State 




However, it should not be overlooked that the meaning of the term ‘equitable principles’ was 
equivocal at that time. 
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf came into force on 10
th
 June 
1964. In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the legal character of the equidistance 
method was an important issue because Germany was not a Party to this Convention at the 
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time. The ICJ concluded that the application of the equidistance method was not obligatory 
in all given cases, pointing out, as part of its main reasoning, that such a method could 
produce an inequitable result.
54
 Instead, the Court willingly accepted the concept of equitable 
principles as part of customary international law.
55
 According to the reasoning of the Court, 
the concept of equitable principles is one element included ‘within’ a rule of customary 
international law governing the delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent 
States.
56
 Nevertheless, it is noted that the concept of equitable principles did not have any 
content at that time. 
The ICJ went on to state that: 
 
“[I]n short, it is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but 
of applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles, […] , 





The Court implied that the ‘application’ of equitable principles should be carried out by 
‘taking all the circumstances into account’.
58
 
In addition, the ICJ distinguished equitable principles from equity, referring to 
“giving some degree of indication as to the possible ways in which it [equity] might be 
applied in the present case” [emphasis added].
59
 The Court expressed ‘some degree of 
indication’, such as concrete factors to be taken into account with regard to the application of 
equity, and then suggested three factors to be taken into consideration for the purpose of 
arriving at an equitable result. These were: (a) the general configuration of the coasts, as well 
as the presence of any special or unusual features; (b) the physical and geological structure, 
as well as the natural resources, of the continental shelf concerned; and (c) proportionality.
60
 
In sum, the ICJ, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, concluded that 
maritime delimitation can be performed by the application of the Equitable Principles-
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2.2.2. The Influence of the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances Rule 
Following the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, there were a number of opinions 
contesting, and attempts to oppose, the mandatory application of the equidistance method in 
maritime delimitation, particularly with regard to the delimitation of the EEZ or the 
continental shelf. This was clearly shown by the deadlock between the ‘Equidistance 
Group’
62
 and the ‘Equitable Principles Group’
63
 during the Third Conference.
64
 Furthermore, 
for the same period, there was one important case dealing with the delimitation of the 
continental shelf: the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case of the Arbitral Tribunal. 
From the beginning of the Third Conference, there had existed some attempts to 
reconcile the equidistance method with the concept of equitable principles. In 1974, 
Provisions 82 and 116 of the Main Trends, which was made by the chairman of the Second 
Committee (of the Third Conference), showed the four formulations concerning the 
delimitations of the continental shelf and the EEZ.
65
 These formulations evidence the tension 
between the equidistance method and the concept of equitable principles. Hence, Articles 
61(1) and 70(1) of the 1975 Informal Single Negotiating Text,
66
 Articles 62(1) and 71(1) the 
1976 Revised Single Negotiating Text,
67
 and Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the 1977 Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text (hereafter referred to “ICNT”) all sought to assimilate the 
equidistance method and the concept of equitable principles. For example, Paragraph 1 of 
Articles 74 (Delimitation of the EEZ) and 83 (Delimitation of the Continental Shelf) of the 
1977 ICNT on delimitation stated that: 
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“The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [the continental shelf] between adjacent 
or opposite States shall be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, 
employing, where appropriate, the median or equidistance line, and taking account of all 




However, both the Equidistance Group and the Equitable Principles Group did not accept all 
of the texts with respect to the delimitation of the EEZ or the continental shelf from 1975 to 
1977. At the Seventh Session of the Third Conference, maritime boundary delimitation was 
recognised as one of the core issues receiving priority over other issues.
69
 In order to deal 
with articles regarding maritime delimitation, the Third Conference established Negotiating 
Group No.7 (hereafter referred to as “NG7”).
70
 Subsequently, since 1978, NG7 had assumed 
the role of formulating the texts regarding the delimitations of the EEZ and the continental 
shelf. Starting with the review of the 1977 ICNT, NG7 examined a number of suggestions.
71
 
However, it shifted to formulating ‘neutral’ texts because all of the suggestions were rejected 
by either or both of the two Groups.
72
 At this point, it should be noted that the process of 
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In spite of the considerable efforts of NG7, even the 1980 suggestion of the 
chairman of NG7 was rejected by the Equitable Principles Group, while it was accepted by 
the Equidistance Group.
74
 However, the suggestion was included in the second revision of 
the ICNT in 1980.
75
 The Equitable Principles Group then sent the President (of the Third 
Conference) a letter rejecting the suggestion.
76
 In the end, the President had no choice but to 
present a new formula, which dispensed with both the terms ‘equidistance method’ and 
‘equitable principles’, and stressed the phrase ‘to achieve an equitable solution’, in 1981.
77
 In 
other words, it can be said that the Equitable Principles Group, which had given emphasis to 
achieving an equitable solution, succeeded in deleting the term ‘equidistance’, in Articles 
74(1) and 83(1) of the 1982 UNCLOS.
78
 
Throughout the drafting history of relevant articles of the UNCLOS, it is clear that 
States had continuously raised objections to the equidistance method. The first reason for the 
objections was that the equidistance method was not regarded as customary international law 
in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
79
 The second was that States, which wanted to 
maximise their interests, tried to avoid an inequitable result arising out of the strict 
application of the equidistance method.
80
 For these reasons, a number of States were likely to 
rely on the concept of equitable principles which seemed to pursue flexibility. 
In this context, it should be noted that the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, 
which was given during the Third Conference, sought to assimilate the combined 
Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule and a rule of customary international law.
81
 This 
case emphasised that the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule and a rule of customary 
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law have the same objective, which is to achieve an equitable delimitation.
82
 In other words, 
the employment of the equidistance method qualified by special circumstances implied that 
an equitable result is much more important than the mandatory enforcement of a specific 
method in a particular case. The sharp tension between the two Groups thus focuses our 
attention on the importance of an equitable solution. 
 
 
3. The Assimilation of the Two Rules 
 
Since the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, the ICJ has stopped attempting to ascertain the 
meaning of equitable principles. The reason for this is that the Court concluded that, with 
regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf between opposite States, the Equidistance-
Special Circumstances rule formulated in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf is not different from the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule 
which existed in customary international law.
83
 Furthermore, the ICJ assimilated the two 
rules regarding the delimitation of the EEZ, stating that “[t]hat statement of an ‘equitable 
solution’ as the aim of any delimitation process reflects the requirements of customary law as 
regards the delimitation both of continental shelf and of exclusive economic zones”.
84
 Thus, 
whereas earlier case-law had rejected the notion that use of the equidistance method was 
obligatory, and sought to clarify the meaning of equitable principles, the 1993 Greenland/Jan 
Mayen case denied the substantial difference between the two rules, and justified the 
‘provisional’ use of the equidistance method.
85
 
Following the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, both the 2001 Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case and the 2002 Land and 
Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case crystallised the logic of this assimilation. For 
instance, in the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case, 
the ICJ stated that: 
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“[T]he equidistance/special circumstances rule, which is applicable in particular to the 
delimitation of the territorial sea, and the equitable principles/relevant circumstances rule, 
as it has been developed since 1958 in case-law and State practice with regard to the 





Likewise, the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case of the Court 
mentioned that: 
 
“They [The applicable criteria, principles and rules of delimitation] are expressed in the so-
called equitable principles/relevant circumstances method. This method, which is very 
similar to the equidistance/special circumstances method applicable in delimitation of the 
territorial sea, involves first drawing an equidistance line, then considering whether there 
are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of that line in order to achieve an 




Attempts to understand the meaning of equitable principles have declined since the 
1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case because the difference between the two rules is not 
remarkable. However, it should not be overlooked that international delimitation cases since 
1993 have also produced an equitable result by ‘taking into account all relevant 
circumstances’ despite the fact that the research into the meaning of equitable principles 
seems to have quickly diminished. In addition, it is noteworthy that the longstanding term 
‘Equidistance-Special Circumstances’ has been replaced with ‘Equidistance–Relevant 
Circumstances’, with reference to the rules which these phrases denote, since the 2002 Land 
and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case. 
The legal reasoning of the ICJ suggests that the construction of an equidistance line 
is no more than a first step in the delimitation process, rather than the mandatory method for 
delimitation. In fact, the equidistance method is one of the methods which can be employed 
in the process of taking into account relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation. 
Therefore, the emphasis on the application of equity or equitable principles has also moved 
towards taking account of all relevant circumstances since the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen 
case, irrespective of the provisional employment of the equidistance method. In Chapter IV, 
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the process of considering these relevant circumstances will be dealt with. 
What is the delimitation rule left to us throughout the assimilation of the two 
delimitation rules? This chapter aims to summarise and clarify the rules governing maritime 
delimitation currently applied in international courts and tribunals before this thesis shows 




4. What is the Delimitation Rule Applied in International Courts and 
    Tribunals? 
 
4.1. The Achievement of an Equitable Solution (or an Equitable Result) 
It may be observed that a teleological delimitation rule has been applied in maritime 
delimitation since the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case. For example, in this case, 
the Court of Arbitration stated that: 
 
“[T]he combined character of the equidistance-special circumstances rule means that the 
obligation to apply the equidistance principle is always one qualified by the condition 
“unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances” […] the role of the 





In other words, it clarified what the aim (‘to ensure an equitable delimitation’) of the rules 
governing maritime delimitation was, while the ICJ ‘indirectly’ expressed the aim in the 
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
89
 Following these cases, the ICJ (or its Chamber) 
clearly showed the ultimate aim of the rules governing maritime delimitation in the 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case and the 1984 Gulf of Maine case. For example, the 
ICJ stated, in the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, that “[t]he result of the 
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application of equitable principles must be equitable” [emphasis added],
90
 and its Chamber 
presented the fundamental norm of aiming at ensuring an equitable result.
91
 Consequently, as 
the 1982 UNCLOS points out, what is left is ‘to achieve an equitable solution’. 
Is the phrase (‘to achieve an equitable solution’) the ultimate objective of maritime 
delimitation or the delimitation rule in itself? Three opinions regarding this phrase can be 
presented. The first view contends that the achievement of an equitable result should be no 
more than the ‘aim’ or ‘goal’ of maritime delimitation.
92
 Thus, the view focuses on the 
clarification of another phrase (‘on the basis of international law’) referred to in Articles 
74(1) and 83(1) of the UNCLOS, instead of the achievement of an equitable solution.
93
 
However, this opinion would reignite the conflict between the two Groups during the Third 
Conference. 
The second view assumes that the achievement of an equitable solution opens the 
door to the use of equity in maritime boundary delimitation.
94
 According to this argument, 
the term ‘equitable solution’ is the only substantial concept that can be found in Articles 
74(1) and 83(1) of the UNCLOS. Subsequently, the term justifies the employment of equity 
in maritime delimitation. Philip Allott argues that the concept of equity employed by the 
term ‘equitable solution’ would evolve ‘equitable principles’ on a case-by-case basis.
95
 
The third submits that an equitable solution needs another standard, such as 
proportionality, to confirm the equitability of the result produced.
96
 In other words, the result 
then reached needs the check of its equitability. 
However, this thesis assumes that the phrase ‘to achieve an equitable solution’ in 
itself has functioned as the rules governing maritime delimitation. As discussed above, since 
the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, international courts and tribunals have always 
sought to reach an equitable result in maritime delimitation. The reason for this is that 
international courts and tribunals are under an ‘obligation’ to ensure an equitable 
delimitation. It is this obligation which guides the process of maritime delimitation. In 
addition, the concept of an equitable solution is the sole ‘constraint’ preventing international 
courts and tribunals from exercising unfettered discretion. 
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Furthermore, because the Chamber of the ICJ explained, in the 1984 Gulf of Maine 
case, that the achievement of an equitable result is one element of the ‘fundamental norm’, 
the concept of an equitable result has been regarded as the rules governing maritime 
delimitation. In other words, the achievement of an equitable result is the sole standard 
settling several issues, including the establishment of an SMB which the UNCLOS does not 
deal with. 
It is submitted that the assimilation of the two rules (the Equidistance-Special 
Circumstances rule and the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule) leads to the 
chief aim of reaching an equitable solution. When international courts and tribunals deal with 
a delimitation case, they have no choice but to extensively consider how the ultimate aim 
would be achieved. As will be shown, the rules governing maritime delimitation binding 
international courts and tribunals look like ‘rules’ of law, in their outward appearance, but act 
as ‘principles’ of law. 
 
4.2. The Structural Characteristics and Open Texture of Rules 
 
4.2.1. The Structural Analysis of the Rules Governing Maritime Delimitation 
Being ‘rules’ in a legal system, the rules governing maritime delimitation should generally 
ensure the predictability of application.
97
 With regard to this important characteristic of rules, 
Ronald M. Dworkin notes that “[i]f the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is 
valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it 
contributes nothing to the decision”.
98
 
However, it is not guaranteed that the rules applied in maritime delimitation will 
generate predictability, in terms of how these rules will be applied, because the ‘achievement 
of an equitable solution’ requires the consideration of all relevant circumstances, which are 
variable in each case. Professor Dworkin also states that “[e]ven those [principles] which 
look most like rules do not set out legal consequences that follow automatically when the 
conditions provided are met”.
99
 The rules governing maritime delimitation, like the operation 
of principles, follow a path of flexibility in arriving at an equitable result. 
Why do the rules in maritime delimitation function in the same way that principles 
                                            
97
 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.261, 
263. 
98










operate in a legal system? The answers can be found in Dworkin’s reasoning. Firstly, 
Professor Dworkin states that “[p]rinciples have a dimension that rules do not – the 
dimension of weight or importance”.
100
 Likewise, each relevant circumstance in a certain 
delimitation case is judged by its weight or importance, as principles compete with each 
other according to their respective weight or importance. Secondly, he describes a principle 
as a “standard that is to be observed […] because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or 
some other dimension of morality”.
101
 The achievement of an equitable solution, which is the 
result of application of the rules governing maritime delimitation, functions as a sort of 
desirable standard to be observed in the area of maritime delimitation. The reason for this is 
that justice or fairness in this area cannot be achieved unless an equitable solution is 
produced. 
Professor Dworkin accepts that law may logically function as rules and substantially 
operate like principles.
102
 A good example of this is the rules governing maritime boundary 
delimitation. The reason for this is that the application of the rules leading to the 
achievement of an equitable solution operates like the weighing-up of principles. Indeed, 
even when we take another delimitation rule, the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule 
codified in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, the two 
elements (the equidistance method and the concept of special circumstances) can be regarded 
as two principles within that rule. As a result, the equidistance method does not necessarily 
have priority over special circumstances. In a certain case, one principle (special 
circumstances) can overcome the other principle (the equidistance method). 
Furthermore, Professor Dworkin implies that words like ‘reasonable’ or ‘unjust’ can 
make a rule function in the same way that a principle operates.
103
 Likewise, the term 
‘equitable’ can also cause a rule to function substantially as the weighing-up of principles. 
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the rules in maritime delimitation do not 
evolve into genuine principles.
104
 The reason for this is that the term ‘equitable’ can compel 
only ‘relevant’ circumstances to be taken into account, as one way of application of the rules. 
In other words, the term ‘equitable’ expresses the ‘kind’ of circumstances that the rules 
depend on, excluding ‘irrelevant’ circumstances. It follows that the term ‘equitable’ is a 
‘constraint’ which requires an international court or tribunal to take account of relevant 
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circumstances. International courts and tribunals apply the ‘rules’ governing maritime 
delimitation, not the principles of law. 
Although Professor Dworkin clarifies the difference between rules and principles, it 
is clear that there are rules (like the rules governing maritime boundary delimitation) that 
function in the same way that principles do. Whilst the rules aim to reach an equitable result, 
the application of these rules is not predictable. It follows that the application of such rules 
leads to the flexibility of their application. 
 
4.2.2. The Open Texture of the Rules Governing Maritime Delimitation 
According to H. L. A. Hart, we have two handicaps: our relative ignorance of fact and our 
relative indeterminacy of aim.
105
 Such human handicaps result in the ‘open texture’ of law.
106
 
Although rules should clearly be formulated for their application, how they are applied may 
prove to be indeterminate in a concrete case. The rules governing maritime delimitation 
possess open texture for two reasons. Firstly, all special or relevant circumstances cannot be 
enumerated when the rules with regard to maritime delimitation are formulated. Secondly, an 
equitable result, which is the final aim of the rules in maritime delimitation, remains 
indeterminate because it varies from case to case. 
With regard to the open texture of law, the late Professor Hart stated that: 
 
“[T]here are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be left to be developed by courts 
or officials striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, between competing interests 




Likewise, the rules possessing open texture in maritime delimitation have been developed 
through the decisions of international courts and tribunals since being formulated. 
International courts and tribunals have made both facts (relevant circumstances) and aim (an 
equitable result) determinate in concrete cases. 
What is the relationship between the concept of flexibility and the open texture of 
the rules governing maritime delimitation? As will be described in Chapter IV, international 
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courts and tribunals have expanded the list of relevant circumstances and have developed the 
weighing-up process of relevant circumstances. This approach of international courts and 
tribunals with respect to relevant circumstances refrains from predictably applying the rules 
in maritime delimitation. Consequently, it is said that international courts and tribunals 
applying the rules governing maritime delimitation (which possess the characteristic of open 
texture) to a concrete case have pursued the flexibility of application of the rules. 
 
 
5. The Current Place of the Equidistance Method in the Delimitation 
    Process 
 
5.1. The Argument for the Preferential Use of the Equidistance Method 
After the two delimitation rules were assimilated, the use of the equidistance method has 
been proven provisional. Moreover, even the provisional employment of the equidistance 
method is not obligatory because the current delimitation rule is to achieve an equitable 
solution. The adoption of the equidistance method is not the application of a legal principle 
or rule. However, since this issue of using the equidistance method was the outset of the 
conflict between the two delimitation rules, it requires commentary. 
Despite the codification of the equidistance method, the ICJ refused to count this 
method as a rule of customary international law in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases, touching on this method for the first time.
108
 Since these cases, the equidistance 
method has failed to acquire a more substantial status in the context of international law. 
There was a lot of opposition to the notion that the application of this method in maritime 
delimitation was obligatory, particularly relating to the delimitation of the EEZ or the 
continental shelf. Disagreements during the Third Conference with regard to this issue 
clearly demonstrate this objection.
109
 As a consequence, the 1982 UNCLOS did not articulate 
the equidistance method in relation to the delimitation of the EEZ or the continental shelf 
except for that of the territorial sea. In this respect, Jonathan I. Charney describes the rules of 
the UNCLOS dealing with maritime delimitation as ‘indeterminate’.
110
 
Some States did not accept the equidistance method because of its potential for 
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producing an inequitable result in a specific case. The opposition to the equidistance method 
is the reason why we should carefully consider the meaning and import of the phrase ‘to 
achieve an equitable solution’. By contrast, other States argued that the concept and content 
of equitable principles were equivocal, and that so-called equitable principles cannot 
guarantee predictability concerning maritime delimitation, as will be proven in the next 
chapter of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, some international law scholars and literatures acknowledge the 
‘preferential’ use of the equidistance method for supporting the notion of predictability in the 
law of maritime boundary delimitation.
111
 In fact, law must have the certainty or 
predictability of application. Therefore, it may be argued that the law of maritime 
delimitation should obtain the predictability of application. 
In addition, Professor Evans indicates that States, which desire to avoid the 
preferential application of the equidistance method, would need ‘forum shopping’ because of 
the ICJ’s reliance on the equidistance method.
112
 In this respect, in 2001, Judge Guillaume, 
the President of the ICJ, predicted that the equidistance method for predictability can be 
applied in the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case which was pending at that 
time.
113
 However, his expectation proved to be wrong, and a scholar in favour of the 
preference of the equidistance method has no choice but to express that the 2007 Caribbean 
Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case of the ICJ was ‘unconvincing’.
114
 
At this point, we must ask whether or not the preferential employment of the 
equidistance method has been accepted for guaranteeing the predictability of law. This issue 
will be examined with respect to two points: the provisional use of the equidistance method 
and the possibility of discovering an alternative method. 
 
5.2. The Provisional Employment of the Equidistance Method 
It is axiomatic that the rules of the 1982 UNCLOS do not indicate a specific method to be 
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applied in maritime delimitation except for the delimitation of the territorial sea. In light of 
this fact, State practice regarding maritime delimitation holds relevance, at least in theory, 
because it can encourage customary international law to be formed.
115
 However, it is clear 
that practices vary between adjacent States, and, furthermore, that it is difficult to identify 
opinio juris even between opposite States. In light of this, of importance are the decisions of 
international courts and tribunals, as well as the opinions of international law scholars 
regarding the rules governing maritime delimitation.
116
 
It may be assumed that, in order to produce an appropriate outcome, the rules 
governing maritime delimitation should be detailed. This is not the case: the rules of the 
UNCLOS are not specific in the case of the delimitation of the EEZ or the continental shelf. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that international courts and tribunals are at liberty to tailor 
individual cases as they see fit even though each delimitation case has its own peculiarities. 
Thus, Professor Charney stresses that international courts and tribunals should seek to 
‘refine’ the (unclear) rules governing the delimitation of maritime boundaries.
117
  
In dealing with cases submitted following the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, the 
ICJ wanted to establish more structural procedures for applying the rules governing maritime 
delimitation as in the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case.
118
 Even in earlier 
cases, however, the Court had sought to develop how the rules governing the location of 
maritime boundaries should be applied. Nevertheless, the central assumption of Court until 
the 1980s was that an ‘equitable’ maritime delimitation must be reached through the 
application of ‘equitable’ principles.
119
 At that time, the approach of the Court seemed to 
reiterate the adjective ‘equitable’.
120
 
In the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case (in which the applicable law was, in part, the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf), the ICJ seemed to appreciate the special 
status of the equidistance method.
121
 It may be argued that the provisional construction of an 
equidistance line in the first stage of delimitation led to the way to predictability in maritime 
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 Furthermore, the ICJ accepted the primary use of the equidistance method in 
the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case in which the 
UNCLOS was the applicable law.
123
 Likewise, international courts and tribunals seemed to 
support this primacy in the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case and 
the 2006 Maritime Delimitation (Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago) case.
124
 
It might be plausible that the preferential use of the equidistance method was 
supported out of a perceived need for objectivity in the application of the rules governing 
maritime delimitation. Judge Guillaume, the President of the ICJ, also expressed this point 
when he delivered his speech at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 31
st
 October 2001, stating that “the Court proceeded to develop its case law in the 
direction of greater certainty”.
125
 This thesis argues, however, that such certainty indicates 
the ‘provisional’ use of the equidistance method at the utmost, not the preferential 
employment of the equidistance method. 
At this moment, it should be noticed that the equidistance method seems to be 
connected with the term ‘special’ circumstances rather than relevant circumstances.
126
 Some 
international law scholars supporting the preference of the equidistance method prefer the 
term special circumstances. According to their view, the equidistance method serves as a 
general rule, while special circumstances are exceptions to the general rule.
127
 They further 
note that the list of special circumstances used to mitigate the strict application of the 
equidistance method seems to be confined to ‘geographical’ factors.
128
 In other words, in 
order to argue that the law of maritime boundary delimitation has been objective, and that the 
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role of equity in the course of maritime delimitation has been reduced,
129
 they adhere to the 
term special circumstances. However, since this thesis does not support the preferential use 
of the equidistance method in maritime delimitation, it prefers the term ‘relevant’ 
circumstances. 
Analysis of the decisions of international courts and tribunals, as will be shown in 
Chapter IV, arouses the doubt that the provisional use of the equidistance method takes the 
shape of the preferential employment of the method or the predictability of law according to 
some publicists. In fact, it is somewhat incautious to regard the use of the equidistance 
method as preferential, because the adoption of the equidistance method is no more than a 
first step in the process of delimitation. In this respect, Professor Evans also admits that there 
exist great possibilities to adjust a provisional equidistance line although this equidistance 
line may be a starting point.
130
 Moreover, an equidistance line might not be a starting line in 
one certain case as in the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case. 
Even if the equidistance method is obligatory in the first stage of the delimitation 
process, an equidistance line is no more than a ‘provisional’ line. The reason for this is that 
the final objective of maritime delimitation is not to guarantee predictability by adhering to 
the strict application of the equidistance method, but to arrive at an equitable solution 
through the consideration of all relevant circumstances. 
 
5.3. The Possibility of Discovering an Alternative Method 
Malcolm D. Evans argues that recent judgments of the ICJ have shown the victory of the 
equidistance method over equitable principles.
131
 In other words, he believes that the Court 
may declare, in its next judgement, that the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule is an 
imperative rule in maritime delimitation.
132
 This thesis does not share his opinion. 
Above all, it should be observed that the achievement of an equitable solution (or 
equitable result) is more important than the compulsory, provisional employment of the 
equidistance method. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the ICJ adopted the bisector 
method as an alternative to the equidistance method in the 2007 Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua/Honduras) case, although it nevertheless expressed that equidistance remains the 
general rule. The Court stated that “the equidistance method does not automatically have 
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priority over other methods of delimitation”.
133
 In carefully considering this case, the Court 
had no option but to adopt a bisector line through a ‘clear’ interpretation of Article 15 of the 
1982 UNCLOS. It meant that the existence of special circumstances may prevent the 
equidistance method from being automatically applied.
134
 It should strongly be stressed that 
the ICJ did not use the equidistance method even in the delimitation of the ‘territorial sea’. 
The Court reached an ‘equitable solution’ articulated in Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS, 
even in the process of delimiting the territorial sea. 
The approach of the ICJ in this case emphasised that special circumstances under 
Article 15 of the UNCLOS mean ‘exceptional’ conditions to refrain from drawing an 
equidistance line.
135
 In other words, the ICJ weakened the predictability of Article 15 of the 
UNCLOS in the case of the delimitation of the territorial sea, because an equidistance line is 
not the one and only provisional one in the delimitation of the territorial sea. At this point, it 
should be expounded that the reference (“equidistance remains the general rule”) of the 
Court can be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation is that equidistance is the 
general rule ‘only’ in relation to the delimitation of the territorial sea.
136
 This implies that the 
equidistance method is not the general rule with regard to the delimitation of the EEZ or the 
continental shelf. The second interpretation is that equidistance is the general rule in all the 
areas of maritime delimitation.
137138
 Insofar as this is the case, the Court put forward the 
inconsistent proposition that a bisector line other than an equidistance line can also lead to 
reaching an equitable result. Even if this decision is interpreted in either way, it may be 
argued that the use of the equidistance method is not the general rule in the law of maritime 
delimitation, because the ultimate goal of maritime delimitation, including the delimitation 
of the territorial sea, is to arrive at an equitable solution. 
Although it is supported by many scholars, the use of the equidistance method in 
maritime delimitation, does not guarantee an equitable solution for all the issues relating to 
maritime delimitation. In fact, the equidistance method is only found in Article 15 among all 
of the articles of the UNCLOS. Keeping the achievement of an equitable solution in mind, 
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we may thus discover alternative methods to the equidistance method with regard to 
maritime delimitation. In sum, although the equidistance method has frequently been 
employed in comparison with other methods in the delimitation process, it is only one of the 
methods to be employed in order to reach an equitable result in a given case. 
An efficacious way of showing how an ‘alternative’ method is discovered, is to 
examine relevant circumstances found in emerging or controversial issues which cannot be 
solved only by reference to the preferential employment of the equidistance method, and this 
thesis will look at some of these in due course. 
 
 
6. Why Is the Flexibility of Application of the Rules Governing Maritime 
    Delimitation Necessary? 
 
6.1. Applying the Rules Governing Maritime Delimitation: 
      Predictability versus Flexibility 
As noted above, some scholars vigorously uphold the obligatory application of the 
equidistance method, because they regard it as an effective way of guaranteeing 
‘predictability’ in the delimitation of maritime boundaries.
139
 For instance, Professor Evans 
states that the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule has become ‘imperative’ since the 
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
140
 According to the supporters of Evans’s argument, 
although an equidistance line may be shifted where there are relevant circumstances, such an 
adjustment is preceded by the application of the equidistance method.
141
 
The position and argument of advocates of the equidistance method raise several 
questions: which is a more desirable ideal in maritime delimitation, predictability or 
flexibility? What relationship does predictability or flexibility have with achieving of an 
equitable result? In other words, does an equitable result ensue from the predictability of the 
delimitation process or the flexibility of application of the rules governing maritime 
delimitation? 
In fact, it may be argued that the employment of the equidistance method is at odds 
with the application of equitable principles. This presupposition seems to be exaggerated 
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through long-running disputes between the Equidistance Group and the Equitable Principles 
Group during the Third Conference. To take an extreme position on the matter, it could be 
believed that the equidistance method only stands for predictability, whereas the application 
of equitable principles pursues flexibility. 
In this regard, Judge Guillaume, the President of the ICJ, stated that: 
 
“We are all aware that international law is constantly developing, and the law of the sea is 
not immune in this regard. However, it is encouraging to note that the law of maritime 
delimitations, by means of these developments in the Court’s case law, has reached a new 
level of unity and certainty, whilst conserving the necessary flexibility. … In all cases, the 
Court, as States also do, must first determine provisionally the equidistance line. It must 
then ask itself whether there are special or relevant circumstances requiring this line to be 




He concluded that predictability and flexibility in maritime delimitation have been 
reconciled, and that the use of the equidistance method symbolises predictability whilst the 
existence of special or relevant circumstances points out flexibility. However, this thesis is 
challenging his conclusion. Is there the concept of predictability in applying the rules 
governing maritime delimitation if the current delimitation rule is to achieve an equitable 
solution? 
Since the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case of the ICJ, it has become a 
typical process for international courts and tribunals to firstly draw a provisional 
equidistance line, and then take account of relevant circumstances to modify that line.
143
 In 
other words, the equidistance method seems to be chosen in order to draw a provisional line 
in the process of maritime delimitation. Accordingly, the essence of controversy is whether 
or not the aim of maritime delimitation can be fulfilled if predictability (which is one of the 
principal characteristics of law) is guaranteed through the use of the equidistance method. 
Regarding this question, it is submitted that the objective of maritime delimitation is always 
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It is evident that an equidistance line, which seems to guarantee predictability, has 
been regarded only as a ‘provisional’ line by international courts and tribunals. Even in 
recent case-law, international courts and tribunals have still required the concept of 
‘flexibility’ (different from the concept of subjectivity) by taking account of relevant 
circumstances in the course of applying the rules governing maritime delimitation.
145
 
Moreover, even the employment of the equidistance method for drawing a provisional line 
may be rejected in a specific case. For these reasons, the ICJ stated that the Equidistance-
Special Circumstances rule and the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule are 
closely interrelated.
146
 That is to say, the most important task in the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries is not to guarantee predictability through the employment of the equidistance 
method, but to arrive at an equitable result by the flexible application of the rules. It is 
concluded that the use of the equidistance method, if necessary, is no more than a ‘starting 
point’ in flexibly applying the rules governing maritime delimitation. Therefore, the late 
Thomas M. Franck had observed the increased flexibility, in recent years, on the part of 




6.2. Criticising the Predictability of Application of the Rules 
First of all, the meaning of ‘predictability’, with reference to the application of the rules 
governing maritime delimitation, should be defined more clearly. The way in which 
international courts and tribunals have applied the current delimitation rule could be 
‘predictable’ in the sense that the ‘phases’ of application of the delimitation rule have been 
established beforehand, and that the ‘list’ of relevant circumstances has been limited to some 
extent, as will be shown in Chapter IV. Predictable stages or patterns of application of the 
rules prove that maritime delimitation is not an arbitrary decision which international courts 
and tribunals make. However, it must be noted that the basic role of international courts and 
tribunals is the interpretation and application of law. With their ‘discretionary’ power as to 
the interpretation and application of law, international courts and tribunals pursue flexibility 
in applying the rules governing maritime delimitation, because this delimitation rule in itself 
aims at arriving at an equitable result without making reference to a specific method. Thus, 
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in treating ‘nature’ in the context of maritime delimitation, international courts and tribunals 
can refashion given facts to a certain extent although they cannot ‘totally’ or ‘entirely’ 
refashion nature. In other words, they rewrite nature to a limited extent with their discretion. 
Nevertheless, several issues, such as the predictable phases of the delimitation 
process, the obligatory use of the equidistance method, and the limitation on the list of 
relevant circumstances, have ceaselessly been presented by international law scholars in 
favour of the predictability of application of the rules. 
It is true that the delimitation process may be relevant to the predictability of the 
rules governing maritime delimitation. Since the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case and the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary 
(Cameroon/Nigeria) case further clarified the relationship between the two delimitation 
rules,
148
 the first phase of delimitation has ended in the construction of a provisional 
equidistance line, regardless of which of the two rules one chooses to apply. Subsequently, 
the three-phase system for international decision-making in delimitation cases, including the 
proportionality check (which is the third phase), has been established by the recent cases of 
international courts and tribunals.
149
 In the sense that international courts and tribunals are 
not prone to depart from their past decisions unless there is an important reason to do so,
150
 
the established three-phase system with regard to maritime delimitation is predictable. For 
this reason, the delimitation process itself may be considered to be predictable. However, 
does the predictability of the delimitation process mean the predictability of application of 
the rules? 
Even if each phase of application of the rules governing maritime delimitation is 
determined, a task performed within the phase is not likely to be predictable. For example, in 
the first phase of delimitation, the drawing of a provisional equidistance line is not 
compulsory and, in the next phase, the identification and weighing-up of relevant 
circumstances adjusting the provisional line are carried out on a case-by-case basis. Thus, 
predetermining phases for applying the rules establish only a ‘framework’ for dealing with 
the delimitation of maritime boundaries. This fact acts as a point of departure for criticising 
the well-developed views of Prosper Weil on the topic. 
Professor Weil argues that, in addition to the predictability of the whole delimitation 
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process, ‘each’ task carried out within ‘each’ delimitation phase would also be predictable.
151
 
This contention is based on the assumption that the decisions of international courts and 
tribunals have themselves made law.
152
 It is, however, submitted that this is not the case: 
rather, international courts and tribunals have influenced the interpretation of law.
153
 With 
regard to maritime delimitation, the role of international courts and tribunals has been more 
dominant, because Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the 1982 UNCLOS concerning the 
delimitations of the EEZ and the continental shelf could be examples of a direct renvoi to 
other rules and principles of international law.
154
 Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind 
that international courts and tribunals have applied the rules that already existed. They have 
not made new rules of international law regarding maritime delimitation. 
As Professor Weil is impressed with the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, 
the first normativity which he supports is the drawing of an equidistance line as a provisional 
line.
155
 However, in the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case, the ICJ seemed to 
strongly reject his argument.
156
 Weil’s other normativity in the delimitation process is to 
verify the equitability of a provisional equidistance line.
157
 It follows that this second 
normativity is highly pertinent to the ‘typification’ of relevant circumstances.
158
 However, as 
will be examined in Chapter IV, the expansion of the list of relevant circumstances and the 
inconsistency of weight accorded to relevant circumstances on a case-by-case basis make the 
consideration of relevant circumstances flexible. 
Here, an interesting issue can be raised. Is the predictability of the delimitation 
process (which has been developed to the three-phase decision-making) undermined if the 
conduct of both States constructs an actual delimitation line, as in the first sector of the 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case of the ICJ? According to the ruling of the 2007 
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case of the ICJ,
159
 the conduct of both States is no 
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more than one of the relevant circumstances to consider in deciding whether or not to refrain 
from the use of the equidistance method, despite the fact that it can be used to draw an actual 
delimitation line. It follows that the first phase of the delimitation process is still the 
construction of a provisional equidistance line. In other words, international courts and 
tribunals will seek to firstly draw a provisional equidistance line and then, if they fail in their 
endeavour, will look for an alternative provisional line. In the end, the delimitation process 
proves to be predictable in the sense that there is a ‘trial’ of constructing a provisional 
equidistance line in the first phase. Nevertheless, the predictability of process does not 
necessarily bring about the predictability of application of the rules. 
 
6.3. Three Reasons Why Flexibility is Essential 
Firstly, it is noted that predictable stages or patterns of application of the rules governing 
maritime delimitation cannot automatically guarantee the achievement of an equitable result. 
Strict insistence on the predictability of application of the rules may result in producing an 
inequitable result. The predictability of application of the rules, such as the obligatory 
employment of the equidistance method, the fixed weight accorded to a certain relevant 
circumstance, and the compulsory construction of an equidistance line as a provisional line, 
would prevent the achievement of an equitable result. This point is consistent with a 
reasoning found in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases: “if the equidistance method 
is employed, then the greater the irregularity and the further from the coastline the area to be 
delimited, the more unreasonable are the results produced”.
160
 As long as the current 
delimitation rule dictates the achievement of an equitable result, and international courts and 
tribunals possess the discretion to interpret nature, even predictable stages or patterns that 
have elaborately been made are not essential to achieving an equitable result. An equitable 
result can be reached on a case-by-case basis only if international courts and tribunals 
exercise the discretion to make a decision even when following predictable stages or 
patterns. 
Secondly, rewriting nature flexibly is required to avoid granting too much weight to 
a small island or a peculiar configuration. The starting point in delimiting maritime 
boundaries is the given: ‘nature’. However, the concept of an equitable result does not mean 
that one State can gain an unfair advantage bringing about a disproportional disadvantage of 
the other, due to the presence of a small island or a peculiar configuration. In other words, 
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nature in itself is not equitable, and the clear reflection of nature is different from the 
achievement of an equitable result.
161
 In fact, through interpreting nature, the legal interests 
of both States should equitably be balanced. This must be the outcome to be reached after the 
rules governing maritime delimitation are applied. The flexible application of the rules is 
required to arrive at an equitable result through the interpretation of nature which could be 
inequitable. The flexibility of application of the delimitation rule is necessary to artificially 
avoid the disadvantages of a State which nature could bring about. According to Professor 
Weil, the purpose of equity is to keep the balance between the faithful reflection of nature 
and the freedom to rewrite nature totally.
162
 Although this thesis does not follow Weil’s 
opinion regarding equity,
163
 his argument shows why the flexibility of application of the 
rules is needed. The late Wolfgang Friedmann asked why the concave coastlines of a State 
are considered to be ‘unnatural’ while the differences between coastal and land-locked 
States, or between States with long and short coastlines, are thought to be natural.
164
 
Although Friedmann’s question was meaningful, the intention behind the dependence on one 
among several given facts is not to rewrite nature completely. In other words, the application 
of the current delimitation rule can ‘interpret’ nature to balance the interests of the States 
concerned. 
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the difference between apportionment and 
delimitation has been blurred. In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated 
that “its task in the present proceedings relates essentially to the delimitation and not the 
apportionment of the areas concerned, or their division into converging sectors”.
165
 
Assuming that there is a sharp difference between apportionment and delimitation, it went on 
to say that “[d]elimitation is a process which involves establishing the boundaries of an area 
already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State and not the determination de novo of 
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 The Court implied that delimitation is a process of discovering the 
boundaries of the continental shelf that ‘already’ ‘belongs to’ a State.
167
 According to the 
view clarified in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morelli, apportionment means the right of 
a State over a certain area of the continental shelf, whereas delimitation should be in 
conformity with the apportionment of the continental shelf automatically effected by 
international law.
168
 Although this difference is, in theory, clear, it has not been maintained. 
The most important reason for this is that the concept of an ‘equitable’ delimitation has been 
developed. The term ‘equitable’ has acted as a constraint over delimitation. The ICJ’s 
presenting of the concept of ‘proportionality’ in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf 
signifies the introduction of an equitable delimitation.
169
 In addition, the notion of an 
equitable delimitation described in the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case has 
strongly been supported.
170
 Since then (when the achievement of an equitable solution 
became the delimitation rule), the difference between apportionment and delimitation has 
declined in importance. As a consequence, in discord with a reasoning of the 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, an equitable result in the field of maritime delimitation means an 
‘equitable division’ of the ‘overlapping areas’ that have not yet been delimited.
171
 It follows 
that such a division means the ‘apportionment’ of the overlapping areas. The consideration of 
all relevant circumstances then plays an important role in producing an equitable 
delimitation. In other words, international courts and tribunals can exercise a proper 
‘discretion’ to take into account all relevant circumstances for the purpose of determining the 
apportionment of maritime areas. 
For the reasons listed above, flexibility in the application of the delimitation rule 
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7. A Concluding Remark 
 
The rule which international courts and tribunals have applied in maritime delimitation until 
now is that “the delimitation of the EEZ [the continental shelf] between the States concerned 
shall achieve an equitable solution”. Despite the fact that there were the two delimitation 
rules (the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule and the Equitable Principles-Relevant 
Circumstances rule) which originated from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf and customary international law, the sole rule that international courts and tribunals 
apply in maritime delimitation is the ‘achievement of an equitable result’. Since the two rules 
were assimilated, the equitability of the result to be reached became much more important 
than the equitability of the principles to be applied in maritime delimitation. Thus, it is 
‘uncertain’ how to apply this delimitation rule for the purpose of producing an equitable 
solution. It follows that it is flexible to apply the current rule in maritime delimitation. 
Where does the flexibility of application of the delimitation rule originate from? The 
consideration or examination of ‘all’ relevant circumstances is the starting point in pursuing 
flexibility. The concept of equity in international law functions only through the concept of 
an ‘equitable solution’ in the context of maritime delimitation, as will be shown in the next 
chapter. Unless the use of the equidistance method is obligatory, only the consideration of all 
relevant circumstances can lead to the achievement of an equitable result. International 
courts and tribunals grant ‘weight’ to given facts on a case-by-case basis when examining all 
of the relevant circumstances. For example, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 
the ICJ ignored the Norwegian Trough to support the concept of ‘natural prolongation’, 
despite the fact that it was aware of the existence of the Trough. 
It is evident that predictable patterns (for example, the existence of the neutral 
circumstances, such as geographical factors) exist in international case-law. However, in a 
given case, the relevance of islands (for example, whereas one island is accorded half effect, 
the other no effect) is still determined by the discretionary power of international courts and 
tribunals because an equitable result should be reached, and such a result varies from case to 
case. 
The discretion of international courts and tribunals can be discussed in the context of 
the establishment of an SMB and the delimitation of the outer continental shelf. Does the 
concept of an SMB restrict the list of relevant circumstances? The answer might be in the 







the delimitation rule must still be pursued. Although the ‘neutral’ circumstances, such as 
geographical factors, have priority over other circumstances in a certain case, international 
courts and tribunals can determine with their discretion what effect an island would be 
accorded or how the peculiar shape of the coastlines concerned would be taken into account. 
The delimitation of the outer continental shelf may be the extension of the 
delimitation of the inner continental shelf in a predictable way. Nevertheless, international 
courts and tribunals still hold the discretionary power to determine which provisional line 
would be employed or which geomorphological factors would have primacy over others. 
To sum up, the two delimitation rules were assimilated, and the current delimitation 
rule is only to achieve an equitable solution. Therefore, an equitable result cannot be 
achieved unless international courts and tribunals (which have the discretion to interpret and 
apply a rule) pursue the flexibility of application of the delimitation rule relied on all of the 
relevant circumstances in a given case, because each case has its own characteristics, and an 










The Demise of Equitable Principles 





In one of his articles, L. D. M. Nelson states that “[t]he tension between the need for 
‘particular justice’ arising from the uniqueness of a specific case and the demand for 
‘universalizable justice’ constitutes a general legal problem”.
1
 He implies that one of the 
fundamental issues in law is the tension between ‘predictability’ and ‘flexibility’. The late H. 
L. A. Hart regarded these twin concepts as ‘two social needs’ in his famous book, The 
Concept of Law.
2
 In spite of this tension, it is, basically, expected that law has predictability 
or certainty because it should generally be applied in order to attain universalizable justice. 
However, it is also true that the predictability of law could lead to a disappointing result that 
falls short of the notion of ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’ in a specific case. Since it is impossible for 
law to possess a high degree of both predictability and flexibility, the flexibility of law may 
be pursued at the cost of predictability, through the application of law named ‘principles’,
3
 or 
a reliance on the discretion of a court or tribunal to interpret law.
4
 At this moment, it must be 
noted that this thesis does not accept the importance of equitable ‘principles’, as will be 
proven in this chapter. Hence, in the law of maritime boundary delimitation, the flexibility of 
application of law can be achieved through the ‘discretion’ of international courts and 
tribunals to interpret and apply the rules aiming at reaching an equitable solution, as will be 
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The tension between predictability and flexibility is an important issue in some areas 
of international law as well. Those who give priority to securing peace or preventing 
conflicts in international relations favour predictability in international law, whereas those 
who intend to bring the concept of justice or fairness to the international community of 
States prefer flexibility.
5
 In this sense, the conflict between predictability and flexibility in 
some areas of international law is closely connected with what should be the function of 
international law. 
Can we say that maritime boundary delimitation is one legal area requiring 
flexibility? The answer is in the affirmative.
6
 Regarding what should be the function of 
international law in the context of maritime delimitation, the two delimitation rules were 
suggested as described in the previous chapter: the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule 
and the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule. The former seems more 
predictable while the latter is flexible. However, both rules include ‘indeterminate’ concepts: 
the ‘special circumstances’ of the former and the ‘equitable principles’ and ‘relevant 
circumstances’ of the latter. Such indeterminate concepts mirror a characteristic of the rules 
governing maritime delimitation which aim at maximising the interests of all of the States 
involved.
7
 The inclusion of concepts considered to be indeterminate would lead to the 
flexible application of the rules. Contrary to analysis of the elements constituting the two 
rules, securing the predictability of application has continuously been sought through the 




As stated in Chapter II, the current delimitation rule is the achievement of an 
equitable solution. The equitability of the result produced dominates maritime delimitation. 
What can we look for if we carefully examine this delimitation rule? The compulsory 
employment of the equidistance method, the application of equitable principles, or the 
achievement of an equitable solution? The achievement of an equitable solution that we can 
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only find out is, however, only the ultimate purpose of the rules in maritime delimitation, but 
the reason for doing so was that States could not accept a strict rule in the context of 
maritime delimitation in which serious conflicts between the interests of the States 
concerned frequently occur. Hence, the present rules governing maritime delimitation are 
arranged in such a way to receive a flexible application. In other words, there are no 
elements or concepts contained in the rules which guarantee predictability. In sum, the only 
rule that is recognisable as properly functioning is the concept of an ‘equitable solution’, in 
which ‘equity’ in maritime delimitation is found. 
Accordingly, a study of the concept, role and application of equity in international 
law constitutes the starting point in understanding what is meant by the concept of equitable 
principles or an equitable result in maritime delimitation. If the true nature of equity applied 
in maritime delimitation is clarified, the demise of equitable principles can easily be 
proclaimed, and two propositions in connection with the concept of equitable principles will 
be abrogated. The two propositions are: one is to guarantee predictability through the 
typification of equitable principles as in the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case of the 
ICJ and the other is to regard equitable principles as the principles to deal with the 
examination of relevant circumstances. Thus, this chapter will start from looking into the 
concept of equity as a fundamental source of flexibility in international law. 
 
 
2. The Origin and History of Equity 
 
To a considerable extent, the concept of equity in international law originated in Aristotle’s 
thought,
9
 even though traces of concepts relating to equity are found in diverse legal systems, 
including Islamic, Hindu, Chinese and African law.
10
 The reason for this is that international 
law had commenced in Europe with the rise of sovereign States.
11
 Therefore, first and 
foremost, the view of Aristotle regarding equity must be examined. Aristotle wrote that: 
 
“What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a 
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correction of legal justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is 




A superficial reading of Aristotle’s notion of equity suggests that its sole aim should be to 
temper the rigour of law. However, Aristotle did not consider equity to be a ‘corrective’: 
rather, his statement must be understood as referring to equity’s dual function, both as a 
corrective and as an extension of natural (or absolute) justice, based on the premise that law 
is flawless.
13
 Whatever his philosophical understanding of equity was, the sole point to be 
appreciated here is that Aristotle focused on defining the ‘function’ of equity (not law), rather 
than the concept itself, whilst equity in international law is a legal concept ‘within’ existing 
law. 
Starting with Roman law, the notion of equity has continuously functioned in 
Common law and Civil law in the European legal tradition. In the Roman law system, the 
praetors made a body of ‘law’ (known as the ius honorarium), which pursued flexibility, and 
issued edicts supporting, supplementing or correcting existing law.
14
 In Common law, equity 
was regarded as a new system of law.
15
 Furthermore, the Common law system went as far as 
to establish the equity ‘court’ organisation, as distinct from common law courts.
16
 Although 
Civil law was less concerned with the idea of equity, it incorporated ‘equitable principles’ 
into its texts to soften the rigour of law.
17
 The European legal system was the true precursor 
to the concept of equity in international law, although the meaning and significance of the 






3. Equity and International Law 
 
3.1. The Incorporation of the Concept of Equity into International Law 
It is said that, having developed out of the European legal tradition, international law 
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acknowledged the notion of equity from its inception. Beginning with Grotius’s accepting 
the existence of equity in international law,
19
 equity has been employed in quite a few 
decisions of international tribunals (even though an express authorisation for the use of 
equity was not given).
20
 As Aristotle was interested in the role of equity, most modern 
international law scholars are also more likely to examine the role of equity in international 
law than to define the term ‘equity’. Therefore, it is very difficult to grasp the exact meaning 
of equity. 
Nevertheless, for convenience’ sake, the reference of the Arbitral Tribunal to equity, 
in the 1922 Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway/U.S.A.) case, serves as a useful starting 
point for understanding the meaning of equity. The Tribunal stated that: 
 
“The majority of international lawyers seem to agree that these words [law and equity] are 
to be understood to mean general principles of justice as distinguished from any particular 




Although this statement did not define the meaning of equity in detail, it has three 
implications. Firstly, equity has been acknowledged in international law. Secondly, it is 
distinguished from the concept incorporated into the municipal law of a State. Thirdly, it is 
closely related to the concept of ‘justice’. In sum, the Arbitral Tribunal of this case presented 
the point of view that equity, which has its own merits in the international law system, is a 
means of reflecting and attaining justice. 
Likewise, the famous Individual Opinion of Judge Hudson in the 1937 Diversion of 
Water from the River Muese case agreed that equity had been a ‘source’ of international law, 
stating that “[w]hat are widely known as principles of equity have long been considered to 
constitute a part of international law, and as such they have often been applied by 
international tribunals”.
22
 Although it is necessary to discuss whether or not equity, which is 
a vague and abstract concept, is a source of international law, it is submitted that the 
presence of equity in international law was noted by Judge Hudson. 
In addition, as C. Wilfred Jenks summarised at length in his valuable book, The 
Prospects of International Adjudication, it is evident that the concept of equity has been 
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admitted in many decisions of international courts and tribunals (although he mainly focused 




3.2. The Difference between Equity in Municipal Law and Equity in 
      International Law 
Although equity in international law had greatly been influenced by the concept of equity 
included in Roman, Common and Civil law, equity in such municipal legal systems and 
equity in international law are not identical concepts.
24
 In other words, equity in international 
law is not the sum of concepts of equity previously applied in many municipal legal systems, 
but is a ‘unique’ means of achieving justice or fairness in ‘international’ law. This is the case 
even though legal principles reflecting the concept of equity in international law are found in 
some national legal systems. More importantly, there exist multiple legal principles, regarded 




Based on the premise that equity in municipal law and equity in international law are 
not identical, two questions should be asked: firstly, what is meant by equity in international 
law and, secondly, whether or not equity is a source of international law. First of all, with 
respect to the issue of equity in international law, Bin Cheng states that “[i]nternational law, 
in its operation, seeks to implement the idea of justice, at least formal justice, in the 
international sphere, whilst equity assists it to achieve subjective justice in individual 
cases”.
26
 This more developed reference to equity in international law notwithstanding, it is 
still impossible to understand the exact meaning of equity in international law.
27
 In other 
words, it is not obvious whether equity in international law means equality, distributive 
justice or something else.
28
 Second of all, whether or not equity is a source of international 
law is an issue highly relevant to the relationship between law and equity. This will be dealt 
with in the next section. 
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3.3. Law, Justice and Equity in International Law 
 
3.3.1. The Relationship between Law and Equity 
As discussed above, the relationship between equity and law needs clarification, although it 
may be argued that it is almost impossible to separate the two.
29
 In relation to this issue, two 
logical outcomes of the argument can be presented. One view is that equity in international 
law is not law.
30
 For example, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Vice-President 
Koretsky argued that equity should not be regarded as law.
31
 The other is that equity is part 
of international law, even though equity is not one of the primary sources of law, such as 
treaties and customary international law.
32
 
As the starting point for this discussion, it is necessary to examine Article 38(1)(c) of 
the Statute of the ICJ. This article refers to the ‘general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations’ as one of the standards to be applied to settle disputes. International law 
scholars tend to seek the legal basis of equity within the general principles of law despite the 
omission of the term ‘equity’ in the relevant articles of the Statute of the ICJ or PCIJ.
33
 They 
assume that equity is one of the general principles of law. 
However, it is essential to note, through a consideration of historical backgrounds 
and careful analysis of the relevant articles of the Statute of the ICJ or PCIJ, that equity and 
the general principles of law are not identical. To give consideration to historical 
backgrounds, the inclusion of equity as a means to settle disputes was rejected, unlike the 
general principles of law, as did the Advisory Committee of Jurists and the First Assembly of 
the League of Nations working on the Statute of the PCIJ in 1920.
34
 At that time, the concept 
of equity was considered to be unnecessary, inappropriate or premature, whereas the general 
principles of law were not.
35
 Moreover, through careful analysis of the relevant articles of the 
Statute of the ICJ or PCIJ, it is noted that the general principles of law do not need to be 
equitable, even if both equity and the general principles of law are regarded as criteria for 
making international decisions.
36
 In addition, while the general principles of law are related 
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to ‘generalising’, equity focuses on ‘particularisation’.
37
 That is to say, the general principles 
of law mean legal principles ‘common’ to diverse municipal legal systems, while equity 
indicates ‘individualised’ justice, which should be attained in a specific case. Concerning the 
general principles of law, Bin Cheng points out that: 
 
“The Statute [Article 38(1) (c) of the Statute of the ICJ] […] assumes that despite the 
differences in civilisation and legal method of the members of the international society, 





It is submitted that the general principles of law are very basic principles to be regarded as 
acceptable without objection by all of the States. 
Although equity and the general principles of law are different, as summarised 
above, we have no choice but to accept that equity is also part of international law for two 
reasons. Firstly, in many cases, equity has functioned as a criterion to settle international 
disputes.
39
 As Hersch Lauterpacht indicated, the formal acceptance of the general principles 
of law represents a break with the tradition of positivism which found treaties and customary 
international law as the only sources of international law.
40
 Nevertheless, international law 
has been clarified through the judgments and arbitral awards of international courts and 
tribunals. Accordingly, if a measure of realism is adopted, it can be accepted that equity is 
part of international law. 
Secondly, as mentioned by the ICJ in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 
‘actual’ rules of (international) law do ‘not’ aim at “applying equity simply as a matter of 
abstract justice”.
41
 Rather, the application of equity may mean “applying a rule of law which 
itself requires the application of equitable principles”.
42
 Furthermore, the ICJ concluded that, 
in cases of maritime delimitation, the rule of law which itself requires the application of 
equitable principles had become customary international law. Although this thesis does not 
support the importance of equitable principles, it is apparent that equity has been used as part 
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of law in itself. Therefore, in line with the wider argument of this thesis, that equity is part of 
international law, it is appropriate to focus on the role and application of equity in 
international law. 
 
3.3.2. The Relationship between Justice and Equity 
Since it is not easy to explain the meaning of equity, as shown above, and it is more useful to 
discern the impact of equity on international law (even if we can grasp the meaning of 
equity), most writers have focused on the categories (infra legem, praeter legem, and contra 
legem) or role of equity in international law.
43
 Accordingly, the purpose of this part of the 
thesis is to discern the role of equity in international law. Before proceeding to do this, 
however, it would be much better to look into whether or not the concept of equity relates to 
the concept of justice, because we can properly understand the role of equity in international 
law if we are able to clarify the relationship between equity and justice. 
Equity is interwoven with the concept of justice. For understanding the relationship 
between equity and justice, the statement of Vaughan Lowe is more convenient (although he 
argues that equity is distinct from law): “What is critical is the attachment of equity to the 
conception of justice and its detachment from the rules of any particular legal system”.
4445
 
Adopting an alternative view of the same opinion, Ruth Lapidoth states that “[e]quity may be 
viewed as measures intended to reduce the gap between law and justice in a specific case”.
46
 
Both scholars assert that equity is related to ‘doing justice’, based on the proposition that law 
and justice are different from each other. According to their opinions, equity is thought of as 
a ‘means’ to render justice. 
At this point, with regard to the thesis that equity is one method of attaining justice, 
it should be asked which kind of justice equity attains. Is equity relevant to the concept of 
distributive justice? In the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, the ICJ denied 
distributive justice, stating that: 
 
“They [economic considerations] are virtually extraneous factors since they are variables 
which unpredictable national fortune or calamity, as the case may be, might at any time 
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cause to tilt the scale one way or the other. A country might be poor today and become rich 




In addition, in the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, the Court clearly stated that 
“there can be no question of distributive justice”.
48
 The evidence suggests that international 
courts and tribunals do not attempt to achieve distributive justice under the pretence of 
attaining an equitable result. In fact, the concept of an ‘equitable result’ prevents 
international courts and tribunals from engaging with the notion of distributive justice. 
International courts and tribunals cannot attempt distributive justice while making an equal 
division (in the case of no relevant circumstances to adjust a provisional line) or checking 
proportionality in a concrete delimitation case. In other words, an equitable result, consisting 
of an equal division or proportionality, is a standard which overrules distributive justice. 
Moreover, a delimitation line in conformity with an equitable result cannot 
compensate for disadvantages from which the States concerned might suffer. This point was 
confirmed by the Chamber of the ICJ in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case and a Nigerian 
argument in the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case.
49
 It is 
therefore submitted that the achievement of an equitable result does not entail distributive 
justice. 
To sum up, the application of equity is not relevant to doing distributive justice. In 
addition, the notion should be ruled out that equity renders justice on the assumption that 
equity is distinguished from law. 
Accordingly, this thesis presupposes that equity in itself is law, and that the 
application of equity equivalent to the application of law aims at attaining justice. This thesis 
does not agree with the idea that equity may be employed as a response to injustice resulting 
from the strict application of law. In other words, equity is part of international law, which 
needs to flexibly be applied. It follows that we should focus on identifying legal ‘areas’ 
which require the application of equity or the achievement of an equitable solution, as will 
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4. The Category and Role of Equity in International Law 
 
4.1. Equity ex aequo et bono and Absolute Equity 
In the categories of equity in international law, the concept of equity ex aequo et bono should 
be summarised. This concept is articulated in Article 38(2) of the Statute of the ICJ (or 
Article 38(4) of the Statute of the PCIJ). If there is the express consent of the contesting 
Parties, the ICJ can decide a case referred to it based on the sense of fairness (or justice), not 
existing law.
50
 Bin Cheng states that “[d]ecisions ex aequo et bono [...] imply decisions based 
on practical considerations and expediency”.
51
 According to Professor Cheng, the concept of 
equity ex aequo et bono is a means to settle disputes for the sake of expediency, even if 
international courts and tribunals disregard existing law or recognised rights. Notably, there 
is no evidence of this concept at work in the decisions of international courts and tribunals. 
In this respect, the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case of the ICJ requires 
commentary. It might be arbitrary that the conduct of the States concerned directly indicated 
an actual delimitation line in the first sector, and that the equitability of the line was not 
checked. However, it is questionable whether or not the ruling of the ICJ in the 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case was one of the applications of equity ex aequo et 
bono. For instance, Robert Y. Jennings and Rosayln Higgins fear that the ICJ might use 
equity ex aequo et bono under the guise of applying equitable principles, without the express 
consent of the Parties concerned, on the premise that the application of equitable principles is 
not easily differentiated from the use of equity ex aequo et bono in maritime delimitation.
52
 
However, an arbitrary decision without the express consent of the contesting Parties is not 
one example of equity ex aequo et bono. The application of ‘equity ex aequo et bono’ is 
always preceded by the ‘express’ consent of the States concerned. Therefore, we can criticise 
the arbitrariness of a decision without using the term ‘equity ex aequo et bono’. For example, 
in his Separate Opinion of the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, Vice-President Oda also 
thought that the ICJ had taken a purely arbitrary decision in choosing the delimitation line.
53
 
Regarding the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, it can also be asked 
whether or not the ‘new accepted trends’ (in the Third Conference) mentioned in the Special 
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Agreement allowed the ICJ to apply equity ex aequo et bono. In other words, it must be 
questioned whether or not the term ‘new accepted trends’ means the express consent of both 
States. In this respect, the Court stated that: 
 
“[T]he Court would have had proprio motu to take account of the progress made by the 
Conference even if the Parties had not alluded to it in their Special Agreement; for it could 
not ignore any provision of the draft convention if it came to the conclusion that the content 
of such provision is binding upon all members of the international community because it 




That is to say, the ICJ understood the ‘new accepted trends’ as a rule of customary 
international law, not a kind of the express consent of both States. 
Furthermore, the opinions of Sir Jennings, Judge Higgins, and Vice-President Oda, 
as introduced above, presume that the concept of equitable principles or an equitable solution 
is no more than the sense of fairness (or justice). However, the current delimitation rule that 
we have includes the concept of an equitable solution. In other words, the achievement of an 
equitable solution is a legal concept within existing law. Based on this analysis of how the 
idea of an equitable solution functions, the application of equity in maritime delimitation 
should be differentiated from equity ex aequo et bono. In sum, the application of equity is the 
application of law itself in maritime delimitation, and it respects both the letter of law and 
the spirit of law. 
Other than equity ex aequo et bono, the concept of absolute equity, which is found in 
some arbitral awards, is also noted. According to Professor Cheng, equity ex aequo et bono 
may disregard existing law for the sake of expediency, whilst absolute equity ignores the 
letter of law in favour of the spirit of law.
55
 Therefore, the notion of absolute equity leads to 
admitting the corrective role of equity. Bin Cheng adds that absolute equity functions as an 
implementation of existing law.
56
 
However, as Judge Weeramantry pointed out, the employment of equity ex aequo et 
bono or absolute equity is not a means of applying international law.
57
 These kinds of 
equities are only needed to better understand the concept of equity in international law. 
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4.2. Three Categories of Equity 
It is also necessary to briefly examine the three categories of equity in international law 
noted by many international law scholars. Throughout this examination, it may be noticed 
that the three categories of equity is quite irrelevant to the actual role of equity in 
international law. Generally, most scholars divide the application of equity into three areas: 
equity infra legem, equity praeter legem, and equity contra legem.
58
 
The first one is relevant to choosing one among several interpretations ‘within’ 
relevant law.
59
 For example, this kind of equity can calculate the measure of damages, make 
an equitable estimate of the compensation due, and fix a fair rate of interest.
60
 However, if 
equity infra legem means that judges can choose one of several interpretations acceptable 
within relevant law, it is unnecessary to accept the concept of equity infra legem. The reason 
for this is that the choice of a preferred interpretation within relevant law is the basic role of 
international courts and tribunals. Therefore, the fact that the ICJ accepted this kind of equity 
in the 1986 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) case was expected, but unnecessary.
61
 Can 
we say that equity used in this case was properly regarded as equity praeter legem? In this 
respect, Ruth Lapidoth argues that equity employed in the 1986 Frontier Dispute (Burkina 
Faso/Mali) case could also be equity praeter legem.
62
 Lapidoth’s view is potentially accurate 
because equity meant ‘equality’ in this case in which there was no rule to be applied. 
However, it is said that equity employed in the 1986 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) 
case might merely indicate that fairness or reasonableness is one of the roles of equity.
63
 In 
contrast to equity’s occasional meaning of fairness, the idea should be refuted that the notion 
of equitable principles is the application of equity infra legem.
64
 As will be shown in this 
chapter, the concept of equitable principles is, in fact, meaningless. As a result, it cannot be 
discussed in the context of equity infra legem which raises the issues of interpretation within 
existing law. In sum, although the concept of equity infra legem cannot be rejected in 
international law, it is not necessarily differentiated from a choice that international courts 
and tribunals make regarding the interpretation of existing law, or equity that simply points 
out fairness as one of the roles of equity. 
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The second type of equity may be used in order to fill gaps where there is no 
relevant law. What should be noted here is that it is a very problematic issue whether or not 
there are lacunae in international law.
65
 Therefore, those who consider that there is no gap in 
international law do not need the concept of equity praeter legem, while those who 
acknowledge gaps in international law seek to use equity praeter legem. However, most 
scholars avoid supporting this kind of equity or keep silent concerning the acceptance of 
equity praeter legem.
66
 First of all, many writers argue that there is no gap in international 
law.
67
 Second of all, according to the opinion of Professor Lowe, an individual dispute can 
be settled through several methods provided by international law, including diverse 
interpretations of existing law, without reference to equity praeter legem.
68
 For these 
reasons, it is still controversial whether or not it is essential to apply equity praeter legem. In 
this respect, Judge Weeramantry stated that “[i]ndeed, viewed strictly from that point of 
view, it ceases to be a category of its own but is merely an application of the law itself”,
69
 
implying that the employment of equity praeter legem is, in fact, the application of the 
general principles of law. Agreeing with his view, this thesis cannot identify a practical use 
of this category of equity. 
The third category of equity holds that equity may be used ‘against’ existing law. 
Basically, the matter of equity contra legem seems to be open to debate with sole regard to 
the issue of whether or not an express authorisation is required in order to use such a mode 
of equity.
70
 However, what should be asked here is whether or not there is a need for the 
application of equity contra legem. Regarding this issue, Vaughan Lowe argues that the need 
might arise to apply equity contra legem where the judges or Parties to disputes need the 
‘reasoning’ on equitable grounds rather than the outcome at which relevant law simply 
aims.
71
 However, it is almost impossible to accept equity contra legem (where there is no 
consent of relevant Parties) because equity contra legem aims to undermine the existing legal 
system. 
Examining the three categories of equity, it is evident that the arguments relating to 
these categories of equity are irrelevant to the points which we have discussed so far in this 
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thesis, i.e. the relationship between equity and law, and the relationship between equity and 
justice. This thesis has already argued that equity is part of international law, and equity 
attains justice. To the contrary, the study on the categories of equity only concentrates on the 
‘relationship’ between equity and law (for example, within relevant law, without relevant 
law, and against relevant law), based on the false premise that equity is synonymous with 
justice. In other word, the research on the three categories of equity in international law is 
only based on the erroneous presupposition that equity is separated from law. Therefore, we 
must free ourselves from the three traditional categories of equity, and look into the actual 
role of equity and its practical uses in international law, relying on the premise that equity is 
law itself. 
 
4.3. The Role of Equity in International Law 
What is the role of equity if the three traditional categories of equity do not accurately reflect 
the application of international law? In one of his books, Oscar Schachter presents the five 
uses of equity: 
 
“(1) Equity as a basis for “individualized” justice tempering the rigours of strict law; 
(2) Equity as consideration of fairness, reasonableness and good faith; 
(3) Equity as a basis for certain specific principles of legal reasoning associated with 
fairness and reasonableness: to wit, estoppel, unjust enrichment and abuse of rights; 
(4) Equitable standards for the allocation and sharing of resources and benefits; [and] 
(5) Equity as a broad synonym for distributive justice used to justify demands for economic 
and social arrangements and redistribution of wealth”.
72 
 
In his Separate Opinion of the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, Judge Weeramantry agreed 
with Schachter’s classification.
73
 In opposition to their argument, this thesis presupposes that 
such classifications would be useless in international law. The reasons for this opposition are 
as follows. In the first definition, equity must be preceded by the existence of the rigours of 
strict law. However, as stated above, equity in itself is law. International law does not accept 
the corrective role of equity, as in the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case of the 
ICJ.
74
 Equity in the second definition can be accepted in international law. However, as 
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described above, it is not differentiated from the application of equity infra legem. The third 
definition of equity seems to locate it closer to the general principles of law rather than 
equity. The definition of equity in the fourth category will be discussed in the sixth section, 
which will show that equitable standards or equitable principles are unhelpful. Lastly, equity 
in the fifth concept cannot be admitted because, as argued above, distributive justice has not 
been acknowledged in international law. In sum, despite his comprehensive categorising of 
the concept of equity, Schachter’s classifications cannot be used in international law. 
Judge Weeramantry’s observations of the a priori and a posteriori employments of 
equity offer a more useful insight into the role of equity in international law.
75
 A priori 
employment of equity indicates that equity is positively applied in a given case. This is 
connected with the predetermined delimitation process or the application of equitable 
principles.
76
 However, a priori employment of equity might produce an inequitable result in 
a specific case. 
By contrast, a posteriori employment of equity means that the equitability of the 
result produced can, in the last stage of the delimitation process, be tested so as to avoid 
producing an arbitrary result. For this test, the case-law of maritime delimitation has 
presented the concept of ‘catastrophic repercussions’ or ‘proportionality’. 
Assuming that a priori and a posteriori employments of equity might be the role of 
equity in international law, one question can be asked: via which routes does equity enter 
into maritime delimitation? This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
5. The Routes of Entry of Equity into International Law 
 
5.1. Equitable Principles Derived from Applicable Law 
As discussed above, this thesis does not accept the three categories of equity which have 
dealt with the relationship between equity and law based on the false premise that equity is 
distinct from law. In case-law, it is said that equity in international law does not correct or 
modify the existing legal system. Dealing with this issue, the 1982 Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libya) case of the ICJ stated that: 
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“It [Equity] was often contrasted with the rigid rules of positive law, the severity of which 
had to be mitigated in order to do justice. In general, this contrast has no parallel in the 





That is to say, equity is not a means to correct or modify existing law, but a legal ‘principle’ 
directly applicable ‘as law’. However, the ruling of the ICJ in the 1982 Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libya) case implied that equity is not applied in a set pattern because it is a legal 
principle. 
Is the concept of equitable principles a route of entry of equity into international 
law? It is noted that equity may function as law (a legal principle) in itself to the extent that 
relevant rules require the application of equitable principles, like the Equitable Principles-
Relevant Circumstances rule presented by the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 
However, the issue of equitable principles raises three questions. Firstly, what 
principles are equitable principles in international law? Secondly, what will happen if the 
application of one principle produces an inequitable result even though the principle is 
regarded as one of the equitable principles? Thirdly, how are equitable principles distinct 
from the general principles of law? 
Since it is impossible to reply to these questions, it is not easy for equity to enter into 
international law through the concept of equitable principles. In the next section, the decline 
in importance of equitable principles will be discussed. 
 
5.2. An Equitable Solution at Which Applicable Law Aims 
The concept of an equitable solution (or equitable result) should be noted.
78
 The adjective 
‘equitable’ is attached to the result of applying the rules of some areas in international law. 
The most important implication which the notion of an equitable result has is that even the 
application of equitable principles is subordinate to the achievement of an equitable result. In 
other words, the application of a principle is subordinate to the achievement of a goal. 
Can we find out the rules which lead to attaining a specific goal in international law? 
To answer this question, the equitable delimitation of maritime areas, the equitable utilisation 
of international watercourses, and the equitable allocation of fishery resources can be 
presented. Equity plays an important role in achieving such a goal through its application. 
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The role of equity is then performed through a posteriori employment of equity, as stated 
above. 
While the ICJ stressed the primacy of an equitable result in the 1982 Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, it had a complaint about the fact that the adjective ‘equitable’ is 
attached to both terms ‘principles’ and ‘result’.
79
 Likewise, The ICJ stated, in the 2002 Land 
and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case, that: 
 
“The Court’s jurisprudence shows that, in disputes relating to maritime delimitation, equity 





Accordingly, equity in international law properly acts as law itself through the concept of an 
‘equitable solution’. Equity performs its role for aiming at an equitable result through taking 
account of all the relevant circumstances in a given case. As a result, equity seeks the 
equitability of the ‘result’ reached on a case-by-case basis. It follows that the application of 
equity pursues the flexibility of application of the rules in international law. 
 
 
6. The Decrease in Importance of Equitable Principles in Maritime 
    Delimitation 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The concept of equity included in the current rules governing maritime delimitation seeks the 
equitability of the result achieved, and plays a role in increasing flexibility. Before moving 
on to Chapter IV, the objective of this section is to prove that the concept of equitable 
principles is ‘meaningless’ in applying equity in maritime delimitation. In fact, up to the 
1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case of the ICJ, international courts and tribunals 
sought to clarify the meaning of the concept of equitable principles. However, this attempt 
fuelled ongoing controversy regarding the concept and content of equitable principles. 
If the notion of equitable principles is discarded in maritime delimitation, what 
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remains is the concept of ‘relevant circumstances’. Relevant circumstances are concrete facts 
which must be taken into account in order to reach an equitable solution. Equity operates in 
attaining the equitability of the result of examining such relevant circumstances, not through 
the application of equitable principles. 
 
6.2. The Emergence of the Term ‘Equitable Principles’ in International Law 
The term ‘equitable principles’ first appeared in the 1945 Truman Proclamation. The 
Proclamation provided that: 
 
“In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared 
with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State 
concerned in accordance with equitable principles” [emphasis added].
81 
 
In fact, the meaning of the term ‘equitable principles’ (proposed by the United States as a 
means of determining the delimitation of the continental shelf between the States concerned) 
was ambiguous. Despite its vagueness, however, the concept of equitable principles was 
readily accepted as part of customary international law in the 1969 North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases of the ICJ.
82
 These cases stated that there is “a rule of law which itself requires 
the application of equitable principles” [emphasis added]. The Court confirmed the concept 
of equitable principles as one of the elements ‘within’ a rule of customary international law 
governing the delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent States.
83
 However, it 
should be noted that equitable principles were not understood to have any content during the 
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 
Regarding the ruling of the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Hugh Thirlway 
observes, “[t]he Court […] allowed the ‘equitable principles’ (of undefined content) to move 
from the sphere of influence on the making of law into the sphere of law proper”.
84
 He 
implies that the notion of equitable principles, which did not yet include any content, became 
law in itself. The widespread acceptance of the term ‘equitable principles’ has ensured that 
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the meaning and content of equitable principles have been under scrutiny in maritime 
delimitation since 1969. 
Turning to another area of international law, the inception of the concept of equitable 
principles can also be traced in the 1957 Lac Lanoux case with respect to the equitable 
utilisation of international watercourses.
85
 During this case, the Tribunal stated that: 
 
“[T]he upper riparian State, under the rules of good faith, has an obligation to take into 
consideration the various interests concerned, to seek to give them every satisfaction 
compatible with the pursuit of its own interests and to show that it has, in this matter, a real 
desire to reconcile the interests of the other riparian with its own” [emphasis added].
86 
 
The process of taking into account the various interests concerned might be termed ‘the 
application of equitable principles’ leading to the achievement of an equitable result. How 
has the law of international watercourses dealt with the application of equitable principles? 
First, a list of relevant circumstances has been produced. For the first time in the context of 
international watercourses, the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers (hereafter referred to as “Helsinki Rules”) made by the International 
Law Association (hereafter referred to as “ILA”) enumerated relevant factors to be taken into 
account for the equitable utilisation of international watercourses. Second, Article V(3) of the 
1966 Helsinki Rules emphasised that “[i]n determining what is reasonable and equitable 
share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis 
of the whole”. Crucially, the Article indicated that the consideration of ‘all’ relevant 
circumstances is necessary to arrive at the equitable utilisation of international watercourses. 
At this point, one might ask how the application of equitable principles (if the concept of 
equitable principles is necessary in the law of international watercourses) relates to the 
consideration of relevant circumstances in the law of international watercourses. The 
relationship between these two concepts will be discussed in a later part of the present 
section. 
In sum, although the original concept of equitable principles – which first emerged 
in relation to the delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent States – did not have 
any substantial content, it was widely accepted as a component of customary international 
law. For this reason, the judgments reached and arbitral awards conferred by international 
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courts and tribunals interpreting and applying customary international law are important 
sources for those who seek to understand the meaning and content of equitable principles. 
Some international law scholars have pursued their own research into the meaning of the 
term ‘equitable principles’. The next sub-sections will deal with international decisions and 
the views of certain scholars regarding the concept of equitable principles. 
 
6.3. Equitable Principles in International Courts and Tribunals 
 
6.3.1. Equitable Principles in the Judgements of the ICJ 
 
6.3.1.1. The 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
As mentioned above, the concept of equitable principles did not yet have any specific 
content in the 1960s. Nonetheless, the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases heard by the 
ICJ offered a useful starting point in exploring the meaning of equitable principles, as these 
were the first cases predicated on the concept of equitable principles as part of customary 
international law in maritime boundary delimitation. 
During the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ rejected the equidistance 
method as obligatory in customary international law,
87
 stating that “delimitation must be the 
object of agreement between the States concerned”, and that “such agreement must be 
arrived at in accordance with equitable principles” [emphasis added].
88
 The Court then 
offered the following clarification: 
 
“[I]n short, it is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but 
of applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles, […] , 




Although the term ‘equitable principles’ might be considered merely rhetorical, the Court set 
forth as a premise that the application of equitable principles under customary international 
law determines the delimitation ‘agreements’ between the States concerned. It is worth 
noting that the ICJ emphasised two key points, as follows. Firstly, in the 1969 North Sea 
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Continental Shelf cases, ‘equitable principles’ were not considered synonymous with 
‘equity’. Secondly, the Court mandated that the ‘application’ of equitable principles should 
involve ‘taking all the circumstances into account’.
90
 These two points are touchstones for a 
clear understanding of the notion of equitable principles. 
Further analysis of the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases indicates the grounds 
on which the ICJ distinguished equitable principles from equity, discussing the need to 
provide “some degree of indication as to the possible ways in which it [equity] might be 
applied in the present case” [emphasis added].
91
 In fact, the ICJ used the concept of equitable 
principles to fill the vacuum resulting from the inapplicability of the equidistance method. In 
other words, the application of equitable principles was necessary in order to determine an 
appropriate ‘means’ of achieving an equitable delimitation.
92
 Lacking their own content, 
equitable principles were to be ‘applied’ as a ‘process’. The ICJ provided ‘some degree of 
indication’, such as factors to be taken into account, as to how such a process should be 
carried out. This means that a method or methods other than the equidistance method may be 
identified with the help of ‘some degree of indication’. Since the task of the ICJ in these 
cases was solely to identify the applicable principles and rules of international law, ‘some 
degree of indication’ meant little more than ‘factors’ which ‘might’ be relevant; not relevant 
circumstances per se. The Court then suggested three factors to be taken into account in 
order to arrive at an equitable result: the general configuration of the coasts (as well as the 
presence of any special or unusual features); the physical and geological structure (as well as 
the natural resources) of the continental shelf concerned; and proportionality.
93
 
In sum, the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases concluded that a practical 
method applicable to maritime boundary delimitation can be identified by the application of 
the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule.
94
 In addition, the ICJ implied that the 
‘application’ of equitable principles, which is required to define a means for arriving at an 
equitable result, can be carried out by taking all relevant circumstances into consideration. 
Since the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the concept of relevant circumstances 
rather than that of equitable principles has been at the centre of the law of maritime boundary 
delimitation, because the concept of ‘some degree of indication’ has been transformed into 
the concept of relevant circumstances, and the list of relevant circumstances has been 
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6.3.1.2. The 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) Case 
During the Third Conference, the ruling of the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases that 
“delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles”
96
 made 
the tension between the equidistance method and equitable principles yet more acute. 
Moreover, the 1969 Judgment provided a momentum for formulating Article 1 of the Special 
Agreement, which referred to both equitable principles and relevant circumstances. Article 1 
functioned as the rules of the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case heard by the ICJ.
97
 
In this case, the Court stated that “[f]or both Parties, the starting point for a discussion of the 
applicable principles and rules has been the Court’s Judgment of 20 February 1969 in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases”.
98
 With regard to the meaning of equitable principles, 
three points should be made as regards the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case. 
Firstly, the ICJ stated that the task of the Court was “to apply equitable principles as 
part of international law, and to balance up the various considerations which it regards as 
relevant in order to produce an equitable result”.
99
 In the 1982 Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libya) case, equitable principles were regarded by the Court as ‘part of 
international law’. As a consequence, equitable principles became not only principles 
governing delimitation ‘agreements’ between the States concerned, but also principles 
binding international courts and tribunals in the process of international ‘adjudications’.
100
 In 
short, the application of equitable principles seemed to be regarded as the rules governing the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries by the ICJ. 
Secondly, the ICJ made a famous pronouncement: “The result of the application of 
equitable principles must be equitable [emphasis added].”
101
 The Court meant that a principle 
is not equitable per se, but only if it produces an equitable result. The ICJ’s adherence to ‘the 
result which is predominant’ led to the conclusion that any and all principles could be 
equitable in light of their outcome. The Court’s logic resulted in the misunderstanding that 
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the examples of equitable principles could be ‘ascertainable’ in a specific case. However, the 
content of equitable principles is not ascertainable, as will be discussed at a later stage. 
Rather, the ‘application’ of equitable principles is a process because it involves taking into 
account all of the circumstances relevant to a particular case. For this reason, the Court’s 
interest rapidly shifted to the issue of relevant circumstances, although it had originally 
intended to regard equitable principles as a set of ascertainable principles. 
Thirdly, the ICJ stated that “[b]oth Parties recognize that equitable principles dictate 
that “the relevant circumstances which characterize the area” be taken into account, but 
differ as to what they are” [emphasis added].
102
 The relationship between equitable principles 
and relevant circumstances can be intuited from this statement. In brief, it may be argued that 
the ‘application’ of equitable principles comprises the identification and consideration of 
relevant circumstances. For this reason, the ICJ did not accept the contention made by both 
Parties that equitable principles and the principle of natural prolongation had a close 
relationship.
103
 Likewise, it should be emphasised that the Court sought to determine the 
appropriate ‘application’ of equitable principles, not their meaning. In this context, the ICJ 
concluded that: 
 
“Clearly each continental shelf case in dispute should be considered and judged on its own 
merits, having regard to its peculiar circumstances; therefore, no attempt should be made 
here to overconceptualize the application of the principles and rules relating to the 
continental shelf” [emphases added].
104 
 
In this way, the Court justified its preference for explaining the ‘application’ of equitable 
principles as a ‘process’ rather than searching for the meaning or content of equitable 
principles. 
In conclusion, based on the premise that the application of equitable principles is the 
law governing maritime boundary delimitation, the ICJ perceived that, in order to achieve an 
equitable result, the application of equitable principles requires international courts and 
tribunals to consider all relevant circumstances. Thus, in the 1982 Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libya) case, equitable principles did not necessarily entail the practical methods of 
maritime delimitation. Rather, the Court tried to clarify the meaning of the ‘application’ of 
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equitable principles, not the meaning of equitable principles per se. 
 
6.3.1.3. The 1984 Gulf of Maine Case 
In the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber of the ICJ stated that the ‘fundamental norm’ of 
international law governing the delimitation of maritime boundaries can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
“(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts may be 
effected unilaterally by one of those States. Such delimitation must be sought and effected 
by means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the 
genuine intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be 
achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party possessing the 
necessary competence. 
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable criteria and 
by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic 




According to the Chamber’s ruling in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the concept of ‘equitable 
criteria’ is an element of the ‘fundamental norm’ of international law governing the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries. However, the Chamber also noted that “[i]t 
[international law] cannot also be expected to specify the equitable criteria to be applied or 
the practical, often technical, methods to be used for attaining that objective”.
106
 In other 
words, the Chamber found that general international law did not provide the content of 
equitable criteria for a specific case. Thus, the 1984 Judgment preferred the term ‘criteria’ to 
the term ‘principles’ because equitable criteria, in themselves, are not the principles and rules 
of international law.
107
 Three points must be noted concerning the concept of equitable 
criteria or equitable principles applied in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case. 
Firstly, the Chamber argued that the appropriateness of particular equitable 
principles (or equitable criteria) is dependent on the specific characteristics of each case.
108
 
To this end, it sought to identify relevant circumstances in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, 
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stating that the “equitableness or otherwise [of criteria] can only be assessed in relation to the 
circumstances of each case”.
109
 This proved that, contrary to the premise of the 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, the equitableness of applicable principles can be 
determined by relevant circumstances, not by an equitable result. However, it should be 
observed that the Chamber’s explanation of equitable principles was based on the 
assumption that equitable principles might be ‘ascertainable’, as in the 1982 Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case. In addition, the Chamber enumerated some examples of equitable 
principles.
110
 The Chamber’s view of equitable principles as ascertainable will be shown to 
be flawed in the relevant part of this thesis. According to this logic, however, on the 
assumption that equitable principles cannot be found in general international law, the content 
of equitable principles was understood to be determined by the relevant circumstances of 
each case. Again, this indicates the extent to which the identification and consideration of 
relevant circumstances – rather than a search for the meaning or content of equitable 
principles – become the central issue in maritime boundary delimitation. 
The second point to consider regarding the 1984 Gulf of Maine case is the 
relationship between relevant circumstances and practical methods. The Chamber stated that: 
 
“[T]he Chamber must therefore arrive at the concrete determination of the delimitation line 
that it is required to draw (a) while basing itself for the purpose on the criteria which it 
finds most likely to prove equitable in relation to the relevant circumstances of the case and 
(b) while making use, in order to apply these criteria to the case, of the practical method or 
combination of methods which it deems the most appropriate”.
111 
 
The choice of a method (or methods) must be based on its (or their) suitability for giving 
effect to circumstances regarded as relevant.
112
 The relevant circumstances of each case can 
thus ‘indicate’ the most appropriate practical method (or methods) to be employed in order to 
produce an equitable solution. 
The third point to note is that, in the final verification stage of the delimitation 
process, an ‘auxiliary’ equitable criterion (for example, an economic factor) identified by the 
Chamber may be considered to be relevant, even though it was not regarded as a relevant 
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circumstance in this case.
113
 In fact, this point proves that the application of equitable 
principles includes the weighing-up process of relevant circumstances. This process, 
however, is flexible, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The 1984 Gulf of Maine case weakened the significance of equitable principles, in 
spite of the premise that equitable principles are ascertainable, because the Chamber implied 
that the content of equitable principles cannot be found in general international law. In 
addition, the Chamber’s view that relevant circumstances can decide the content of equitable 
principles, as well as practical methods to be used, should be interrogated. According to the 
argument of this thesis, which pays attention to the application of equitable principles as a 
process rather than the search for the detailed content of equitable principles, relevant 
circumstances cannot determine the content of equitable principles. 
In sum, one positive effect of the 1984 Gulf of Maine case was that the identification 
of relevant circumstances became the main task in maritime boundary delimitation. In 
addition, the Chamber implied that one relevant circumstance must be weighed against 
another. As a result, the 1984 Gulf of Maine case proved that taking account of all relevant 
circumstances is the most important step in maritime delimitation. 
 
6.3.1.4. The 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) Case 
The 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case of the ICJ advanced some controversial 
issues with regard to the concept of equitable principles. Firstly, the Court stated that: 
 
“[I]ts application [The application of the rule of law] should display consistency and a 
degree of predictability; […], it also looks beyond it to principles of more general 
application. This is precisely why the courts have, from the beginning, elaborated equitable 
principles as being, at the same time, means to an equitable result in a particular case, yet 




According to this statement, equitable principles can ‘generally’ be applied, on the 
assumption that they are ‘ascertainable’. This was the final conclusion reached by the ICJ in 
its efforts to clarify the meaning of equitable principles since the 1982 Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libya) case. Furthermore, this conclusion resulted in the enumeration of five 
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(1) No question of refashioning geography; 
(2) Non-encroachment on the natural prolongation of another State; 
(3) The principle of respect due to all relevant circumstances; 
(4) The principle that equity does not necessarily imply equality; and 
(5) No question of distributive justice. 
 
However, the ICJ’s reasoning in this regard seems to have been based on a misunderstanding 
of the meaning of equitable principles, because some of the examples suggested by the Court 
ought to be considered under different headings. For example, physical geography and 
natural prolongation should be included within ‘relevant circumstances’ to be taken into 
account. Also, both concepts of ‘no question of refashioning geography’ and ‘non-
encroachment on the natural prolongation of another State’ are the aspects or content of an 
equitable result reached, as will be discussed in the next chapter. In addition, the 
consideration or examination of all relevant circumstances points out that both equality and 
distributive justice may not be guaranteed when a final result is achieved in maritime 
delimitation. Accordingly, the ‘principle of respect due to all relevant circumstances’ is the 
only meaningful example of the five listed above. Since ‘respect due to all relevant 
circumstances’ can incorporate all of the other four principles suggested by the ICJ, the 
application of equitable principles (if the concept of equitable principles must be accepted) 
means, above all, to take into account all the relevant circumstances in each case. 
Secondly, the Court stated that “the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary 
must be effected by the application of equitable principles in all the relevant circumstances in 
order to achieve an equitable result” [emphasis added].
116
 Although the expression ‘in all the 
relevant circumstances’ was somewhat awkward in comparison with earlier cases ruled by 
the ICJ,
117
 it nonetheless confirmed that the delimitation process is carried out by means of 
the identification and consideration of relevant circumstances. 
Thirdly, the ICJ observed that “[t]he application of equitable principles thus still 
leaves the Court with the task of appreciation of the weight to be accorded to the relevant 
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circumstances in any particular case of delimitation”.
118
 In other words, the ICJ concluded 
that the application of equitable principles entails the weighing-up process of relevant 
circumstances. 
According to the 1985 Judgment, the application of equitable principles can be 
defined as taking into account all relevant circumstances, even though the ICJ understood 
equitable principles as a body of ascertainable norms. After the Court stated the rules 
governing the delimitation of the continental shelf, it sought to determine whether or not 
certain circumstances invoked by the Parties would be relevant.
119
 In addition, in the process 
of identifying and weighing up all the relevant circumstances of each case, these 
circumstances can indicate practical methods to be employed. In the 1985 Continental Shelf 
(Libya/Malta) case, the process of assigning weight to each relevant circumstance suggested 
the use of a provisional line or the modification of the provisional line. 
Despite its clear understanding of the application of equitable principles, the ICJ’s 
insistence on equitable principles as empirically ascertainable comes under criticism, 
because the application of equitable principles is most usefully understood as the ‘process’ of 
taking into account all relevant circumstances. The ruling of the Court in its 1985 Judgment 
on the predictability of equitable principles is also problematic. The contention that the 
application of equitable principles should be predictable is only correct in the sense that the 
application of equitable principles entails taking into account all the relevant circumstances 
in all maritime delimitation cases. In other words, the only predictable factor is that all 
relevant circumstances must be taken into consideration in all delimitation cases. 
 
6.3.2. Equitable Principles in International Arbitral Awards 
 
6.3.2.1. The 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case 
In the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, the Court of Arbitration was requested to 
determine, in accordance with the rules of international law applicable in this case, the 
course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the portions of the continental shelf 
appertaining to the United Kingdom (and the Channel Islands) and to the French Republic, 
respectively, westward of 30 minutes west of the Greenwich Meridian as far as the 1,000 
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 Article 6 (the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule) of the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf could be applied in this case, since the two States were 
both Parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention at that time. However, the effect of the French 
reservations was such that the Court of Arbitration had to apply customary international law 
to the delimitation of the continental shelf in the ‘Channel Islands region’.
121
 According to 
the ruling of this case, customary international law governing the delimitation of the 
continental shelf is that “the boundary between States abutting on the same continental shelf 
is to be determined on equitable principles” [emphasis added].
122
 It is thus worth noting the 
application of equitable principles in the case of the delimitation of the continental shelf in 
the Channel Islands region. 
When applying customary international law to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf in the Channel Islands region, the Court of Arbitration stated that: 
 
“Moreover, it is clear both from the insertion of the “special circumstances” provision in 
Article 6 and from the emphasis on “equitable principles” in customary law that the force of 
the cardinal principle of “natural prolongation of territory” is not absolute, but may be 
subject to qualification in particular situations”.
123 
 
Here, the Court of Arbitration implied that the concept of special circumstances under the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, and the notion of equitable principles under 
customary international law, might both be related to the particular context of each case. In 
other words, the Court’s statement in this regard suggested that the application of equitable 
principles would involve the identification of relevant circumstances in a specific case. 
Although this case did not clarify the meaning of equitable principles, it showed that the 
‘application’ of equitable principles focused on the identification of ‘the features and 
considerations’ pertinent to the Channel Islands region (that is, the identification of relevant 
                                            
120
 The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (Geneva, 30
th
 June 1977), UNRIAA, Volume XVIII, p.5, 
Article 2(1) of the 1975 Arbitration Agreement. 
121
 The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (Geneva, 30
th
 June 1977), UNRIAA, Volume XVIII, p.47, 
para.74. 
122
 The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (Geneva, 30
th
 June 1977), UNRIAA, Volume XVIII, pp.45-
46, para.70. 
123
 The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (Geneva, 30
th











Moreover, the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case looked for practical 
methods applicable to the delimitation of the Channel Islands region by identifying and 
considering relevant circumstances. Two relevant circumstances were the oppositeness 
between the relevant coasts of the two States, and the presence of the Channel Islands.
125
 The 
oppositeness between the relevant coasts then indicated the median line, and the presence of 
the Channel Islands indicated the boundary of the 12-mile zone.
126
 This case is meaningful in 
that the Court of Arbitration showed that relevant circumstances can ‘indicate’ practical 
methods to be applied in a given case. 
 
6.3.2.2. The 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case 
In the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, another arbitral award given eight years after the 
1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, the Arbitration Tribunal drew the course of an 
SMB between the territorial sea, the continental shelf, and the EEZ appertaining respectively 
to Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Concerning the rules governing maritime delimitation, the 
Tribunal stated: 
 
“For the Tribunal, the essential objective consists of finding an equitable solution with 
reference to the provisions of Article 74, paragraph 1, and Article 83, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea. This is a rule of international law 
which is recognized by the Parties and which compels recognition by the Tribunal. 
However, in each particular case, its application requires recourse to factors and the 
application of methods which the Tribunal is empowered to select. This nevertheless does 
not mean that the Tribunal is endowed with discretionary powers or is authorized to decide 
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The Tribunal’s statement raises two significant points. Firstly, a rule of international law 
regarding maritime delimitation aims to arrive at an equitable solution. The application of the 
rules for producing an equitable solution entails a recourse to factors (or circumstances) and 
the choice of a method or methods. In practice, an equitable result can be reached through 
the identification (and weighing-up) of relevant circumstances and the choice of a suitable 
method or methods for giving effect to these circumstances. Secondly, a recourse to factors 
(or circumstances) and the choice of a method or methods carried out by the Tribunal do not 
mean a decision ex aequo et bono. In other words, the decision of the Tribunal should be 
based on ‘the achievement of an equitable solution’, which was considered part of 
international law. 
In the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, it is evident that a recourse to factors (or 
circumstances) was sought and the choice of a method or methods was made for the purpose 
of achieving an equitable result. In order to arrive at an equitable solution, the Tribunal first 
identified and then assessed relevant circumstances.
128
 The presence of islands,
129
 the length 
of relevant coastlines,
130
 the coastal configuration and orientation,
131
 and a line (the southern 
limit) included in the 1886 Franco-Portuguese Convention
132
 were all established as relevant 
circumstances. The consideration of these circumstances then indicated practical methods to 
be employed in this case.
133
 The 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case offered another example 
of the Tribunal’s arrival at an equitable result through the identification and consideration of 
relevant circumstances. Moreover, the Tribunal emphasised the open-endedness of categories 
of relevant circumstances, recommending that the application of the rules be applied flexibly, 
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6.3.2.3. The 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon Case 
In the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case between Canada and France, another arbitral 
award regarding maritime delimitation was given. The two Parties agreed that the 
fundamental norm “requires the delimitation to be effected in accordance with equitable 
principles, or equitable criteria, taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in order to 
achieve an equitable result” [emphasis added].
135
 Following this explanation of the 
fundamental norm, the Court of Arbitration stated that “[t]he underlying premise of this 
fundamental norm is the emphasis on equity and the rejection of any obligatory method”.
136
 
In other words, the Court of Arbitration implied that the way of application of the 
delimitation rule is not predetermined in applying the fundamental norm, which requires that 
the peculiarities of each case be taken into consideration. Thus, emphasising that 
“[g]eographical features are at the heart of the delimitation process”,
137
 the Court paid 
attention to the ‘marked disparity in the length of relevant coasts’ and the ‘relationship 
between the relevant coasts of two Parties’.
138
 
In this case, the Court of Arbitration examined several legal principles which the two 
States had regarded as equitable principles. For example, France adduced the principle of the 
sovereign equality of States, and the principle of the equal capacity of islands and mainland 
States to generate maritime areas; whilst Canada presented the principle of non-
encroachment and the principle of proportionality.
139
 Both States had incorrectly understood 
equitable principles to be ascertainable. Nevertheless, an equitable result was obtained by 
taking into account the ‘geographical features’ of the case.
140
 In other words, the Court of 
Arbitration arrived at an equitable result through the identification and consideration of 
relevant circumstances, not through the application of legal principles presented by the two 
States. 
Furthermore, the Court of Arbitration stated that “[r]ules of international law, as well 
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as equitable principles, must be applied to determine the relevance and weight of the 
geographical features” [emphasis added],
141
 implying that the application of equitable 
principles also includes the process of weighing up relevant circumstances. 
 
6.3.3. Decline in Importance of the Meaning of Equitable Principles in the 
         Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals 
Following the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, in which the ICJ first acknowledged 
the concept of equitable principles in maritime delimitation, the meaning of the term 
‘equitable principles’ was embodied through international case-law. Since the 1993 
Greenland/Jan Mayen case ruled by the ICJ, however, the importance of the meaning of 
equitable principles has decreased. Unlike earlier cases, which had tried to enumerate 
examples of equitable principles or clarify the content of equitable principles, the 1993 
Greenland/Jan Mayen case focused on the importance of an equitable solution, accepting the 
‘provisional’ use of the equidistance method.
142
 
Since that time, two major opinions have predominated with regard to the decisions 
of international courts and tribunals. The first, held by the supporters of the Equidistance-
Special Circumstances rule, is that the ICJ has, despite appearances, admitted the obligatory 
character of the equidistance method.
143
 According to this view, the only imperative rule in 
maritime delimitation is the Equidistance-Special Circumstances rule. The second opinion, 
as argued by scholars in favour of the achievement of an equitable result, stresses that the 
results produced from the applications of the two rules are not, in fact, dissimilar. In other 
words, scholars holding this view believe that the two rules have been assimilated or mixed. 
Whichever opinion one holds, it is certainly the case that the struggle to clarify the 
meaning of equitable principles has declined in significance, because the examples (or 
content) of equitable principles are of no use in achieving an equitable solution. However, it 
is worth noting that, since the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, international case-law has 
still produced equitable results through reliance on ‘all relevant circumstances’, even though 
it has given up the clarification of the meaning of equitable principles. The only concept that 
remains applicable to maritime delimitation cases is that of relevant circumstances. 
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Furthermore, in conflict with the argument made by Professor Evans that there has 
historically been an obligatory rule in maritime delimitation,
144
 the reasoning of the 1993 
Greenland/Jan Mayen case justified the use of the equidistance method only as the starting 
point or the construction of a provisional line in the delimitation process.
145
 As already 
pointed out with reference to the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, it is evident that 
the employment of the equidistance method may bring some advantages, such as practical 
convenience and the certainty (or predictability) of application in most cases.
146
 At other 
times, however, relevant circumstances may advise against the application of the 
equidistance method. As shown in the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case, even 




Finally, the ICJ confirmed its decision to relegate the construction of an equidistance 
line to a ‘first’ step in the delimitation process, depending on the relevant circumstances of a 
given case. As implied in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the equidistance 
method is just one of the methods that can be employed in the process of considering 
relevant circumstances with the aim of achieving an equitable result. Since the 1993 
Greenland/Jan Mayen case, the current delimitation rule has only been applied to reach an 
equitable result through reliance on the concept of relevant circumstances; neither the 
equidistance method nor a search for the meaning of equitable principles has been 
mandatory. 
 
6.4. Views of International Law Scholars Concerning Equitable Principles 
Before moving on to summarise the relationship between equitable principles and relevant 
circumstances, it will be useful to examine the opinions of the former held by some 
publicists, in order more clearly to understand the meaning of equitable principles. 
 
6.4.1. The Argument for Equitable Principles as Ascertainable 
In his Separate Opinion during the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case of the ICJ, Judge 
Weeramantry stated that: 
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“Equitable principles are in this discussion taken to include concepts, black-letter rules and 
standards or principles in the broader sense, as there is no need in this discussion to refine 
this category further. The important distinction drawn by jurists between black-letter rules 
and standards or principles is hence not used for the purpose of this classification, and the 
term “equitable principles” is to be read as covering all of these” [emphasis added].
148 
 
Following this definition of equitable principles, Judge Weeramantry presented some 
examples relating to the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, such as “equitable principles 
applicable to the assessment of representations of State policy regarding maritime 
delimitation which other States have relied upon to their prejudice; equitable principles of 
interpretation in relation to relevant treaties; and principles of fairness in considering 
whether large sections of the waters to be demarcated are unusable in consequence of their 
being frozen over for considerable periods”.
149
 If equitable principles are understood as ‘all’ 
concepts, black-letter rules and standards or principles in accordance with equity, the concept 
of equitable principles would mean nothing but justice, fairness or reasonableness in an 
abstract, broad sense. However, as shown in the previous section, the concept of equitable 
principles could be one of the routes of equity into international law.
150
 As already examined 
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in analysis of international case-law, equitable principles do not have their own content, but 
might be rather a process used for the application of equity. It follows that equitable 
principles, in themselves, cannot be ascertainable. In addition, it seems that Judge 
Weeramantry failed to advance an explanation of the relationship between equitable 
principles and relevant circumstances.
151
 
Similarly, Barbara Kwiatkowska considers diverse ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ 
principles applied in maritime delimitation to be equitable principles, on the assumption that 
the doctrine of equitable principles is a ‘fundamental legal norm’ governing maritime 
delimitation.
152
 She views equitable principles as a body of ascertainable principles. 
Accordingly, she concludes that: 
 
“The above observations permit the conclusion that the doctrine of equitable principles 
applicable to maritime delimitation has already achieved, both with regard to its procedural 
and substantive elements, a degree of clarity and predictability […] At the same time, […] 
the principles listed above do not lay down obligations but simply provide guidelines for 
achieving an equitable result in delimitation”.
153 
 
Kwiatkowska’s argument resembles that of Judge Weeramantry insofar as she includes ‘all’ 
of the principles identified through international case-law within the category of equitable 
principles. This begs a question, however: why does the doctrine of equitable principles 
provide only guidelines for an equitable result, even though it possesses a degree of clarity 
and predictability? If equitable principles are no more than guidelines for arriving at an 
equitable solution, this means that the rules governing maritime delimitation should flexibly 
be applied in a given case. In fact, since maritime delimitation is carried out through the 
identification and weighing-up of relevant circumstances, the mere presentation of all 
relevant principles is of little help in determining the meaning of equitable principles. 
Likewise, Prosper Weil states that: 
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“It is relevant circumstances that give life and body to equitable principles and the courts 
will often prefer to consider the weight to be given to such and such a fact rather than to 
formulate equitable principles in the abstract. So, it is a posteriori, in the light of relevant 
circumstances and by implication, that equitable principles can be best understood”.
154 
 
According to Professor Weil, even though equitable principles a priori exist in theory, they 
must be identified a posteriori by relevant circumstances. However, any approach that 
regards equitable principles as ascertainable is meaningless, because the application of 
equitable principles is a process (which has been established to take into account all relevant 
circumstances) or the examination of all relevant circumstances in itself. 
 
6.4.2. The Argument for Equating Equitable Principles with Equity 
While Prosper Weil, Barbara Kwiatkowska, and Judge Weeramantry consider equitable 
principles to be a body of ascertainable principles, Robert Y. Jennings understands that 
equity is synonymous with equitable principles. He refers to the latter as “undefined, and 
unlisted, but apparently indistinguishable from “equity” in general”.
155
 On the premise that 
the function of equity (or equitable principles) is to correct or modify an existing rule of law 
which would produce an inequitable result if strictly applied,
156
 Sir Robert Jennings then 
explores how equity (or equitable principles) functioned in the 1969 North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, when the ICJ concluded that the equidistance method was no longer 
obligatory.
157
 Sir Robert Jennings also criticises the ICJ’s 1969 Judgment, arguing that the 
application of equitable principles cannot be differentiated from a decision ex aequo et 
bono.
158
 However, his argument requires two provisos. Firstly, as discussed in this chapter, 
the function of equity in international law is not to correct an existing rule of international 
law. Secondly, as pointed out above, the application of equitable principles (if the concept of 
equitable principles must exist) leading to an equitable result is on the basis of an ‘actual’ 
rule of international law. In other words, a final result which the application of the 
delimitation rule produces is different from an arbitrary decision. 
Similarly, responding to the premise that equitable principles have an affinity with 
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the concept of equity, Oscar Schachter states that equitable principles have a ‘more specific 
substantive’ and ‘legislative’ character.
159
 In his view, equitable principles are ascertainable. 
Yet, he also notes that both equitable principles and equity aim to carry out individualised 
justice. He is interested in the fact that equitable principles and equity work towards the 
same objective, not the question of whether or not equitable principles are ascertainable. 
Therefore, it can be said that Schachter regards equitable principles as synonymous with 
equity. 
 
6.4.3. The Argument for Disregarding the Term ‘Equitable Principles’ 
In his recent book, Nuno Marques Antunes argues that: 
 
“In case law, the recourse to the term “equitable principles”, and its inclusion as part of 
customary law, was mere formalism. It was an attempt to circumvent difficulties related to 




Antunes, an ardent proponent of the Equidistance-Special Circumstance rule, concludes that 
the key legal element within maritime boundary delimitation is equity, not equitable 
principles.
161
 This thesis can share Antunes’s conclusion. However, it has two different 
reasons leading to the same conclusion that Antunes arrives at. Firstly, there is no meaningful 
principle resulting in an equitable solution in maritime delimitation except for the principle 
of taking into account all relevant circumstances. Secondly, the current delimitation rule 
seeks the equitability of the result to be reached, not the equitability of the principles to be 
applied in maritime delimitation. 
 
6.4.4. A Concluding Remark 
The three views held by the publicists cited above require commentary. Firstly, equitable 
principles are not a body of ascertainable principles. The 1982 Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libya) case, the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, and the 1985 Continental Shelf 
(Libya/Malta) case all contributed to this misunderstanding. In turn, the misunderstanding 
has generated the argument (as made by Barbara Kwiatkowska) that the application of 
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ascertainable, equitable principles has consistency or predictability. However, the only 
predictable aspect of application of equitable principles is that all relevant circumstances 
must be taken into account. In other words, it is only certain or predictable that the 
application of equitable principles is a process considering all relevant circumstances; how 
equitable principles (if precisely expressed, the ‘achievement of an equitable result’ as the 
current delimitation rule because this thesis does not accept the importance of equitable 
principles) are applied is not predictable. 
Secondly, equitable principles may be regarded as synonymous with equity. 
Equitable principles as an example of equity might appear in ‘certain’ areas of international 
law, such as the law of international watercourses or the law of maritime boundary 
delimitation. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether or not the concept known as equitable 
principles has its own meaning in these areas of international law. 
Lastly, the application of equitable principles is a procedural concept involving the 
consideration of all relevant circumstances. In other words, the ‘application’ of equitable 
principles is another name for a ‘process’ examining all relevant circumstances. Therefore, 
there is no need to keep the term ‘equitable principles’ in order to indicate the process. The 
reason for this is that the current delimitation rule does not aim at the equitability of the 
process. 
Bearing these three points in mind, the next sub-section will address the research on 
the relationship between equitable principles and relevant circumstances. It will show that 
the concept of equitable principles (which are said to have predictability, according to some 
international law scholars and earlier decisions of international courts and tribunals) has little 
meaning, and the notion of relevant circumstances (which enables the rules governing 
maritime delimitation to be applied flexibly) must be the key factor of maritime delimitation. 
 
6.5. The Relationship between Equitable Principles and Relevant 
      Circumstances 
 
6.5.1. The Emergence and Meaning of the Concept of Relevant Circumstances 
The 1966 Helsinki Rules introduced a list of ‘relevant factors’ to be considered in order to 
arrive at an equitable utilisation in the law of international watercourses.
162
 Subsequently, the 
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases of the ICJ used the term ‘relevant circumstances’ for 
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the first time with regard to the law of maritime boundary delimitation.
163
 Since no 
difference has been found between the terms ‘relevant factors’ and ‘relevant circumstances’, 
this thesis presupposes that the concept of relevant factors is identical to that of relevant 
circumstances. However, it should be noted that there is a difference between relevant 
circumstances and ‘factors to be taken into consideration’. 
Since the delimitation of maritime boundaries is determined by the identification and 
weighing-up of relevant circumstances, relevant circumstances are ‘facts’ on which 
international courts and tribunals must rely in the process of delimiting maritime areas. On 
the other hand, ‘factors to be taken into consideration’ are ‘reasons’ presented by the States 
concerned in relation to maritime delimitation. Among these factors to be taken into 
consideration, a factor or factors regarded as ‘significant’ in a given case can then become 
‘relevant’. For example, even though several factors to be taken into consideration as regards 
the Channel Islands were presented by both Parties in the 1977 Anglo-French Continental 
Shelf case, the factors considered to be significant were the oppositeness between the 
relevant coasts of both States and the presence of the Channel Islands close to the French 
coast.
164
 These factors to be taken into consideration thus made themselves relevant in the 
delimitation process. 
Nevertheless, the concept of ‘factors to be taken into consideration’ is diminishing in 
importance. Some factors to be taken into account, such as geographical features or the 
presence of islands, have been included in the list of relevant circumstances. This means that 
the list of relevant circumstances could be formulated to some extent, even in the law of 
maritime delimitation. Thus, some examples of factors to be taken into consideration would 
be included in the list of relevant circumstances, depending on the normative density of 
relevant circumstances. This point will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In sum, while various factors may be presented by the States concerned, not all of 
these factors are necessarily relevant. Equally, they are not necessarily capable of ensuring 
that a relevant circumstance (within the catalogue of relevant circumstances) is accorded a 
certain degree of weight. However, the claims made by Parties of various factors to be taken 
into consideration may expand the list of relevant circumstances. Any increase in factors to 
be taken into consideration then plays an important role in enhancing the flexibility of 
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application of the rules governing maritime delimitation in a certain case. 
Here, it should be noted that relevant circumstances can be defined in two ways in 
the context of maritime delimitation, depending on whether or not the use of the equidistance 
method is considered mandatory. The first view, which supports the obligatory character of 
the equidistance method, maintains that relevant circumstances are nothing but 
circumstances which call for an equidistance line to be adjusted. On the other hand, the 
second opinion, which denies the mandatory character of the equidistance method, concludes 
that the use of the equidistance method is provisional in the delimitation process, and that 
relevant circumstances may indicate another provisional line if they point out that it is 
impossible to draw a provisional equidistance line. This thesis has shown, through analysis 
of the judgements and arbitral awards made by international courts and tribunals, that the 
application of equitable principles entails the identification and weighing-up of relevant 
circumstances. This study supports the second view, and its next section will therefore deal 
with the indicative role of relevant circumstances. 
 
6.5.2. The Indicative Role of Relevant Circumstances 
Malcolm D. Evans classifies the role of relevant circumstances into two categories: 
amelioration and indication.
165
 In their ameliorative aspect, he argues, the role of relevant 
circumstances is to modify a provisional line. Still, this point can be criticised. 
For example, the oppositeness between the coasts concerned as a relevant 
circumstance requires an equidistance line to be drawn provisionally. Adjusting the 
equidistance line, however, does not fall under the heading of amelioration. Rather, this 
example can be understood such that the oppositeness between relevant coasts demands the 
use of the equidistance method, and then another relevant circumstance calls for the 
equidistance line to be adjusted. In other words, if a prior, obligatory method does not exist, 
the ameliorative role of relevant circumstances cannot be valid. Of the two roles of relevant 
circumstances proposed by Professor Evans, therefore, closer attention should be paid to 
their indicative role than their ameliorative function. 
Fascinatingly, Professor Evans also implies that the indicative role of relevant 
circumstances is not in fact to indicate but to exclude a specific method.
166
 In light of the 
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases of the ICJ, Evans’s view seems accurate. The Court 
                                            
165
 Evans, supra note 117, pp.78-83. 
166
 Malcolm D. Evans, “Maritime Delimitation and Expanding Categories of Relevant 







made it clear that the geographical circumstances of these cases excluded the equidistance 
method.
167
 In other words, the peculiar characteristics of these cases indicated that the 
equidistance method must be excluded. However, if delimitation cases since the 1969 
Judgment are examined en masse, Evans’s argument appears less tenable. In fact, relevant 
circumstances in several cases indicated a specific method. For example, the 1977 Anglo-
French Continental Shelf case stated that: 
 
“In other words, even under Article 6 it is the geographical and other circumstances of any 
given case which indicate and justify the use of the equidistance method as the means of 
achieving an equitable solution rather than the inherent quality of the method as a legal 
norm of delimitation” [emphasis added].
168 
 
The indicative role of relevant circumstances was also confirmed during the 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case of the ICJ, as follows: 
 
“A finding by the Court in favour of a delimitation by an equidistance line could only be 
based on considerations derived from an evaluation and balancing up of all relevant 
circumstances, since equidistance is not, in the view of the Court, either a mandatory legal 




In this case, relevant circumstances (for example, the conduct of the States concerned) were 
understood to indicate an appropriate line: a de facto line dividing the concession areas.
170
 In 
several cases after this one, including the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the 1985 Continental 
Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, and the 1992 Saint Pierre 
and Miquelon case, the indicative role of relevant circumstances was consistently 
acknowledged. The relevant circumstances of each case indicated practical methods or actual 
delimitation lines which were employed or drawn. 
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6.5.3. The Importance of Relevant Circumstances as Elucidated by the 
         Relationship between Equitable Principles and Relevant Circumstances 
As has been shown above, the concept of equitable principles (if equitable principles must 
exist) can only be meaningful when these principles are ‘applied’. Equitable principles in 
themselves do not have their own meaning or content. It is possible that one of the 
applications of equity in maritime delimitation might be named equitable principles. 
However, it should be noted that the rules governing maritime delimitation do not have a 
goal to ensure the equitability of the principles to be applied. 
Exploring the relationship between equitable principles and relevant circumstances 
is an essential step in understanding the meaning of equitable principles in maritime 
delimitation. The application of equity (or equitable principles) is a ‘process’ by means of 
which an equitable result is produced in some areas of international law. The process of 
applying equity (or equitable principles) in maritime delimitation takes all of the relevant 
circumstances of each case into consideration. It must thus be determined how relevant 
circumstances are dealt with in the course of applying equity (or equitable principles). 
Even before the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, whose outcome implied that the 
two rules governing maritime delimitation had to some extent been combined, delimitation 
cases had generally identified and weighed up relevant circumstances, and they had then 
applied practical methods indicated by these circumstances. Following the 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases heard by the ICJ, the ‘application’ of equitable principles became a 
central concern in maritime delimitation, taking precedence over the meaning of equitable 
principles per se. However, in attempting to define the meaning of equitable principles 
during its three cases in the 1980s, the ICJ (or its Chamber) tried to present some concrete 
examples of equitable principles, based on the misconception that equitable principles are a 
set of ascertainable norms. These attempts were a failure. Despite the ICJ’s aim during the 
1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case to present five concrete examples of equitable 
principles, in order to support the argument for the predictable application of the rules 
governing maritime delimitation, there was no way to explain the application of equitable 
principles except in terms of the identification and weighing-up of all the relevant 
circumstances in a given case. 
At this point, it will be necessary to comment on the examples of equitable 
principles enumerated by the ICJ during the 1984 Gulf of Maine case and the 1985 







following equitable principles: the criterion that the land dominates the sea; the criterion of 
non-encroachment on areas too close to the coast of another State; and the criterion of 
preventing any cut-off of the seaward projection of the coast (or part of the coast) of the 
States concerned.
171
 However, it may be observed that these principles could apply, equally, 
in the process of taking account of all relevant circumstances. In other words, the application 
of equitable principles results from taking into account all of the relevant circumstances in a 
specific case. Likewise, all of the equitable principles presented during the 1985 Continental 
Shelf (Libya/Malta) case (with the exception of the principle of taking into account all 
relevant circumstances) could apply to the identification and weighing-up of relevant 
circumstances. Accordingly, even if we accept the assumption that equitable principles are 
ascertainable, the concrete examples of equitable principles enumerated by the ICJ (or its 
Chamber) can only apply in the course of taking into consideration all relevant 
circumstances. 
Here, it should be noted that the concrete examples of equitable principles 
enumerated by the ICJ (or its Chamber) were not principles applied when relevant 
circumstances were taken into account. In other words, such equitable principles did not 
examine relevant circumstances. Rather, the result reached after the examination of all 
relevant circumstances must be in conformity with these principles. All of the principles 
referred to in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case and the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case 
(except for the principle of taking into account all relevant circumstances) are closer to 
confirming or showing the equitability of the result produced. This point will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
Unlike the ICJ (or its Chamber) in its three cases in the 1980s, international arbitral 
tribunals in the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case and the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-
Bissau case were apt to focus on the concept of relevant circumstances. In the 1977 Anglo-
French Continental Shelf case, the Court of Arbitration implied that, in the Channel Islands 
region, the application of equitable principles should be carried out through the identification 
and consideration of relevant circumstances. Likewise, in the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
case, an equitable result was arrived at by identifying and weighing up relevant 
circumstances, such as the presence of islands, the length of relevant coastlines, the coastal 
configuration and orientation, and a line (the southern limit) included in the 1886 Franco-
Portuguese Convention. Notably, the Tribunal of the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case stated 
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that “each case of delimitation is a unicum”.
172
 In other words, the Tribunal emphasised the 
uniqueness of each case, not a search for a structured system of equitable principles. 
Since the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, almost all maritime boundary 
delimitation cases have constructed a provisional equidistance line as the starting point in the 
delimitation process. Nevertheless, the identification and weighing-up of relevant 
circumstances have still been essential steps in the delimitation of maritime boundaries, 
irrespective of the provisional use of the equidistance method. In other words, the 
achievement of an equitable result, which is the current rule governing maritime 
delimitation, still requires that all of the relevant circumstances should be taken into account. 
In conclusion, the relationship between equitable principles and relevant 
circumstances can be understood in the sense that the application of equitable principles is a 
process which takes account of all the relevant circumstances in each concrete case. Does 
equity play its lead role or autonomous role in maritime boundary delimitation?
173
 The 
answer is in the negative. Equity in maritime delimitation focuses and relies solely upon the 
consideration of all relevant circumstances, and it aims at the equitability of the result 
produced. It follows that the current delimitation rule governing maritime delimitation is 
flexibly applied through taking account of all relevant circumstances, without respect to the 
obligatory character of the equidistance method. 
 
 
7. A Concluding Remark 
 
As has been shown above, the meaning of equitable principles is elucidated by the 
relationship between equitable principles and relevant circumstances. This thesis assumes 
that the process of applying so-called equitable principles is synonymous with taking 
account of all the relevant circumstances in a particular case. 
Hence, in the delimitation of maritime boundaries or the utilisation of international 
watercourses, equitable principles are not a body of ascertainable principles. Rather, 
equitable principles (if the concept of equitable principles must exist) are only meaningful in 
their application – that is, the process of considering all relevant circumstances leading to an 
equitable result. 
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The purpose of the application of equity in maritime delimitation is solely to reach 
an equitable ‘solution’. Therefore, there is no reason for clinging to the term ‘equitable 
principles’ in order to define the process of considering relevant circumstances as equitable. 
Whether or not the process itself of taking into account all relevant circumstances is 
equitable does not mark its place in the course of discussing maritime delimitation. In other 
words, the subject of maritime delimitation seeks the equitability of the result to be achieved 
through the flexibility of the rules governing maritime delimitation or through the discretion 
of international courts and tribunals dealing with all relevant circumstances. Without the 
term ‘equitable principles’, we can produce an equitable result by taking into account all the 
relevant circumstances in a given case. In addition, the reason why equity in maritime 
delimitation cannot be equity ex aequo et bono is that it depends entirely on the examination 
of ‘all’ the relevant circumstances in a certain case. 
In sum, in some areas of international law, such as the law of maritime boundary 
delimitation or the law of international watercourses, equity plays its role in arriving at an 
equitable ‘result’, through reliance on the examination of all relevant circumstances. Except 
that the application of equitable principles only means taking into account relevant 
circumstances in maritime delimitation, we cannot find out any reason for maintaining the 










The Rise of Relevant Circumstances 





The objective of the previous chapter is to get rid of the misunderstanding about the concept 
of equitable principles, because the concept of relevant circumstances should be the one and 
only issue to be observed. 
Tenacity for equitable principles has resulted in the argument that they should have 
predictability. As shown above, however, the application of equitable principles only means 
that all relevant circumstances must be taken into account. The question whether or not 
equitable principles have certainty or predictability would not be helpful in achieving an 
equitable solution in a certain case. Rather, the concept on which we can depend in a 
delimitation case is that of relevant circumstances. These circumstances are concrete facts 
that we cannot deny. 
Reliance on the notion of relevant circumstances leads to the argument that the rules 
governing maritime delimitation must be applied flexibly in reaching an equitable solution. 
The reason for this is that each delimitation case has its own relevant circumstances. 
Although the normative density of relevant circumstances varies in each area of international 
law, as will be shown in the next section, the diversity will not eliminate the flexible 
application of the rules in a certain area for the purpose of producing an equitable result. 
Moreover, the discussion on the normative density of relevant circumstances will enable us 
to properly grasp the concept of relevant circumstances in international law. 
In order more clearly to understand the process of applying the rules governing 
maritime delimitation which deals with relevant circumstances, Chapter IV intends to 
identify and explore the three phases of taking into account relevant circumstances to 
produce an equitable result. In addition, analysis of international case-law will lead to the 







the avoidance of producing an arbitrary result in maritime delimitation. 
Nevertheless, this chapter will also show the indeterminacy of an equitable result 
achieved through the process of application of the rules governing maritime delimitation. 
The fact that the process of taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances in 
maritime delimitation has been established is not relevant to enhancing the predictability of 
the rules in maritime delimitation. 
 
 
2. The Normative Density of Relevant Circumstances in International 
    Law 
 
2.1. The Highest Level: The Law of International Watercourses 
 
2.1.1. The Emergence of the Doctrine of Equitable Utilisation 
International law has brought about several equitable results on the basis of the concept of 
equity, including the achievement of an equitable delimitation, which functions as the 
delimitation rule. Of these equitable results, this thesis will first address the concept of 
equitable utilisation as acknowledged in the law of international watercourses, with reference 
to the normative density of relevant circumstances. 
At this point, it should be stressed that this research intends to regard the concept of 
equitable utilisation itself as the current rule governing the utilisation of international 
watercourses. Just as in maritime delimitation, therefore, all relevant circumstances must be 
taken into account in order to equitably utilise international watercourses. This means that 
the concept of relevant circumstances is more important than the concept of equitable 
principles or procedures for the utilisation of international watercourses. Hence, this thesis 
will prefer the term ‘doctrine’ or ‘objective’ of equitable utilisation to the term ‘principle’ of 
equitable utilisation. 
Even though water was one of the world’s most important resources before the 
twentieth century, its importance increased dramatically after this time due to the growth of 
population and industry.
1
 As a result, certain doctrines or objectives evolved in relation to 
States’ utilisation of water resources. These included the Harmon doctrine, the principle of 
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absolute territorial integrity (or riparian rights), and the principle of prior appropriation.
2
 The 
doctrine of equitable utilisation, based on the concept of limited sovereignty, was another. 
The concept of equitable utilisation had received strong support even before the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational 




For instance, the 1966 Helsinki Rules made by the ILA accepted the concept of 
equitable utilisation. Article IV of the Helsinki Rules stated that “[e]ach basin State is 
entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the 
waters of an international drainage basin” [emphasis added]. This means that each State 
concerned has an ‘equal right’ to a reasonable and equitable share of the beneficial uses of 
international watercourses.
4
 However, this Article did not provide a thorough explanation of 
the concept of equitable utilisation, despite acknowledging the significance of equal rights to 
equitable utilisation. Another Article of the Helsinki Rules is worth being examined for the 
insight that it offered into the meaning of equitable utilisation. Article V(1) of the Helsinki 
Rules dictated that “[w]hat is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article 
IV is to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case” 
[emphasis added]. Close attention to this article reveals that the meaning of equitable 
utilisation, as one possible equitable result, is also determined in the context of ‘all the 
relevant factors in each particular case’. First, an individual relevant circumstance taken into 
consideration may ‘indicate’ the ‘quantity’ of water needed for each State; second, all of the 
relevant circumstances are weighed up. It is thus an important task to identify and draw up a 
list of relevant circumstances. In the legal context of international watercourses, unlike 
maritime boundary delimitation, a list of relevant circumstances was made as early as 1966. 
For example, Article V(2) of the Helsinki Rules enumerated relevant circumstances 
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(although not exhaustively) with regard to the doctrine of equitable utilisation. This point can 
be regarded as the highest level in relation to the normative density of relevant 
circumstances. 
In its next sections, this thesis intends to illustrate the doctrine of equitable 
utilisation as acknowledged in international law-making processes and the judgements and 
arbitral awards of international courts and tribunals, in order more clearly to understand the 
significance of relevant circumstances in achieving equitable utilisation. 
 
2.1.2. The Acknowledgement of the Doctrine of Equitable Utilisation in 
         International Law-making Processes 
 
2.1.2.1. Declarations and Recommendations Adopted by International 
            Conferences 
First, the second paragraph of the 1933 Declaration of Montevideo concerning the industrial 
and agricultural use of international rivers, approved by the seventh International Conference 
of American States, stated that “[t]his right [the exclusive right to exploit the margin], 
however, is conditioned in its exercise upon the necessity of not injuring the equal right due 
to the neighbouring State on the margin under its jurisdiction”.
5
 According to this 
declaration, the right of each State was restricted by the condition that the ‘equal right’ of a 
neighbouring State should not be affected. 
Second, Recommendation 51 of the ‘Action Plan for the Human Environment’, 
adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, mandated 
that “[t]he net benefits of hydrologic regions common to more than one national jurisdiction 
are to be shared equitably by the nations affected”. In other words, this recommendation 
clearly provided for the doctrine of equitable utilisation. 
Likewise, the ‘Mar del Plata Action Plan’, adopted by the United Nations Water 
Conference in 1977, referred to the doctrine of equitable utilisation in terms of the 
management and utilisation of water resources. For example, Recommendation 91 of this 
Action Plan declared that: 
 
“In relation to the use, management, and development of shared water resources, national 
policies should take into consideration the right of each State sharing the resources to 
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equitably utilize such resources as the means to promote bonds of solidarity and co-
operation”. 
 
The declarations and recommendations cited above were neither legally binding treaties nor 
instances of customary international law. However, some of the principles underlying these 
declarations and recommendations may be regarded as the ‘established’ principles of 
international law. Moreover, these declarations and recommendations have played an 
important role in transforming certain principles into the principles of international law – 
despite their not originally having been accepted as such. Therefore, the doctrine of equitable 
utilisation put forward in some declarations and recommendations (whether an established 
objective of international law at that time, or merely a suggested principle) has been included 




From the late nineteenth century onwards, numerous bilateral agreements were concluded 
that relied either explicitly or implicitly on the doctrine of equitable utilisation.
6
 Analysis of 
these agreements indicates that the doctrine of equitable utilisation has been applied to 





 and the right to fish.
9
 By means of extensive studies of existing 
bilateral agreements, including the decisions of international courts and tribunals and the 
opinions of international law scholars, the ILA and the Institut de Droit International have 
sought to formulate the rules regarding the doctrine of equitable utilisation. After all, as 
discussed above, the ILA formulated an explicit list of relevant circumstances, and 
acknowledged the doctrine of equitable utilisation in its 1966 Helsinki Rules. The doctrine of 
equitable utilisation in its codified form can be found in some multilateral agreements, 
including the UN Convention on International Watercourses in 1997. 
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For example, Article 2(2)(c) of the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe) sought “[t]o ensure that transboundary waters are used in a 
reasonable and equitable way, taking into particular account their transboundary character”. 
Although it does not fall into the category of multilateral agreements, Article 12 of the 2004 
Berlin Rules on Water Resources of the ILA also accepted the doctrine of equitable 
utilisation. 
In relation to areas other than the utilisation of international watercourses, the ILC 
adopted the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers in 2008. Article 4 of these 
Draft Articles also supported the doctrine of equitable utilisation concerning the utilisation of 
transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems. 
 
2.1.3. The Acknowledgement of the Doctrine of Equitable Utilisation in the 
         Judgements and Arbitral Awards of International Courts and Tribunals 
 
2.1.3.1. The Judgements of International Courts 
First, with regard to the judgements of international courts, two cases heard by the PCIJ 
should be examined: the 1929 River Oder case and the 1937 Diversion of Water from the 
River Meuse case. In the 1929 River Oder case, the PCIJ was asked to determine whether or 
not the jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder extended to two 
tributaries of the Oder located in Poland under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles: the Netze and 
the Warthe. The PCIJ answered in the affirmative, based on the ‘idea of a community of 
interest of riparian States’, not the idea of a right to passage in favour of upstream States. 
That is to say, the PCIJ stated that: 
 
“[I]t is at once seen that a solution of the problem has been sought not in the idea of a right 
of passage in favour of upstream States, but in that of a community of interest of riparian 
States. This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common 
legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in 
the user [use] of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential 
privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the others” [emphases added].
10 
 
This case was related to the ‘navigational’ uses of international watercourses. Can the same 
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logic be applied to the ‘non-navigational’ uses of international watercourses? The second 
report on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, written by 
Stephen C. McCaffrey, answered this question in the affirmative.
11  
Later, the 1997 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case of the ICJ also applied the logic of the 1929 River Oder case to 
the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.
12
 It is likely that the ‘common legal 
right’ to which the PCIJ referred meant the doctrine of equitable utilisation.
13
 However, it 
should be noted that a common legal right does not necessarily mean that each State has the 




The PCIJ addressed the doctrine of equitable utilisation again in the 1937 Diversion 
of Water from the River Meuse case. Belgium and the Netherlands had concluded a treaty in 
1863 concerning the diversion of water from the River Meuse for the feeding of navigation 
canals and irrigation channels. In this case, the Netherlands alleged that some of Belgium’s 
works and projects were not in accordance with the 1863 Treaty.
15
 In contrast, Belgium 
claimed that the Netherlands had violated the 1863 Treaty by the construction of a barrage, 
and that another canal (the Juliana Canal) should also be subject to the 1863 Treaty.
16
 
However, all of the submissions made by both States were rejected by the Court. Although 
the PCIJ ruled this case only to fall under the 1863 Treaty, not under the general principles of 
international law,
17
 it should be noted that the utilisation regime of the River Meuse was still 
based on the concept of equitable utilisation, even under the 1863 Treaty. While the 
Netherlands assumed that it had the ‘special privilege’ of control over and above the ‘right of 
supervision’ with regard to the utilisation regime of the River Meuse,
18
 the PCIJ rejected this 
contention.
19
 By granting the Netherlands a ‘lesser’ right, the Court indicated that the 
equitable utilisation of the River Meuse was of primary concern. 
Subsequently, we must examine the 1997 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case of the ICJ. In 
1977, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (replaced by the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993) 
had concluded a treaty regarding the Construction and Operation of the Gabčíkovo-
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Nagymaros System of Locks. This treaty was concerned with building one lock at 
Gabčíkovo (in Czechoslovak territory) and the other lock at Nagymaros (in Hungarian 
territory).
20
 However, this project was never finished, because Hungary abandoned the works 
at Nagymaros in 1989;
21
 as a result, Czechoslovakia proceeded to a ‘unilateral diversion’ of 
the River Danube, called ‘Variant C’.
22
 Although this case raised several issues concerning 
the law of treaties, the law of State responsibility, and international environmental law, this 
study intends to focus on the issues pertaining to the doctrine of equitable utilisation. In 
response to Hungary’s argument that ‘Variant C’ was not in line with the doctrine of 
equitable utilisation, the ICJ stated that: 
 
“The Court considers that Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of a shared 
resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of 
the natural resources of the Danube – with the continuing effects of the diversion of these 
waters on the ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetköz – failed to respect the 
proportionality which is required by international law”.
23 
 
The Court considered the ongoing effects on the ‘ecology’ of the riparian area of the 
Szigetköz to be a relevant circumstance. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
environmental issue itself became a relevant circumstance. In fact, it was significant 
primarily in the sense that “the operation of Variant C led Czechoslovakia to appropriate, 
essentially for its use and benefit, between 80 and 90 per cent of the waters of the Danube 
before returning them to the main bed of the river”.
24
 In short, it was likely that Hungary’s 
‘social and economic needs’ – which seemed to take precedence over other categories of 
relevant circumstance, as will be shown below – had been denied by Czechoslovakia. In 
other words, from the standpoint of social and economic needs, the concept of equitable 
utilisation is related to the ‘quantity’ of water (to be allocated or accommodated) as well as 
the right of access to water, not environmental protection. 
Furthermore, in support of Hungary’s argument, the ICJ made an important 
statement with respect to the law of State responsibility. According to the Court, a 
countermeasure not in accord with the doctrine of equitable utilisation was to be considered 
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a ‘disproportionate’ countermeasure. Therefore, this case strengthened the importance of the 
doctrine of equitable utilisation in international law.
25
 
Lastly, it is worth noting the recent case of the ICJ: the 2010 Pulp Mills case. In this 
case, the concept of ‘optimum and rational’ utilisation to which Article 1 of the 1975 Statute 
of the River Uruguay refers was examined. The Court implied that the concept of optimum 
and rational utilisation is broader than that of equitable utilisation: 
 
“[T]he attainment of optimum and rational utilization requires a balance between the 
Parties’ rights and needs to use the river for economic and commercial activities on the one 
hand, and the obligation to protect it from any damage to the environment that may be 




However, this statement of the ICJ does not necessarily mean to weaken the doctrine of 
equitable utilisation in international law. Rather, the 2010 Pulp Mills case raised an 
environmental issue as well. Therefore, the Court went on to say that: 
 
“Article 27 embodies this interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable utilization 
of a shared resource and the balance between economic development and environmental 




2.1.3.2. The Arbitral Awards of International Tribunals 
With regard to the utilisation of international watercourses, perhaps the most famous 
arbitration case is the 1957 Lac Lanoux Arbitration case between Spain and France. This 
case concerned a hydroelectric project undertaken by France which planned to divert the 
waters of Lake Lanoux. Spain opposed the project from the very beginning. In response, 
France proposed that it would withdraw an amount of water equivalent to that which had 
been diverted. Nevertheless, an arbitration tribunal was established, because Spain continued 
to oppose the modified project of France. On the subject of these modifications, the Tribunal 
observed that “[a] withdrawal with return, as contemplated in the French project, does not 
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alter a state of affairs established in response to the demands of life in society”.
28
 According 
to the Tribunal, France’s ‘withdrawal with return’ project was in accord with the obligations 
arising from the relevant treaty between the two States. Addressing the issue of whether or 
not France (the upper riparian State) had taken the interests of Spain (the lower riparian 
State) into account, the Tribunal stated that: 
 
“The Tribunal considers that the upper riparian State, under the rules of good faith, has an 
obligation to take into consideration the various interests concerned, to seek to give them 
every satisfaction compatible with the pursuit of its own interests, and to show that it has, in 




The Tribunal thereby implied that, although France was not in violation of its obligations, 
Lake Lanoux was subject to equitable utilisation, not unlimited sovereignty. However, the 
Tribunal did not clarify the list of ‘various interests’ to be taken into account. 
 
2.1.4. The List of Relevant Circumstances in the Law of International 
         Watercourses 
As mentioned above, the law of international watercourses had already made a list of 
relevant circumstances in the 1966 Helsinki Rules. The 1997 UN Convention on 
International Watercourses included a similar list. The list of relevant circumstances drawn 
up in Article V(2) of the 1966 Helsinki Rules is as follows: 
 
“(a) The geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area in 
the territory of each basin State; 
(b) The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each 
basin State; 
(c) The climate affecting the basin; 
(d) The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing utilization; 
(e) The economic and social needs of each basin State; 
(f) The population dependant on the waters of the basin in each basin State; 
                                            
28
 Para.8 (of the Award of 16
th
 November 1957) in partial translations in Yearbook of the ILC 1974, 
Volume II, Part Two, p.196, para.1064. 
29
 Para.22 (of the Award of 16
th
 November 1957) in partial translations in Yearbook of the ILC 1974, 







(g) The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social needs 
of each basin State; 
(h) The availability of other resources; 
(i) The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin; 
(j) The practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means of 
adjusting conflicts among uses; and 
(k) The degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing 
substantial injury to a co-basin State”. 
 
Subsequently, Article 6(1) of the 1997 UN Convention on International Watercourses 
recognised the following as relevant circumstances: 
 
“(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a 
natural character; 
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
(c) The population dependant on the watercourse in each watercourse State; 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other 
watercourse States; 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the 
watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; [and] 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing 
use”. 
 
Although these two lists of relevant circumstances differ in some particulars, they can be 
divided into four categories: the social and economic needs of the States; existing uses; 
efficient utilisation; and natural factors (including geography and hydrology). 
Firstly, Article 6(1)(b) of the 1997 UN Convention on International Watercourses 
and Article V(2)(e) of the 1966 Helsinki Rules explicitly refer to the ‘social and economic 
needs of the States’. However, other relevant circumstances in the two lists are also 
connected to these needs. For example, the reference to the ‘population dependant on the 
watercourse’ inserted in Article 6(1)(c) of the 1997 UN Convention on International 
Watercourses and Article V(2)(f) of the 1966 Helsinki Rules alludes to the social and 
economic needs of the States concerned. The ‘existence of alternative water or other 







Watercourses and Article V(2)(h) of the 1966 Helsinki Rules may also be a relevant 
circumstance relating to the social and economic needs of the States involved. Furthermore, 
the ‘extent of irrigated or irrigable land’ and the ‘extent of the economy of the States which 
is dependant on the river’ have been proposed as relevant to the context of the utilisation of 
‘national’ watercourses, even though they are not included in the two above-mentioned lists 
of relevant circumstances.
30
 With regard to the category of the social and economic needs of 
the States concerned, it should be noted that the ‘domestic uses’ of international 
watercourses, such as drinking, may have priority over other relevant circumstances.
31
 This 
point is connected to the fact that Article 10(2) of the 1997 UN Convention on International 
Watercourses includes the phrase ‘with special regard being given to the requirements of 
vital human needs’. 
Secondly, Article 6(1)(e) of the 1997 UN Convention on International Watercourses 
and Article V(2)(d) of the 1966 Helsinki Rules dealt with the ‘existing uses’ of international 
watercourses. With respect to the existing uses of international watercourses, the most 
important issue is whether or not this circumstance has priority over other relevant 
circumstances. As Ximena Fuentes points out, Article 6(3) of the 1997 UN Convention on 
International Watercourses clearly implies that no relevant circumstance has an inherent 
priority over other circumstances.
32
 It is also worth noting that the existing uses of 
international watercourses might not function as a relevant circumstance without respect to 
other relevant circumstances, because existing uses could include ‘historical’ elements.
33
 In 
other words, the existing uses of international watercourses may or may not be a relevant 
circumstance depending on the ‘present’ social and economic needs of the States concerned. 
Thirdly, Article 6(1)(f) of the 1997 UN Convention on International Watercourses 
and Article V(2)(i) of the 1966 Helsinki Rules dealt with the ‘efficient utilisation’ of 
international watercourses. Here, we can see that the scope of the 1997 UN Convention on 
International Watercourses is broader than that of the 1966 Helsinki Rules, which only 
regulated the avoidance of unnecessary waste. What is important, in this context, is that 
efficiency has little relevance to the ‘allocation’ of international watercourses, because it 
would be affected by financial and technical issues, such as the construction of new dams 
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(assuming that the State concerned does not intentionally waste water resources).
34
 In an 
exceptional case, wilful waste could result in the denial of water resources to the wasteful 
State, whose behaviour may be considered to evince no need for water. Therefore, except for 
rare cases in which the State concerned intentionally wastes water resources, efficient 
utilisation cannot generally be considered a relevant circumstance with regard to the 
allocation of international watercourses. However, efficiency can play a role in weighing up 
different uses.
35
 In other words, if the two matters of irrigation and power generation 
conflict, efficient utilisation may prove a relevant circumstance necessary to arrive at 
equitable utilisation. 
Fourthly, Article 6(1)(a) of the 1997 UN Convention on International Watercourses, 
and Article V(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the 1966 Helsinki Rules, are related to ‘natural factors’, 
such as the length of river frontage, the extent of the drainage area in the territory of each 
State, and the contribution of water by each State. Still, such natural factors are no more than 
‘auxiliary’ factors, because other relevant circumstances, such as the social and economic 
needs of the States concerned, and the existing uses of international watercourses, are 
regarded as more significant means of attaining the equitable utilisation of international 
watercourses.
36
 If the quantity of water is sufficient, natural factors have no role in 
determining the quantity of water to be allocated to the States concerned.
37
 When water is 
lacking, however, such natural factors are employed as relevant circumstances to adjust the 
quantity of water indicated by the social and economic needs of the States concerned, or the 
existing uses of international watercourses.
38
 
As Article 10(1) of the 1997 UN Convention on International Watercourses and 
Article VI of the 1966 Helsinki Rules clearly indicate, no single relevant circumstance takes 
inherent priority over other relevant circumstances. However, of the four categories 
mentioned above, States’ social and economic needs seem to take some precedence over the 
other categories. 
 
2.1.5. A Concluding Remark 
As shown above through analysis of the judgements and arbitral awards of international 
courts and tribunals, the concept of equitable utilisation has been accepted, but no list of 
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relevant circumstances has yet been produced by international courts and tribunals. The 
reason for this is that, in reality, these cases did not deal with the allocation of shared water. 
Instead, the ILA (in 1966) and the UN (with the assistance of the ILC in 1997) made their 
two lists of relevant circumstances with regard to the equitable utilisation of international 
watercourses. 
Case-law on the issue of international watercourses, unlike that regarding maritime 
boundary delimitation, has not dealt with the examples of relevant circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the reason for considering the normative density of the law of international 
watercourses to be the ‘highest’ with respect to the concept of relevant circumstances is that 
a list of relevant circumstances has clearly been assumed by the relevant treaties. 
Moreover, although the two lists of relevant circumstances cited above are not 
exhaustive, it is doubtful whether other relevant circumstances, to which the two lists do not 
refer, can be found. As discussed above, equitable utilisation would generally be guided by 
the social and economic needs of the States concerned; and in the process of weighing up 
these ‘needs’, special regard would be paid to vital human needs. In other words, the list of 
relevant circumstances with regard to the utilisation of international watercourses has been 
fixed. For this reason, it can be said that the concept of relevant circumstances included in 
the law of international watercourses has the highest normative density in international law. 
However, the normative density concerning the law of international watercourses is 
confined to the ‘list’ of relevant circumstances and the weighing-up ‘process’ itself. In other 
words, as will be dealt with below, in spite of the highest normative density of relevant 
circumstances, the weighing-up of such relevant circumstances must be flexible. 
 
2.2. The Intermediate Level: The Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
 
2.2.1. Non-existence of the List of Relevant Circumstances 
It is true that the law of maritime boundary delimitation has not yet made an established list 
of relevant circumstances. When the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was 
concluded, there was insufficient material to do so, in contrast with the law of international 
watercourses, because the delimitation of maritime boundaries was a new subject in the field 
of international law at that time. That is to say, international case-law could not be consulted 
as a source for the list of relevant circumstances. Moreover, the matter of special or relevant 







Convention on the Continental Shelf considered the application of the equidistance method 
to be the essence of the delimitation process. In other words, relevant circumstances were 
confined to their ameliorative function under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf.
39
 Furthermore, the 1982 UNCLOS, unlike the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, did not even articulate the term ‘special’ or ‘relevant’ 
circumstances in relation to the delimitation of the EEZ or the continental shelf (except for 
the delimitation of the territorial sea). 
For these reasons, the examples of relevant circumstances identified in international 
cases since the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases of the ICJ would be helpful in 
drawing up a list of relevant circumstances. Nevertheless, this thesis will regard the 
normative density of relevant circumstances in the law of maritime boundary delimitation to 
be at an intermediate level, because the list of relevant circumstances ‘could’ potentially be 
formulated. In this context, it should be noted that this research will examine the normative 
density of the list of relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation in two ways. One 
assumes that the list of relevant circumstances could be formulated through the examination 
of international cases, based on the premise that there is no limit on the categories of relevant 
circumstances. The other acknowledges that, despite there theoretically being no limit, some 
limits on the open-endedness of categories of relevant circumstances have been set. 
 
2.2.2. The Open-endedness of Categories of Relevant Circumstances 
In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated that: 
 
“In fact, there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of for 
the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable procedures, and more often than not it 
is the balancing-up of all such considerations”.
40 
 
The Court explicitly admitted the open-endedness of categories of the circumstances which 
‘might’ be relevant. In light of this case (in which the ICJ only declared the delimitation rule 
to be applied in the negotiations of the States involved), it must be noted that the absence of 
a legal limit on the considerations of which States may take account in their negotiations 
does not necessarily mean that there is no legal limit on the circumstances which 
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international courts and tribunals can take into account. As will be shown below, 
international courts and tribunals cannot endorse the categories of relevant circumstances as 
limitless. 
Since the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case in which the Court of 
Arbitration was requested to draw a delimitation line, States have advanced quite a few 
circumstances which might be relevant, in line with the logic of the 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases that there is no limit on the list of the circumstances to be considered. 
Of the circumstances presented by the States involved, some have been regarded as relevant, 
while others have been rejected by international courts and tribunals. For example, 
geographical factors have proven to be one of the typical examples of relevant 
circumstances, whereas security interests have never been considered relevant in 
international case-law. 
One important question concerns whether or not it is permanently impossible to 
incorporate the categories of the circumstances which have been rejected in the past into the 
list of relevant circumstances. The answer is perhaps in the negative. Although the 1984 Gulf 
of Maine case made it very difficult for economic factors to be included in the list of relevant 
circumstances, the possibility of regarding them as relevant to a certain case was not totally 
eliminated. The reason for this is that each case has its own characteristics. In this context, it 
is evident that the statement made in the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case (“each case of 
delimitation is a unicum”)
41
 justified the open-endedness of relevant circumstance 
categorisation in maritime delimitation. Therefore, the fact that a certain factor (which might 
be relevant) has not been regarded as relevant in international case-law does not necessarily 
mean that the factor will never be one of the relevant circumstances in the future. 
In consequence, the open-endedness of categories of relevant circumstances is a 
useful starting point in the process of achieving an equitable result. Such open-endedness 
enables the flexible application of the rules governing maritime delimitation. For instance, 
Professor Evans agrees that the open-endedness of categories of relevant circumstances 
decreases the likelihood of recourse to the equidistance method.
42
 However, despite the 
theoretical open-endedness of these categories in maritime delimitation, the categories of 
claims made by the States concerned and accepted in international judgements have led to 
the ‘virtual’ formulation of a list of relevant circumstances with regard to the normative 
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density of relevant circumstances. This is due to the fact that certain limits have been set on 
the open-endedness of categories of relevant circumstances. This issue will be discussed in 
the following section. 
 
2.2.3. Limits on the Open-endedness of Categories of Relevant Circumstances 
In the process of taking into account all relevant circumstances, two key factors set limits on 
the open-endedness of categories of relevant circumstances, as described below. 
Firstly, in international cases regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries, it is 
evident that certain relevant circumstances have been accorded more weight. For example, 
since the main practical issue of maritime boundary delimitation has become the 
establishment of an SMB, so-called ‘neutral’ circumstances – such as geographical factors, 
related to both the EEZ and the continental shelf – have been prioritised in the process of 
taking account of all relevant circumstances. Comparatively little attention has been paid to 
economic factors and security issues. 
Secondly, the relevance of a particular circumstance has usually been determined on 
the ‘basis of title’. For instance, since the concept of natural prolongation was the basis of 
title to the continental shelf in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases,
43
 these cases 
regarded circumstances relating to the geological context as the circumstances which might 
be relevant.
44
 On the contrary, the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case did not 
consider geological or geophysical factors within 200NM to be relevant circumstances 
because the 1985 Judgment of the ICJ was based on the criterion of distance.
45
 
In sum, in the process of taking account of all relevant circumstances, the open-
endedness of categories of relevant circumstances has been restricted by the weighing-up 
process and the basis of title to maritime areas. However, in comparison with the law of 
international watercourses, it is worth asking whether or not the law of maritime boundary 
delimitation exhibits a ‘special regard’ (for example, the vital human needs to be prioritised 
in the law of international watercourses). In relation to the absence of a fixed weight or a 
special regard, Professor Evans points out that the term ‘open-ended’ includes “the sense that 
an example of a factor identified as a special circumstance need not always be treated as 
such”.
46
 Thus, the weighing-up process does not necessarily reduce the open-endedness of 
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categories of relevant circumstances. For these reasons, the normative density of relevant 
circumstances in maritime delimitation can be regarded as at an intermediate level in 
comparison with the law of international watercourses. It follows that such an intermediate 
level of the normative density of relevant circumstances does not eliminate the flexibility of 
application of the rules governing maritime delimitation. 
 
2.3. The Lowest Level: The Law of High Sea Fisheries 
 
2.3.1. The Emergence of the Concept of Equitable Allocation 
The right of States to natural resources (whether living or non-living) was originally based 
on the concept of ‘sovereignty’. This was expressed in Resolution 1803 (XVII) [Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources]
47
 of the UN General Assembly, adopted in 1962, and 
Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) [Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order]
48
 and 3281 (XXIX) [Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States]
49
 of the UN 
General Assembly, adopted in 1974. Moreover, international decisions with regard to 
fisheries (the 1951 Norwegian Fisheries case of the ICJ and the 1893 Behring Sea Fur-Seals 
Arbitration case)
50
 have traditionally been founded on the concept of jurisdiction derived 
from sovereignty. In the 1951 Norwegian Fisheries case of the ICJ, the United Kingdom cast 
doubt on the validity of the limit lines of the Norwegian fisheries zone.
51
 The UK’s assertion 
reflected the freedom of the high seas ‘outside’ the limit lines of Norway.
52
 Likewise, in the 
1893 Behring Sea Fur-Seals Arbitration case, the contention that the United States had the 
right of protection or property to the fur-seals frequenting its islands in the Behring Sea, 
when such seals were found ‘outside’ the ordinary three-mile limit, was rejected.
53
 
However, as States and international organisations have begun to express more and 
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more interest in environmental issues or the utilisation of natural resources beyond national 
jurisdiction, greater attention has been paid to the concepts, such as ‘shared natural 
resources’, ‘common property’, and ‘common heritage’. With respect to the concept of 
shared natural resources, Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell state that 
“[t]hese resources do not fall wholly within the exclusive control of one state, but neither are 
they the common property of all states”.
54
 According to the authors, shared natural resources 
reflect the interests of a relatively limited group of States in geographical proximity (or 
continuity), whereas common property is concerned with the interests of all States. 
Therefore, shared natural resources are ‘under’ the jurisdiction of a number of States, 
whereas common property is related to spaces ‘beyond’ national jurisdiction.
55
 
In conclusion, the concept of shared natural resources raised the issue of equitable 
utilisation, whereas the concept of common property resulted in the emergence of the 
doctrine of equitable allocation. This study will examine the doctrine of equitable allocation 
applied to the high seas as common property, and the extent to which this doctrine differs 
from the doctrine of equitable utilisation. 
 
2.3.2. Common Property and the Doctrine of Equitable Allocation 
In essence, common property is related to areas beyond national jurisdiction, such as the 
high seas. Hence, States have traditionally regarded fishery stocks found in the high seas, 
where the freedom of navigation, fishing or scientific research can be exercised, as common 
property accessible to all States.
56
 However, coastal fishing States have sought to extend 
their EFZs, which enable them to assert their exclusive rights with regard to fishing. The 
arguments made by coastal fishing States on this subject have resulted in conflicts with 
distant water States, which support free access to common property. The 1974 Icelandic 
Fisheries cases of the ICJ highlighted the conflict between coastal fishing States and other 
States. 
By the early 1970s, Iceland’s share of the catch of demersal species was slightly over 
50 per cent in the waters around Iceland. Accordingly, in 1972, Iceland unilaterally extended 
its EFZ from 12NM to 50NM.
57
 The United Kingdom and Germany, both greatly affected by 
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Iceland’s action, each referred this matter to the ICJ. Even though the Court did not clearly 
express that a 50NM EFZ (beyond 12NM) was contrary to international law,
58
 it 
acknowledged the ‘preferential rights’ of Iceland and the ‘historic fishing rights’ of the 
United Kingdom and Germany ‘in the waters between the 12NM and 50NM limits’.
59
 The 
ICJ clearly stated that “[t]he characterization of the coastal State’s rights as preferential 
implies a certain priority, but cannot imply the extinction of the concurrent rights of other 
States”.
60
 In order to resolve the conflict between the preferential rights of coastal fishing 
States and the traditional fishing rights of distant water States, the ICJ suggested that a rule 
of international law be applied which itself requires the application of equitable principles, as 
noted in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
61
 In other words, the 1974 Icelandic 
Fisheries cases regarded the application of equitable principles as the existing rule governing 
the allocation of high sea fisheries. 
In terms of the need to balance the conflicting interests of coastal and other States, 
one important point must be noted. The ‘uniqueness’ of each case should be taken into 
consideration in order to reach an equitable allocation of fishing resources.
62
 For example, 
the degree of a coastal State’s preference cannot be considered to be fixed.
63
 It is evident that 
this emphasis on the particular situation of each case reflects the flexibility of the rules in the 
law of high sea fisheries. It can thus be said that the application of equitable principles means 
to take into account all relevant circumstances, even in the law of high sea fisheries. 
 
2.3.3. The Doctrine of Equitable Allocation and Its Impact on the UNCLOS 
The preferential rights of coastal States, one circumstance to be taken into account in order 
to arrive at an equitable allocation, affected the content of the 1982 UNCLOS.
64
 According 
to Article 56(1) of the UNCLOS, following the introduction of the concept of the EEZ, 
coastal States have sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing natural resources (whether living or non-living) within 200NM. This means 
that marine living resources existing within 200NM are no longer regarded as common 
                                            
58
 That is, the ICJ stated only that the Icelandic Regulations establishing a 50NM EFZ are ‘not 
opposable’ to the United Kingdom and Germany. See I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp.23-24, para.53; I.C.J. 
Reports 1974, p.29, para.67; I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.192, para.45; I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.198, para.59. 
59
 See I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp.26-27, paras.58-59; I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp.27-28, para.62; I.C.J. 
Reports 1974, p.29, para.68. 
60
 I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp.27-28, para.62. 
61
 I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.33, para.78. 
62
 I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp.31-32, para.73; I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.33, para.78. 
63
 I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.30, para.70. 
64









 Rather, relying on the notion of national self-interest, the UNCLOS seeks to 
ensure the sustainability of marine resources which have previously been considered 
common property.
66
 It should also be noted that the preferential rights of coastal States were 
transformed into sovereign rights (which are more exclusive than preferential rights). 
However, the traditional fishing rights of distant water States (another circumstance 
to be taken into account when States seek to reach an equitable allocation), as confirmed in 
the 1974 Icelandic Fisheries cases, are decreasing in importance. Article 62(3) of the 
UNCLOS referred to the ‘need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals 
have habitually fished in the zone’, in relation to the traditional fishing rights of distant water 
States. This statement recalls the argument made by the United Kingdom in the 1974 
Icelandic Fisheries cases that the exclusion of British fishing vessels from the Icelandic area 
would affect the British fishing industry.
67
 However, the inclusion of Article 62(3) of the 
UNCLOS is no more than one factor among all of the relevant factors which a coastal State 
is required to ‘take into account’ in order to permit other States’ access to its EEZ.
68
 In other 
words, compared to the preferential rights of coastal States, the traditional fishing rights of 
distant water States are not reflected in the UNCLOS. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the doctrine of equitable allocation may at least in part be applied to the law of high seas 
fisheries, with respect to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. 
Although the importance of the traditional fishing rights of distant water States 
diminished with the introduction of the EEZ, the preferential rights of coastal States and the 
traditional fishing rights of distant water States should still be respected in the high seas, as 
the ICJ confirmed in the 1974 Icelandic Fisheries cases. Still, the number of relevant 
circumstances is small, and the weighing-up process unclear. For these reasons, the present 
thesis considers the normative density of relevant circumstances in the law of high seas 
fisheries to be at the lowest possible level. 
 
2.4. A Concluding Remark 
The normative density of relevant circumstances has been examined in three areas of 
international law. Whether or not there is an established list of relevant circumstances makes 
the normative density of each area diverse. Nonetheless, of importance is that the 
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consideration of all relevant circumstances, not the application of so-called equitable 
principles, produces an equitable result. Despite the difference of normative density among 
the three areas, the concept of relevant circumstances is still essential in arriving at an 
equitable solution. 
In the following section, three phases in taking into account such relevant 
circumstances in maritime delimitation will be examined. 
 
 
3. Three Phases in the Process of Taking into Account Relevant 
    Circumstances in Maritime Delimitation 
 
3.1. The Identification of Relevant Circumstances 
 
3.1.1. The Concept of Relevant Circumstances 
As pointed out in Chapter III, the application of equity in maritime delimitation means taking 
account of all the relevant circumstances in a delimitation case in order to reach an equitable 
result. The first phase in this process involves identifying relevant circumstances. In the 1969 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ only referenced factors which ‘might’ be relevant 
because these cases did not aim to draw a delimitation line. However, all international 
delimitation cases except for the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases have sought to 
identify concretely circumstances regarded as relevant in each case. The reason for this is 
that it is necessary to consider all the relevant circumstances of a given case in order to 
construct a delimitation line. 
According to the ICJ in the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, the concept of relevant 
circumstances “can be described as a fact necessary to be taken into account in the 
delimitation process”.
69
 Moreover, the Court implied that the concept of special 
circumstances and that of relevant circumstances are frequently assimilated because both 
concepts are utilised to achieve an equitable result.
70
 The ICJ indicated that these concepts 
play the same role in the delimitation process, despite the difference between the terms. Both 
concepts refer to ‘facts’ which must be taken into consideration in order to produce an 
equitable result. However, these facts do not necessarily include all facts. Only facts deemed 
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to be relevant in the course of the delimitation operation can be included in the categories of 
relevant circumstances in any given case. It is worth noting here that the concept of relevant 
circumstances must be distinguished from the concept of relevant coasts or relevant areas, as 
will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
 
3.1.2. The Concepts of Relevant Coasts and Relevant Areas 
In the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case, the ICJ 
described the concept of relevant coasts as follows: 
 
“The Court will therefore first determine the relevant coasts of the Parties, from which will 
be determined the location of the baselines and the pertinent basepoints which enable the 
equidistance line to be measured” [emphasis added].
71 
 
While this case was interested in technical issues relating to relevant coasts which were to 
determine the ‘baselines’ and the ‘basepoints’ needed to draw a provisional equidistance line, 
the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case of the ICJ defined the concept of 
relevant coasts in clearer terms. The Court stated that “the coast, in order to be considered as 
relevant for the purpose of the delimitation, must generate projections which overlap with 
projections from the coast of the other Party”.
72
 In other words, if the projections generated 
by one State’s coasts do not overlap with those generated by the other State’s coasts, neither 
coast can be considered relevant. 
The role of coasts is basically to indicate the rights of the States concerned to the 
EEZ or the continental shelf.
73
 Notably, in the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, 
the ICJ pointed out that “the coast of the territory of the State is the decisive factor for title to 
submarine areas adjacent to it”.
74
 What is the role of relevant coasts if the role of coasts is 
associated with generating the rights of the States concerned? The 2009 Maritime 
Delimitation in the Black Sea case referred to the two roles of relevant coasts: one is to 
determine “what constitutes […] the overlapping claims to these zones [the continental shelf 
and the EEZ]”, and the other is to “check […] whether any disproportionality exists in the 
ratios of the coastal length of each State and the maritime areas falling either side of the 
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Even though relevant coasts have two important legal functions, it must be noted 
that relevant coasts are not relevant circumstances. According to the 2002 Land and 
Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case, relevant coasts must be defined ‘before’ 
relevant circumstances are identified.
76
 The most important reason why relevant coasts 
should not be regarded as relevant circumstances is that the former refers to the ‘objective’ 
geographical context of a certain delimitation case. The 2006 Maritime Delimitation 
(Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago) case of the Arbitral Tribunal indicated that the identification 
of relevant coasts is an ‘objective’ criterion, like the equidistance method.
77
 Bearing the issue 
of objectivity in mind, the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case did not regard 




In sum, the determination of relevant coasts is a ‘preliminary’ and ‘objective’ process 
preceding the identification and weighing-up of relevant circumstances. Therefore, the 
concept of relevant coasts cannot be equated with that of relevant circumstances. 
The concept of relevant areas must also be distinguished from that of relevant 
circumstances. Basically, relevant areas can be determined by the configuration of relevant 
coasts.
79
 This means, for instance, that a gulf which is not regarded as one of the relevant 
coasts may be excluded.
80
 Also, the maritime areas of the third parties cannot be understood 
as relevant areas.
81
 Why is the concept of relevant areas employed? In the 2009 Maritime 
Delimitation in the Black Sea case, the ICJ implied that the concept of relevant areas is 
required to check proportionality in the final stage of the delimitation operation.
82
 In this 
final phase, a result proposed by the delimitation process is assessed for its equitability ‘by 
reference to the respective coastal lengths and the apportionment of areas that ensue’.
83
 
In short, therefore, the determination of relevant coasts is a preliminary phase, and 
the concept of relevant areas is needed to check the proportionality of a proposed result 
obtained through the delimitation operation, as discussed above. In contrast, relevant 
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circumstances are facts which should be taken into consideration during the delimitation 
process. Why should relevant circumstances be taken into account in this process? The most 
important reason is that an equitable result cannot be achieved unless relevant facts are taken 
into consideration.
84
 Other explanations have been offered for the significance of facts which 
may affect the legal rights of States in disputes over maritime areas, such as the EEZ or the 
continental shelf. During the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case of the ICJ, for example, Judge 
Ranjeva declared that “special or relevant circumstances appear as facts which affect the 
rights of States over their maritime spaces as recognized in positive law, either in their 
entirety or in the exercise of the powers relating thereto” [emphasis added].
85
 The false 
premise of Judge Ranjeva is that such rights ‘already’ belong to the States concerned. 
Crucially, however, the reason why the issue of maritime delimitation is raised is that the 
States concerned ‘all’ have ‘entitlements’ to the maritime areas which will be delimited. It is 
not logical to ‘fully’ respect the legal rights of one State and only ‘partially’ respect the legal 
rights of another State. Respecting each set of legal rights to a different extent would not lead 
to an equitable result. 
Therefore, the reason why we take into account all relevant circumstances is that 
these facts affect the equitability of the result achieved. In its next section, the thesis will deal 
with the process of identifying a certain circumstance as relevant in the delimitation 
operation. 
 
3.1.3. How Does a Certain Circumstance Become Relevant to the Delimitation 
         Process? 
If a certain circumstance is necessary to arrive at an equitable result, that circumstance is 
regarded as relevant to the delimitation process. Since the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases, international courts and tribunals have identified the relevant circumstances of each 
delimitation case by reviewing the arguments of the States concerned. Two broad categories 
of relevant circumstances have emerged through the accumulation of international 
delimitation cases: geographical circumstances and non-geographical circumstances. If 
international courts and tribunals do not take account of geographical circumstances, a 
refashioning of geography or a cut-off effect may occur. Either outcome would adversely 
affect the equitability of the result. Non-geographical circumstances, such as economic 
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factors, the conduct of the States concerned, and security issues relating to a case, may also 
be deemed to be relevant if they have an impact on the interests of States which can 
otherwise be protected in an equitable way. 
How do we determine which facts are necessary to achieve an equitable result? If the 
existence of a fact affects the achievement of an equitable result, it is defined as a relevant 
circumstance. That is to say, if international courts and tribunals need to take into account the 
existence of a fact to produce an equitable result, that fact must be considered relevant to a 
certain delimitation case. For example, if a cut-off effect may result from the presence of 
islands in a delimitation case, the presence of islands itself becomes a relevant circumstance 
in that case. 
This process of determining the relevance of a circumstance reflects the flexibility of 
application of the rules governing maritime delimitation. In this context, Professor Evans 
states that “[c]ommon sense plays a part in this […] the adage ‘you know one when you see 
one’ is an honest statement”.
86
 However, the relevance (or otherwise) of a circumstance is 
determined not by either or both Parties, but by an international court or tribunal responsible 
for interpreting the significance of a circumstance and applying the current delimitation rule. 
Evidently, international courts and tribunals exercise their discretion in the course of 
identifying relevant circumstances so as to achieve an equitable result. With regard to 
identifying the relevance of a circumstance, the ITLOS stated in the 2012 Maritime 
Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case that “there is no 
general rule”.
87
 International courts and tribunals can determine the relevance of a 
circumstance to a certain delimitation case on a case-by-case basis, but they must not 
produce an arbitrary result on the false premise that a specific circumstance is always 
relevant. Even if the list of relevant circumstances in the law of maritime boundary 
delimitation could be fixed, flexibility would have to remain a dominant characteristic of the 
process of applying the rules governing maritime delimitation because the concept of an 
equitable result is not fixed for any given case. An equitable result may reflect the avoidance 
of geographical refashioning, non-encroachment on natural prolongation, an equal division, 
or proportionality.
88
 However, the concept of an equitable result is not determined in advance 
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in a given case. In the last section of this chapter, the diversity of an equitable result will be 
addressed. 
At this point, it is appropriate to examine the issue of the ‘typification’ of relevant 
circumstances. A list of relevant circumstances could be drawn up through the examination 
of international case-law; however, in an actual delimitation dispute, a certain circumstance 
can only be considered relevant to the case if it is necessary to produce an equitable result. 
For instance, the presence of islands must not be considered a relevant circumstance unless it 
is required to obtain an equitable result in a particular case, even though the presence of 
islands is generally discussed in terms of the categories of relevant circumstances. By the 
same token, an economic factor cannot be a relevant circumstance unless it has a role in 
properly balancing the legal rights of the States concerned regarding the EEZ or the 
continental shelf. Hence, it is not appropriate to argue that the ‘typification’ of relevant 
circumstances may enhance the predictability of application of the rules in the law of 
maritime boundary delimitation.
89
 The 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case of the ICJ 
suggested that only circumstances ‘pertinent’ to a maritime space like the continental shelf 
can be considered to be relevant.
90
 The Court intended in this regard to support the 
typification of relevant circumstances. However, the circumstances necessary to reach an 
equitable result in one case may not be relevant in another, because different cases have 
different relevant circumstances. The uniqueness of each set of relevant circumstances – 
reflecting the fact that each delimitation case is a ‘unicum’ – also demands that the 
application of the rules governing maritime delimitation is flexible. In short, the typification 
of relevant circumstances is of no use, because a specific circumstance may be relevant to 
one case but irrelevant to another. 
To sum up, a given circumstance becomes relevant to a specific delimitation dispute 
if the failure to consider that circumstance brings about a refashioning of geography or 
prevents the interests of the States involved from being protected in an equitable way. Thus, 
in an actual case, the typification of relevant circumstances could prevent the flexible 
application of the rules governing maritime delimitation. At this point, it should be noted that 
awareness of each case as a unicum does not necessarily lead to a decision ex aequo et bono. 
A given delimitation case relies on the appropriate consideration of all relevant 
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circumstances in order to achieve an equitable result, and thus excludes the consideration of 
‘irrelevant’ circumstances. Identifying all of the relevant circumstances of each case is the 
first phase of the process of taking into account relevant circumstances in maritime 
delimitation so as to produce an equitable result. 
 
3.1.4. Might a Delimitation Case Lack Relevant Circumstances Altogether? 
If international courts and tribunals declare that they cannot identify any relevant 
circumstances in the delimitation process, does this mean that no relevant circumstances 
exist for that case? This question might be asked of the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary 
(Cameroon/Nigeria) case, the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, and the 
areas beyond 12NM up to 200NM of the 2007 Maritime Delimitation (Guyana/Suriname) 
case. In all of these cases, international courts and tribunals declared that no relevant 
circumstances existed. Here, the concept of ‘no relevant circumstances’ must be 
distinguished from that of ‘no relevant circumstances to adjust a provisional equidistance 
line’. It was strongly implied in each of these cases that ‘relevant circumstances to adjust a 
provisional equidistance line’ were non-existent, not that the case had ‘no relevant 
circumstances’ whatsoever. It is incorrect, therefore, to state that international courts and 
tribunals failed to identify even a single relevant circumstance in these cases. 
In fact, it should not be overlooked that international courts and tribunals have 
already taken relevant circumstances into account when they draw a provisional equidistance 
line. Unless ‘coastal geography’ (not ‘relevant coasts’) prevents an equidistance line from 
being regarded as the appropriate provisional line in a given case, that line can provisionally 
be constructed. It follows that international courts and tribunals identify coastal geography as 
one of the relevant circumstances in the maritime delimitation process. In the 2002 Land and 
Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case, the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black 
Sea case, and the areas beyond 12NM up to 200NM of the 2007 Maritime Delimitation 
(Guyana/Suriname) case, for example, international courts and tribunals all concluded that a 
provisional equidistance line would become the final delimitation line. However, they also 
clearly identified coastal geography as one of the relevant circumstances of each case. In 
fact, coastal geography is preferentially taken into account when relevant circumstances are 
identified. It can be said, therefore, that there is no delimitation case in which relevant 
circumstances cannot be identified. 







circumstance that should be taken into account in ‘all’ delimitation cases? The answer is in 
the affirmative, for two reasons. First, the concept of coastlines is the basis of the 
‘entitlements’ of the States concerned to the EEZ and the continental shelf.
91
 Second, coastal 
geography can indicate whether or not a provisional equidistance line can be drawn. In this 
regard, it should be observed that earlier cases differ from recent ones in the treatment of 
coastal geography. In earlier cases, coastal geography was reviewed primarily for the 
purpose of allowing international courts and tribunals to determine the convexity or 
concavity of the coastlines involved, and to clarify the coastal relationship between the 
States concerned.
92
 In more recent cases, however, international courts and tribunals have 
reviewed coastal geography with an emphasis on the question of whether or not a provisional 
equidistance line can be constructed. For example, the coastal geography of the 2007 
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case indicated that the drawing of a provisional 
equidistance line would be inappropriate, as certain geographical problems were identified as 




3.2. The Process of Weighing Up Relevant Circumstances 
 
3.2.1. The Process of Weighing Up Relevant Circumstances with Regard to 
         the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
The second stage in the process of taking into account relevant circumstances in maritime 
delimitation is the weighing-up of relevant circumstances. What does this stage involve? Is it 
necessary to weigh up relevant circumstances only when two or more such circumstances are 
identified? If two or more relevant circumstances are found and there is no conflict between 
them, is the weighing-up process unnecessary? Does the weighing-up process aim to grant 
weight to a certain relevant circumstance even when only one such circumstance has been 
identified? 
This section will first examine the process of weighing-up in certain international 
cases, with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf. This process was carried out 
during the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, the 1982 Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libya) case, and the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, all of which dealt 
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solely with the delimitation of the continental shelf. In the part of the 1977 Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf case relating to the Channel Islands region, for example, two relevant 
circumstances (the oppositeness of the relevant coasts of the two States, and the presence of 
the Channel Islands) were taken into account separately, as they were assumed to have no 
impact on each other.
94
 In the Atlantic region of the same case, however, two additional 
relevant circumstances (the position of the two States in relation to the same continental 
shelf, and the presence of the Scilly Isles) were weighed up.
95
 Since the presence of the 
Scilly Isles made the drawing of an equidistance line inequitable (despite the fact that the 
States occupied the same position in relation to the same continental shelf), the Scilly Isles 
were accorded half effect. In other words, the weighing-up process in the Atlantic region 
gave more weight to the position of the two States in relation to the same continental shelf. 
Similarly, in the second sector of the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, 
two relevant circumstances were identified: the transformation of the relationship between 
Tunisia and Libya from that of adjacent States to that of opposite States, and the presence of 
the Kerkennah Islands.
96
 In the weighing-up process, the Kerkennah Islands were given half 
effect, like the Scilly Isles in the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case. 
In contrast to the two cases above, one may question whether or not the weighing-up 
process took place at all in the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, because the two 
relevant circumstances identified (the general geographical context and the great disparity in 
the lengths of the relevant coasts of the two States) together indicated that the provisional 
median line should be shifted to the north.
97
 
To summarise, in international case-law regarding the delimitation of the continental 
shelf, the weighing-up process of relevant circumstances has usually only raised the issue of 
how much weight a certain relevant circumstance (for example, the existence of an island) 
should be given, based on the premise that coastal geography or an objective geographical 
context is accorded more weight. 
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3.2.2. The Process of Weighing Up Relevant Circumstances with Regard to 
         the Establishment of an SMB 
Since the 1984 Gulf of Maine case heard by the Chamber of the ICJ, an SMB has usually 
been established in the delimitation of maritime boundaries. However, the 1984 Gulf of 
Maine case, the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, and the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon 
case were not different in character to previous cases, all of which had dealt solely with the 
delimitation of the continental shelf. This is due to the fact that these three cases did not 
consider circumstances other than those commonly pertinent to both the EEZ and the 
continental shelf to be relevant.
98
 It follows that ‘geography’, which was deemed to have a 
‘neutral’ character, was given special treatment.
99
 For example, in the second segment of the 
1984 Gulf of Maine case, three circumstances arising from geography (the oppositeness of 
the relevant coasts of the two States, the difference in lengths between the respective 
coastlines of the two States, and the presence of Seal Island) were understood to be 
relevant.
100
 Throughout the weighing-up of these circumstances, as in the previous 
continental shelf delimitation cases, ‘coastal’ geography (especially the oppositeness of the 
relevant coasts of the two States, and the difference in lengths between the respective 
coastlines of the two States) was granted more weight, whereas the presence of Seal Island 
was accorded only half effect. At this point, the 1984 Gulf of Maine case requires 
commentary. In its verification phase, the 1984 Gulf of Maine case presented one ‘auxiliary’ 
criterion as another possible relevant circumstance: the economic catastrophe that might 
result from a proposed delimitation line drawn after going through the three phases of taking 
into consideration all of the relevant circumstances in this case (namely the identification and 
weighing-up of relevant circumstances, and the application of practical methods indicated by 
the relevant circumstances). This auxiliary criterion was applied to check the equitability of 
the proposed result.
101
 Since there was deemed to be no potential for an economic 
catastrophe (that is, no other relevant circumstance was identified), the weighing-up process 
in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case was the same as that in the previous continental shelf 
delimitation cases. However, the weighing-up process would have been more complicated 
had the potential for an economic catastrophe been identified in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case. 
In the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, three relevant circumstances (an existing 
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treaty, the presence of islands, and the shape of relevant coastlines) were identified.
102
 
However, as in the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, it is debatable whether or not 
the process of weighing up relevant circumstances actually took place. Rather, these 
circumstances were each respected on an individual basis in order to arrive at an equitable 
result in this arbitral award. 
In the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case, the weighing-up process was dominated 
by the fact that the relevant coasts of France were much shorter than those of Canada.
103
 
Although the adjacency of the two States was also deemed to be a relevant circumstance in 
the case,
104
 this was only one reason to avoid drawing a provisional equidistance line. After 
the relevant circumstances were taken into account, France was accorded a 12NM ‘radial’ 
zone in addition to the 12NM territorial sea in the first sector,
105
 but granted only a 200NM 
‘frontal corridor’ in the second sector.
106
 The weight accorded to this particular relevant 
circumstance (the difference between the lengths of relevant coasts) was thus somewhat 
arbitrary. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the contiguous zone given 




To sum up, until the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case, the process of weighing 
up relevant circumstances had two significant implications. One was that coastal geography 
should be granted more weight; and the other was that the potential for an economic 
catastrophe could be considered a relevant circumstance. 
However, the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case of the ICJ raised different issues in 
the process of weighing up relevant circumstances. The first question was whether or not a 
circumstance pertinent ‘only’ to the fishery zone between the continental shelf and the 
fishery zone could be considered a relevant circumstance in the course of establishing a de 
facto SMB. The second question, which derived from the first, was whether or not a 
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circumstance relevant to both the continental shelf and the fishery zone should take priority 
over a circumstance related to only one maritime zone. 
The 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case identified two relevant circumstances (the 
disparity in coastal lengths and the access to the capelin fishery resources) necessary to 
adjust a provisional median line.
108
 In the process of weighing up the two relevant 
circumstances, the access to the capelin fishery resources played a role in shifting the 
provisional median line to the ‘equidistance’ line between two lines (namely the provisional 
median line and the 200NM line calculated from the coasts of eastern Greenland in the first 
zone).
109
 By contrast, the marked disparity in coastal lengths moved the provisional median 
line only ‘one third’ eastward between the two lines (namely the median line and the 200NM 
line calculated from the coasts of eastern Greenland in the second and third zones).
110
 The 
essence of the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case is that the access to the capelin fishery 
resources was given more weight in the first zone, despite the fact that coastal geography had 
been granted more weight in earlier cases. Therefore, the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case 
showed that an economic factor operating as a relevant circumstance could be regarded as 
more than merely an auxiliary criterion in the delimitation operation. 
Another important point which requires discussion is the predictability of the weight 
accorded. The 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case stated that: 
 
“A court […] will therefore have to determine “the relative weight to be accorded to 
different considerations” in each case; to this end, it will consult not only “the 
circumstances of the case” but also previous decided cases and the practice of States. In this 
respect the Court recalls the need, referred to in the Libya/Malta case, for “consistency and 
a degree of predictability” (I.C.J. Reports 1985, p.39, para.45)” [emphasis added].
111 
 
In fact, the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case emphasised that the application of 
equity, not the weight granted, should display consistency and a degree of predictability.
112
 If 
the weight granted were predictable, would this require a certain relevant circumstance to be 
accorded a ‘fixed’ weight? It is clear that relevant circumstances are not granted weight in a 
predictable way. We might assume, for example, based on the verdict in the 1984 Gulf of 
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Maine case, that the potential for an economic catastrophe would greatly affect the result of a 
new case, even though circumstances pertinent to coastal geography are generally given 
more weight. Of course, however, this would not necessarily be the case. Accordingly, the 
granting of weight to a relevant circumstance in the delimitation process is another issue 
which reflects the flexibility of taking into account relevant circumstances in maritime 
delimitation. 
As indicated above, in the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) 
case, the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, and the areas beyond 12NM up 
to 200NM of the 2007 Maritime Delimitation (Guyana/Suriname) case, provisional 
equidistance lines became the final delimitation lines, since no relevant circumstances were 
found to adjust the provisional equidistance lines. In other words, the weighing-up process 
did not occur in these cases. 
Despite the fact that some delimitation cases since the early 2000s have not 
identified any relevant circumstances resulting in the adjustment of a provisional 
equidistance line, recent international case-law has consistently entailed the weighing-up of 
relevant circumstances when an SMB is established. For example, in the 2001 Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case, the ICJ paid attention to the 
presence of Fasht al Jarim.
113
 However, Fasht al Jarim (“which, if given full effect, would 
“distort the boundary and have disproportionate effects””) was ultimately accorded no effect, 
because the Court also took into account the fact that the northern coasts of Qatar and 
Bahrain are not markedly different in character from each other.
114
 
In the 2006 Maritime Delimitation (Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago) case, the 
Arbitral Tribunal accepted that coastal frontages and their relative lengths are relevant 
circumstances requiring the adjustment of a provisional equidistance line.
115
 It could not 
ignore the coastal frontages of the islands of Trinidad and Tobago.
116
 How did the Tribunal 
go through the process of weighing up relevant circumstances? Above all, it presumed that 
“[t]he degree of adjustment called for by any given disparity in coastal lengths is a matter for 
the Tribunal’s judgment in the light of all the circumstances of the case”.
117
 In other words, 
international courts and tribunals still retain their discretion in weighing up relevant 
circumstances. Exercising this discretion, the Arbitral Tribunal determined the appropriate 
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point (described as ‘10’) of deflection of the provisional equidistance line.
118
 This particular 
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line, in contrast to an unadjusted equidistance 
line, accorded weight to the existence of coastal frontages,
119




Furthermore, it must be noted that a provisional bisector line was adjusted around 
islands in the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case of the ICJ.
121
 That is to say, 
the absence of viable basepoints at Cape Gracias a Dios, one circumstance requiring the 
employment of the bisector method, was weighed up in relation to the presence of islands, 
the other circumstance taken into consideration in this case. 
Lastly, the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the 
Bay of Bengal case of the ITLOS must be examined. It is important to note that ‘most’ of the 
provisional equidistance line was shifted following consideration of the severe concavity of 
the coastlines involved.
122
 Moreover, this relevant circumstance (the severe concavity of the 
coastlines concerned) affected the delimitation of the outer continental shelf, because 
changing the provisional equidistance line allowed Bangladesh to gain the access to the 
continental shelf beyond 200NM to which it was entitled. By contrast, we can assume that 
the ‘access to the continental shelf beyond 200NM’, another relevant circumstance, allowed 
the provisional equidistance line to be deflected. The reason for this is that the direction of 
the provisional equidistance line was altered to the same azimuth of 215° (from point X) as 
that of a bisector line proposed by Bangladesh.
123
 If this assumption is correct, one must 
conclude that the access to the continental shelf beyond 200NM was granted more weight by 
the ITLOS than the concavity of the coastlines concerned. Moreover, it should be noted that 
St. Martin’s Island was granted no effect with respect to the establishment of an SMB in this 
case. The reason for according no effect to St. Martin’s Island is that “a line blocking the 
seaward projection from Myanmar’s coast” should not be constructed.
124
 Here, the point of 
chief interest is that the ITLOS did not regard St. Martin’s Island as a relevant circumstance, 
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giving no effect to the island.
125
 Whereas the ICJ regarded Fasht al Jarim (also accorded no 
effect) as a relevant circumstance in the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case, the ITLOS did not accept even the relevance of St. Martin’s 
Island to the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of 
Bengal case with regard to the establishment of an SMB. However, it cannot be concluded 
that the existence of St. Martin’s Island was not weighed up in relation to the provisional 
equidistance line. On the contrary, the ITLOS determined how much weight the presence of 
St. Martin’s Island must be accorded so as to achieve an equitable solution. In sum, 
international courts and tribunals have continued to weigh up relevant circumstances in 
recent delimitation cases. 
This analysis of international delimitation cases leads to the conclusion that no 
weighing-up process is necessary if relevant circumstances do not conflict with each other – 
even when two or more relevant circumstances are found. It is also unclear whether or not 
the weighing-up process is employed as a means of granting weight to a single relevant 
circumstance when only one such circumstance can be identified. For instance, the 1992 
Saint Pierre and Miquelon case reached a somewhat arbitrary result after evaluating only 
one relevant circumstance. 
It seems clear, therefore, that if a given delimitation case involves two or more 
relevant circumstances which must be weighed up, the weighing-up process enhances the 
flexibility of application of the rules governing maritime delimitation. This is due to the fact 
that it is impossible to know in advance how much weight a relevant circumstance will be 
accorded. Furthermore, the assessment of economic factors other than coastal geography is 
also flexible. 
 
3.3. The Indication and Application of Practical Methods 
 
3.3.1. The Study of International Delimitation Cases 
The third stage in the process of taking into account relevant circumstances in maritime 
delimitation is the indication and application of practical methods: more precisely, the 
application of practical methods indicated by relevant circumstances. With the exception of 
the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, all international courts and tribunals involved in 
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maritime delimitation have been required to construct a delimitation line for each case. In 
order to draw the final delimitation line in a given case, relevant circumstances are identified 
and then weighed up, and lastly practical methods indicated by the identification and 
weighing-up of relevant circumstances are applied. 
For example, whereas two relevant circumstances (the oppositeness of the relevant 
coasts of the two States, and the presence of the Channel Islands) respectively indicated the 
median line and the boundary of the 12NM zone in the Channel Islands region of the 1977 
Anglo-French Continental Shelf case,
126
 two other relevant circumstances (the position of the 
two States in relation to the same continental shelf, and the presence of the Scilly Isles) 




In the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, the ICJ expressed strong 
approval for the indicative role of relevant circumstances, stating that “[t]he circumstance 
alluded to in paragraph 113 above which the Court finds to be highly relevant to the 
determination of the method of delimitation is a circumstance related to the conduct to the 
Parties” [emphasis added].
128
 Therefore, the conduct of the Parties, as one relevant 
circumstance of the first sector, indicated that the delimitation line must be drawn at 26°.
129
 
Moreover, two relevant circumstances of the second sector (the transformation of the 
relationship between Tunisia and Libya from that of adjacent States to that of opposite 
States, and the presence of the Kerkennah Islands) indicated both the construction of a 
straight line (the 62° line) and the need to modify this line.
130
 However, regarding the 
conclusion of delimitation in the second sector of the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) 
case, there is a different interpretation from the above-mentioned one. According to a new 
interpretation, the bisector method was employed because the presence of the Kerkennah 
Islands advised against the full effect of a straight line (the 62° line).
131
 In short, the 
existence of the Kerkennah Islands may indicate the employment of the bisector method. 
In the first segment of the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the uncertainty of sovereignty 
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over Machias Seal Island and the Parties’ choice of point A indicated the inadmissibility of 
the equidistance method.
132
 On the basis of this indication, and presupposing that a 
‘geometrical’ method respecting the geographical situation of the coasts would be required, 
the Chamber employed the bisector method.
133
 Was the choice of the bisector method 
determined by the indicative role of relevant circumstances? The same issue was raised in 
the final delimitation of the second sector of the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case. 
This will be discussed at a later point. 
In contrast to the delimitation of the first segment, the oppositeness between relevant 
coasts provisionally indicated a median line in the second segment of the 1984 Gulf of Maine 
case, because it was the most important of three relevant circumstances.
134
 However, the 
other relevant circumstances (the difference in lengths between the respective coastlines of 
the two States, and the presence of Seal Island) respectively adjusted the provisional median 
line to the degree indicated by the weight given to each.
135
 That is to say, each of the three 
relevant circumstances played an indicative role. However, in the third segment of the 1984 
Gulf of Maine case – which applied a geometrical method, drawing a perpendicular line – the 
indicative role of relevant circumstances was unclear.
136
 This point will also be addressed at 
a later stage. 
In the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, it is evident that two relevant 
circumstances (the general geographical context and the great disparity in the lengths of the 
relevant coasts of the two States) indicated the shift of the provisional median line to the 
north. However, it is unclear why the ICJ decided on a northward transposition by ‘18´’ of 
latitude. No relevant circumstance indicated such a transposition. 
Two relevant circumstances (an existing treaty and the presence of islands) of the 
1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case indicated the southern limit and the attribution of a 12NM 
territorial sea to the island of Alcatraz.
137
 However, it is questionable whether or not the third 
relevant circumstance (the shape of the relevant coastlines) indicated a perpendicular line. 
This point will also be explored in the related section of the thesis. 
Two relevant circumstances of the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case also indicated 
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the eastward shift of the provisional median line. However, it is difficult to deduce the 
indicative role of relevant circumstances from the fact that the marked disparity of coastal 
lengths shifted the provisional median line ‘one third’ eastward between the two lines 
(namely the median line and the 200NM line calculated from the coasts of eastern Greenland 
in the second and third zones).
138
 Rather, the extent to which the provisional median line was 
shifted seems more closely related to the concept of flexibility in applying the rules in 
maritime delimitation. In other words, the ICJ exercised its discretion in deciding the extent 
of the adjustment in this case. 
With the exception of the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case, all 
delimitation cases since the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case have employed an equidistance 
line as the provisional line. The employment of a provisional equidistance line means that 
coastal geography as a relevant circumstance has indicated the use of such a line. 
Conversely, in the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case, coastal geography 
indicated that the use of the equidistance line was inappropriate. 
To summarise, the indicative role of relevant circumstances can be confirmed 
through analysis of international delimitation cases. Still, two further issues require 
consideration, as below. 
 
3.3.2. The Expansion of the Indicative Role of Relevant Circumstances: 
         Indication over Exclusion 
As shown above, relevant circumstances can indicate practical methods to be applied in each 
delimitation case. At this point, it seems appropriate to examine the argument made by 
Malcolm D. Evans. According to Professor Evans, the indicative role of relevant 
circumstances is confined to the ‘exclusion’ of a specific method.
139
 For example, whereas 
the presence of islands can indicate the inapplicability of the equidistance method, the 
absence of islands cannot indicate the use of the equidistance method. However, as shown in 
the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case and the 1982 Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libya) case, the indicative role of relevant circumstances was not restricted to the 
exclusion of a certain method. 
This issue can be summarised as follows. Basically, the indicative role of relevant 
circumstances can be divided into three aspects: the exclusion of a specific method; the 
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indication of a certain delimitation line; and the indication of the extent to which a 
provisional equidistance line should be adjusted. 
Firstly, the exclusion of a specific method, to which the indicative role of relevant 
circumstances is limited, as Professor Evans suggests, has been accepted since the 1969 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases. How, then, can we explain the use of the bisector method 
or the perpendicular method once a relevant circumstance has indicated the exclusion of the 
equidistance method? In the first segment of the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber 
invoked the bisector method or the perpendicular method as possible geometrical methods 
reflecting the relevant circumstances of the case after the inapplicability of the equidistance 
method had been indicated.
140
 In other words, the relevant circumstances of this case 
indicated the ‘appropriateness’ of the bisector method or the perpendicular method. The 
reason for this is that either the bisector method or the perpendicular method may produce a 
result as close as possible to an equal division (which is the very rationale behind the 
equidistance method), respecting the geographical reality of the coastlines of both States. 
Therefore, the indicative role of relevant circumstances cannot be restricted to the exclusion 
of a certain method. 
Secondly, the indication of a certain delimitation line is also an aspect of the 
indicative role of relevant circumstances. For example, one of the relevant circumstances, the 
presence of the Channel Islands, indicated the 12NM radial zone boundary in the Channel 
Islands region of the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case.
141
 Likewise, the conduct of 
both States as a relevant circumstance pointed out an actual delimitation line in the 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case of the ICJ.
142
 
Thirdly, it is questionable whether or not relevant circumstances can indicate the 
extent to which a provisional equidistance line should be adjusted. In fact, this matter is 
frequently left to the discretion of international courts and tribunals. How else can we 
explain the northward transposition by 18´ from the provisional median line in the 1985 
Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, and the shift of the provisional median line ‘one third’ 
eastward between the two lines (namely the median line and the 200NM line calculated from 
the coasts of eastern Greenland) in the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case? It must be noted 
here that these shifts would have been more reasonable if the ‘proportionality’ of the 
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proposed results produced had been checked once more. This is due to the fact that an 
equitable result can be confirmed by means of a verification stage, such as the 
proportionality check, even though relevant circumstances do not indicate the extent to 
which a provisional equidistance line should be adjusted. However, even if relevant 
circumstances were to indicate the precise adjustment required, the indicative role of relevant 
circumstances cannot in itself be denied. 
 
3.3.3. The Need for a Geometrical Method 
As mentioned above, the indicative role of relevant circumstances, which means that 
relevant circumstances indicate practical methods to be applied in each delimitation case, is 
well attested to in international case-law. Another issue to be raised regarding the indicative 
role of relevant circumstances is the fact that a ‘geometrical’ method has been invoked in 
almost all delimitation cases, except for a small number of cases in which certain relevant 
circumstances, such as the conduct of States, have not indicated geometrical methods. In 
other words, it can be said that relevant circumstances indicate ‘objective’ methods to be 
applied. In this context, the ICJ added that geometrically objective methods are needed even 
when a provisional line is established.
143
 
Two factors supporting the argument for a geometrical method can be suggested. 
The first is the need, as far as possible, to avoid the subjectivity of delimitation. The 2006 
Maritime Delimitation (Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago) case illustrated the attempt to 
minimise subjective delimitation, stating that “the need to avoid subjective determinations 
requires that the method used start with a measure of certainty”.
144
 The second reason is that 
the rationale behind geometrical methods is often one aspect of an equitable result (such as 
an equal division) or the expression of the legal basis of title (including the criterion of 
distance).
145
 In other words, if a geometrical method is applied, an equitable result may more 
easily be fulfilled. 
However, the need for objective methods is not connected with the predictability of 
application of the rules governing maritime delimitation. The result achieved by the 
application of objective methods as indicated by some relevant circumstances is no more 
than the establishment of a provisional line. The provisional line would be adjusted through 
the examination of other relevant circumstances or by the proportionality check. 
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Consequently, even if a geometrical method is employed, the final result of maritime 
delimitation may subsequently be changed. 
Furthermore, the choice of an objective method relies on the relevant circumstances 
of a specific case. It follows that only the objective method which most closely reflects the 
relevant circumstances of a certain case can be chosen. 
Geometrical methods actually employed in international delimitation cases are the 
equidistance method, the bisector method, and the perpendicular method. Of these, an 
equidistance line is the most commonly used provisional line unless relevant circumstances 
indicate the exclusion of the equidistance method. According to the 2007 Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua/Honduras) case, the bisector method may be chosen on the basis of the 
configuration of, and the relationship between, the relevant coastal fronts and the maritime 
areas to be delimited in a situation in which the equidistance method is impossible or 
inappropriate.
146
 In line with this statement, the ICJ confirmed that the bisector method is 
also a possible geometrical approach.
147
 
In sum, in order to establish a provisional line, the relevant circumstances of each 
delimitation case can indicate a geometrical method to be understood as the most 
appropriate. Nonetheless, it must be noted, in fact, that the indicative role of relevant 
circumstances closely resembles the exclusion of a certain method, because another 
geometrical approach cannot be adopted unless the use of the equidistance method is 
rendered unsuitable by the relevant circumstances of a certain delimitation case. 
 
 
4. Three Decision-making Processes Undertaken by International 
    Courts and Tribunals 
 
4.1. Single-phase Decisions: The Immediate Establishment of a Final 
      Delimitation Line 
In the previous sections, three elements constituting the process of taking into account 
relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation were examined: the identification of relevant 
circumstances, the process of weighing up relevant circumstances, and the indication of 
practical methods. It should be noted that the combination of these three elements can affect 
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certain aspects of the ‘decisions’ made by international courts and tribunals. This thesis will 
divide such decisions into three kinds: single-phase decisions, two-phase decisions, and 
three-phase decisions. 
‘Single-phase’ decisions are made by international courts and tribunals in situations 
in which relevant circumstances identified (while the rules governing maritime delimitation 
are applied) directly indicate practical methods ‘without the weighing-up process of relevant 
circumstances’. In other words, single-phase decisions produce the result of each case ‘as 
soon as’ relevant circumstances indicate the practical methods to be used in the case. In the 
Channel Islands region of the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, and in the first 
sector of the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, international courts and tribunals 
made single-phase decisions. Moreover, in the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) 
case, the bisector line drawn up to the 12NM arc around islands can also be categorised as 
the result of a single-phase decision. 
Single-phase decisions ‘immediately’ respond to the assessment of the relevant 
circumstances of each delimitation case. That is to say, international courts and tribunals 
choose practical methods which most closely reflect relevant circumstances, as soon as the 
relevant circumstances have been identified for a particular case. However, it is still 
questionable whether or not single-phase decisions have achieved an equitable result, since 
no verification operation – such as checking proportionality – is involved. For example, it is 
evident that the outcome of the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case was arbitrary. For this 
reason, single-phase decisions are rarely made by international courts and tribunals. 
 
4.2. Two-phase Decisions: The Construction of a Provisional Line 
Two-phase delimitation decisions are made in situations when relevant circumstances 
indicate practical methods ‘through the weighing-up process of relevant circumstances’. In 
other words, two-phase decisions produce the end result of each case through one important 
essential element of the delimitation operation: the weighing-up of relevant circumstances. 
Why are these decisions termed ‘two-phase’ decisions? Since the process of weighing up 
relevant circumstances usually takes place in the course of modifying a provisional line, the 
establishment of a provisional line and the shift of the provisional line offer the typical 
example of a two-phase decision. Clearly, therefore, the construction of a provisional line 
and the modification of the provisional line equate, respectively, to the two phases of two-







French Continental Shelf case, the second sector of the 1982 Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libya) case, the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, the 2001 Maritime Delimitation 
and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case, and the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary 
(Cameroon/Nigeria) case are all examples of two-phase decisions. 
Two-phase decisions tend to prioritise the ‘certainty’ of the delimitation process. 
Thus, geometrical methods are invoked in order to draw a provisional line. This frequently 
leads to the construction of a provisional equidistance line. The provisional line can then be 
adjusted depending on the weight of other relevant circumstances. To illustrate this point, it 
is worth ascertaining whether or not the result of the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary 
(Cameroon/Nigeria) case is classified as a two-phase decision. In this case, no relevant 
circumstance that might adjust a provisional line was found. Therefore, the provisional line 
became the final delimitation line. Still, the outcome of this case can also be regarded as a 
two-phase decision, since the ICJ sought to identify other relevant circumstances for the 
purpose of its attempt to weigh up all the relevant circumstances adjusting the provisional 
line. 
Are two-phase decisions related to the flexibility of application of the rules in 
maritime delimitation? Since geometrical methods are employed in order to establish a 
provisional line, two-phase decisions seem to guarantee that the application of the 
delimitation rule must be predictable. However, the certainty of a provisional line cannot be 
equated with the predictable application of the rules in maritime delimitation, because other 
relevant circumstances might shift the provisional line during the weighing-up operation. In 
short, the application of the current delimitation rule remains flexible. It is evident, therefore, 
that two-phase decisions promote flexibility, because they focus on the identification of a 
certain relevant circumstance (which is mainly responsible for the selection of a certain 
provisional line) and the weighing-up of relevant circumstances. 
 
4.3. Three-phase Decisions: The Emphasis on Proportionality 
With respect to the judgements and arbitral awards of maritime delimitation, three-phase 
decisions are made by international courts and tribunals when one more verification phase is 
required to check the equitability of the result reached on the basis of two-phase decisions. 
One example of this additional verification phase is the proportionality check, which is one 
typical way to verify the equitability of a proposed result. Therefore, three-phase decisions 







and the checking of proportionality. Such decisions are more effective than two-phase 
decisions in verifying and thus ensuring the equitability of a proposed result. 
In this context, we must ask whether or not the proportionality check is included in 
the process of taking into account relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation. The 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case suggested that checking proportionality is an “aspect 
of equity”.
148
 Does this statement mean that the checking of proportionality is one stage of 
the process of applying the delimitation rule? As already pointed out, the process of taking 
into consideration of all relevant circumstances consists of the identification of relevant 
circumstances, the weighing-up of relevant circumstances, and the indication and application 
of practical methods. The effective application of the current delimitation rule governing 
maritime delimitation requires that all relevant circumstances are taken into account. 
However, checking proportionality involves examining the result produced after applying 
the delimitation rule, rather than applying the rule itself. This means that the concept of 
proportionality indicates ‘one aspect of an equitable result to be achieved’ or no more than ‘a 
standard to confirm the equitability of a proposed result’. In other words, we can only inspect 
that all relevant circumstances have been taken into account through invoking the concept of 
proportionality. This point will be discussed in the next section. 
One important reason for employing the third phase in the decision-making process, 
such as the proportionality check, is to reach a ‘more’ equitable result – because there is no 
such thing as a singular or absolute equitable result. By means of a verification phase, the 
equitability of a proposed result is enhanced. From a strict legal viewpoint, it follows that the 
aim of adopting a verification operation is to avoid producing an arbitrary outcome. 
In the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, the check of 
proportionality was named the “disproportionality test”, thereby reflecting the traditional role 
of proportionality in the delimitation of maritime boundaries.
149
 The ICJ made the proviso 
that “[t]his checking can only be approximate”.
150
 According to the Court, the proportionality 
check is not mathematical. It follows that “[t]his is not to suggest that these respective areas 
should be proportionate to coastal lengths”, as the Court stated.
151
 A proposed result 
constructed through the application of the rules governing maritime delimitation is 
considered equitable if it is not disproportional. In other words, the result of maritime 
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delimitation cannot be mathematical, because it is merely ‘an’ equitable result, not ‘the’ 
equitable result. 
 
4.4. A Concluding Remark 
The fact that the consideration of all relevant circumstances only dominates the whole 
delimitation process is noticed by examining the three kinds of decisions as has been 
explained above. In addition, all of the three kinds of decisions made by international courts 
and tribunals reflect the flexibility of application of the rules governing maritime 
delimitation. There is no fixed decision-making process in maritime delimitation. The three 
kinds of decisions are interchangeable depending on all the relevant circumstances of a 
particular case. In future cases, an international court or tribunal can select one from the 
three decision-making processes on a case-by-case basis. 
One question to be asked here is whether or not single-phase decisions should be 
avoided and three-phase decisions should be urged. In fact, it is true that the conduct of the 
States concerned may indicate a delimitation line in a certain case, and the line may be 
considered the achievement of an equitable solution in light of all relevant circumstances. 
Insofar as the achievement of an equitable result is the final aim in maritime delimitation, the 
issue of choosing one from the three decision-making processes is a means to the solution. 
The law of maritime delimitation has not established the primacy of three-phase decisions. It 
follows that a predictable or established decision-making process gives way to the 
achievement of an equitable solution. 
 
 
5. Indeterminacy of an Equitable Result Achieved by Taking into 
    Account Relevant Circumstances in Maritime Delimitation 
 
5.1. The Meaning of an Indeterminate Equitable Result 
Simply put, the flexibility of the rules in the context of maritime delimitation refers to the 
flexibility of applying these rules. The ‘indeterminacy’ of a proposed result can be addressed 
in the same light. In short, a result produced from the flexible application of the rules 
governing maritime delimitation is indeterminate. 
The ILC, which began in 1950 to formulate the rules regarding the delimitation of 







equidistance method articulated in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. This method was invented because no rule of international law with 
respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf had previously existed. However, the 
mandatory nature of the equidistance method has since been challenged on two fronts, as 
described below. Consequently, the result of maritime delimitation – whose predictability 
would have been guaranteed by the obligatory use of the equidistance method – cannot be 
considered determinate. 
The first challenge to the obligatory character of the equidistance method came with 
the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, when the Court did not consider the invocation 
of the equidistance method to be obligatory under customary international law. According to 
the ruling made in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, any suitable method other 
than the equidistance method may be employed in delimiting maritime boundaries.
152
 Hugh 
Thirlway has stressed that these cases were closely involved with the concept of flexibility. 
As international courts and tribunals have failed to derive a particular method on the basis of 
entitlement (for example, natural prolongation or the criterion of distance),
153
 Professor 
Thirlway believes that flexibility is necessary in maritime delimitation cases.
154
 In particular, 
he finds evidence of such flexibility in paragraph 20 of the 1969 Judgment: “The 
delimitation itself must indeed be equitably effected.”
155
 Professor Thirlway argues that the 
ICJ had finally accepted the inclusion of the concept of flexibility in maritime delimitation, 
despite the fact that the sentence quoted above was written in order to reject the concept of a 
‘just and equitable share’.
156
 Indeed, in the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, the ICJ 
accepted that there was an ‘area of overlapping potential entitlement’.
157
 It follows that the 
indeterminacy of a result produced by the flexible application of the rules governing 
maritime delimitation can be increased, in the sense that there is the possibility of a ‘sharing-




The second challenge to the mandatory equidistance method is that, as the 1977 
Anglo-French Continental Shelf case declared, special (or relevant) circumstances may 
                                            
152
 I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp.46-47, para.85. 
153
 Hugh Thirlway, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (1960-1989): Part 
Five”, The British Year Book of International Law, Issue 64 (1993), p.31. 
154
 Ibid., p.34. 
155
 I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp.22-23, para.20. 
156
 Thirlway, supra note 153, pp.34-35. 
157
 I.C.J. Reports 1993, p.47, para.19. 
158







qualify the use of the equidistance method, although its employment is obligatory.
159
 
Predictability – the underlying notion of the equidistance method – is thus undermined by 
the flexibility of application of the rules when relevant circumstances are taken into account. 
The consequence of denying the obligatory character of the equidistance method is 
an emphasis on both the achievement of an equitable result, and the indeterminacy of that 
result. The indeterminacy of an equitable result can be explained in three ways. Firstly, given 
that the result produced is regarded as equitable unless a proposed result (which is achieved 
through the drawing of a provisional line, and the identification and weighing-up of relevant 
circumstances) proves inequitable, all results which remain ‘within’ some limits may be 
equitable. For example, the ratio between the relevant areas of two States may be either 
49:51 or 51:49, on the assumption that the length of the relevant coastlines of one State is the 
same as that of the relevant coastlines of the other. Both of these ratios may be equitable. 
Similarly, in the 2007 Maritime Delimitation (Guyana/Suriname) case, the ratio of relevant 
areas (Guyana 51%: Suriname 49%) was considered to be equitable in relation to the ratio of 
coastal frontages (Guyana 54%: Suriname 46%).
160
 In other words, the term ‘equitable’ does 
not mean ‘mathematical’. How can the equitable limits of a provisional result be 
determined? At this juncture, the ‘disproportionality test’ can be invoked.
161
 It follows that 
the indeterminacy or diversity of a result is enhanced because, according to judicial and 
arbitral case-law, a proposed result will ultimately become an equitable result unless it is 
disproportional. It should not be overlooked, however, that the discretion of international 
courts and tribunals can be exercised with regard to the disproportionality test.
162
 There is a 
fine line between a ‘discretionary’ decision and an ‘arbitrary’ decision made by international 
courts and tribunals. An equitable result cannot be an arbitrary decision insofar as it is 
produced systematically, with all relevant circumstances taken into account. Even though an 
equitable result may differ from case to case, it should be regarded as the outcome of a 
discretionary decision. 
Secondly, on the premise that the provisional line constructed can be adjusted, the 
end result of maritime delimitation cannot be anticipated. The final result will depend on 
which circumstances are relevant or how much weight the relevant circumstances are given; 
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again, the final result will differ from case to case. 
Thirdly, the concept of indeterminacy can be discussed with reference to practical 
examples of an equitable result. Since an equitable result in a certain delimitation case is not 
fixed but dependent on the particular characteristics of that case, the result is justifiably 
considered indeterminate. For example, while a result which ensures non-encroachment on 
natural prolongation may prove an equitable result in one case, a proportional result may be 
equitable in another. Practical examples of an equitable result will be examined in the 
following section. 
 
5.2. The Achievement of ‘an’ Equitable Result 
 
5.2.1. Equitable Principles and an Equitable Result 
As discussed above, maritime delimitation is performed not by the application of equitable 
principles, but by taking account of all relevant circumstances. At this point, it is important 
to raise the concept of ‘equitable principles’ once more, because many principles adduced by 
international courts and tribunals as examples of equitable principles, in fact, mean several 
aspects of an equitable result. 
It should be noted that the concept of equitable principles leads to two key 
misunderstandings. The first is that certain reasonable, practical methods (including the 
equidistance method) might constitute equitable principles. This misunderstanding is natural. 
One year after the 1945 Truman Proclamation, for instance, Francis A. Vallat opined that 
equitable principles could be constituted by reasonable, practical methods of delimitation, 
including the equidistance method.
163
 However, this misconception was dispelled in the 1969 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases. In these cases, the ICJ placed the emphasis on the 
‘application’ of equitable principles, in order to stress that various methods other than the 
equidistance method could be employed in maritime delimitation.
164
 This emphasis on a 
diverse range of methods applicable to maritime delimitation allowed for the possibility that 
the equidistance method could be inequitable in a specific delimitation case. Conversely, 
even though the conduct of the States concerned is not generally considered a reasonable, 
practical method for determining delimitation, it can produce an equitable result in a 
particular delimitation case. However, as stated above, the application of equitable principles 
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(if the concept of equitable principles must be kept) indicates to examine all the relevant 
circumstances of a concrete case. It follows that equitable principles cannot be defined 
merely as reasonable, practical methods which include the equidistance method. 
The second misunderstanding relating to the concept of equitable principles is that 
certain principles necessary to take into consideration relevant circumstances may 
themselves be equitable principles. Faraj Abdullah Ahnish describes equitable principles as 
‘a set of legal delimitatory rules’.
165
 According to his view, the concept of equity identifies 
some applicable principles in relation to maritime delimitation, depending on geographical 
and other circumstances.
166
 That is to say, he equates such applicable principles with 
equitable principles. Yet, principles, such as no question of refashioning geography, non-
encroachment on natural prolongation, and equal division or proportionality (all of which 
have been adduced as examples of applicable principles), are, in fact, the aspects of an 
equitable result to be achieved – not equitable principles in themselves. 
The 1984 Gulf of Maine case found that equitable principles “are not themselves 
rules of law and therefore mandatory in the different situations”.
167
 However, equitable 
principles (as introduced by the Chamber of the ICJ in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case), may 
form part of the content of an equitable result to be achieved in a certain delimitation case. 
The reason for this is that the principles enumerated by the Chamber relate to the concrete 
elements of a result that can be considered equitable. In other words, one of the ‘principles’ 
enumerated by the Chamber may be one aspect of an equitable result to be obtained in a 
given case. In this respect, it is worth noting the argument of one scholar. Professor Evans 
states that: 
 
“There clearly is a duality in the Court’s understanding of equitable principles. In addition 
to using it as a term which describes the reflection of the relevant circumstances in the 




Subsequently, he implies that equitable principles are “standards to which an equitable 
delimitation will normally conform”.
169
 Developing his argument, this thesis regards these 
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standards as the aspects or content of an equitable result to be reached. The reason for this is 
that equitable principles referred to in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case and the 1985 Continental 
Shelf (Libya/Malta) case indicate the elements of the equitability of a result produced after 
all relevant circumstances are taken into account. 
This begs the question of how the aspects of an equitable result are related to the 
indeterminacy of that result. When all relevant circumstances are taken into account in a 
certain case, some aspects of an equitable result will be accorded greater weight than others, 
depending on the unique characteristics of that case. For example, in the 2009 Maritime 
Delimitation in the Black Sea case, the ICJ did not regard Serpents’ Island as part of relevant 
coasts, in order to refrain from a judicial refashioning of geography.
170
 Moreover, 
proportionality was checked at the third stage of the delimitation process.
171
 The Court 
considered both the avoidance of geographical refashioning and proportionality to be among 
the aspects of an equitable result considered especially important in this case. However, 
another delimitation case might consider other aspects of an equitable result to be decisive. 
Therefore, the concrete aspects of an equitable result must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. This is what constitutes the indeterminacy of a result. 
 
5.2.2. Examples of an Equitable Result 
Which aspects of an equitable result have international courts and tribunals identified thus 
far? Non-encroachment on natural prolongation (no cut-off effect), an equal division, 
proportionality, no question of refashioning geography, and non-encroachment on a 12NM 
fishery zone can all be cited. 
 
5.2.2.1. Non-encroachment on Natural Prolongation 
Non-encroachment on natural prolongation has been part of the content of an equitable result 
since the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases. In these cases, the ICJ described “a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural 
prolongation of the land territory of the other” [emphases added].
172
 Since the Court referred 
to the ‘territory’ of one State and the ‘territory of the other’, the ‘premise’ of these rulings 
was that there was a ‘single (common)’ ‘geological’ continental shelf in the region
173
 – even 
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though this was not in fact the case. If a single geological continental shelf does not exist, the 
issue of non-encroachment on natural prolongation is not relevant to an equitable result to be 
achieved in a certain case. Where a single geological continental shelf does not exist, only 
the outer limits of the continental shelf of the States involved need to be identified. Even 
though the emergence of the criterion of distance refrained from the identification of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf within 200NM, the issue of non-encroachment on natural 
prolongation still remains important with respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf 
‘beyond’ 200NM. 
The assumption that the North Sea consists of a single geological natural 
prolongation
174
 shows that the non-encroachment (of one) on natural prolongation (of the 
other) was considered an important aspect of an equitable result to be produced in the 1969 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases. Likewise, the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case 
regarded the ‘continuous’ continental shelf of the French Republic in the Channel Islands 
region as an aspect of the equitable result to be reached.
175
 
At this point, it should be noted that non-encroachment on natural prolongation was 
considered to be an equitable ‘principle’ in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case and the 1985 
Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case.
176
 Whereas the concept of equitable principles might 
refer to practical norms to be applied in the delimitation process, an equitable ‘result’ as the 
final aim of maritime delimitation can be reached unless natural prolongation is encroached 
on in each case. The concept of non-encroachment on natural prolongation lacks concrete 
guiding standards leading to an equitable result. Rather, as this thesis assumes, it shows an 
element of the equitability of the result produced. Therefore, in contrast to the reasoning in 
the 1984 Gulf of Maine case or the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, non-
encroachment on natural prolongation must be considered an aspect of an equitable result. In 
other words, encroachment on natural prolongation can obstruct the achievement of an 
equitable result in a given delimitation case. 
What is the relationship between non-encroachment on natural prolongation and no 
cut-off effect? Since the Chamber of the ICJ dealt with these two concepts separately in the 
1984 Gulf of Maine case,
177
 we must assume that non-encroachment on natural prolongation 
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differs from no cut-off effect. Non-encroachment on natural prolongation can form part of 
the content of an equitable result if natural prolongation is a source of title to the continental 
shelf. In contrast, no cut-off effect refers to the need to ensure as far as possible that the 
‘seaward’ ‘projection’ of the States concerned is not cut off. For example, the outcome must 
avoid preventing the States concerned from approaching the continental shelf, if possible. 
Although the two concepts are not identical, they are often interchangeable.
178
 In sum, what 
must be stressed is that both non-encroachment on natural prolongation and no cut-off effect 
belong to the aspects of an equitable result to be produced after all relevant circumstances 
are taken into account. 
 
5.2.2.2. An Equal Division 
At the 115
th
 meeting of the ILC on 2
nd
 July 1951, Jean Spiropoulos stated that: 
 
“In the case of States whose coastlines faced each other and were separated by straits, say 
twice as wide as the limit of territorial waters, it might be agreed that half the continental 
shelf should belong to each of the two States, in the absence of some other division arrived 
at by mutual consent” [emphasis added].
179 
 
Although Spiropoulos’s statement was irrelevant to the use of the equidistance method, it is 
clear that an equal division could well have been one of the aims which the delimitation of 
the continental shelf sought to achieve. Likewise, the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
(which denied the mandatory character of the equidistance method) considered an equal 
division – which entails dividing overlapping areas equally, in the absence of agreement – to 
be one aim of maritime delimitation.
180
 
Although the concept of an equal division can be discussed without reference to the 
equidistance method, the equidistance method is in fact one of the key methods of making an 
equal division.
181
 With respect to the relationship of ‘opposite’ States, this point was strongly 
supported by the Court of Arbitration in the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case.
182
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At this point, it should be noted that, in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber of 
the ICJ set out the reasoning behind its employment of the bisector method. The reason for 
choosing the bisector method was to produce “a result which is probably as close as possible 
to an equal division of the first area to be delimited”.
183
 In the 2007 Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua/Honduras) case, the ICJ cited another paragraph of the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, 
to express its agreement that the employment of the bisector method can lead to an equal 
division of areas where the maritime projections of both States overlap.
184
 In other words, 
even if the equidistance method is employed, an equal division may still be one aspect of an 
equitable result to be achieved. 
 
5.2.2.3. Proportionality 
The concept of proportionality has a long history in the delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
One year after the issuing of the 1945 Truman Proclamation, Francis A. Vallat suggested 
that, in dividing a large bay or a gulf surrounded by several States, “[p]erhaps the most 
equitable solution would be to divide the submarine area outside territorial waters among the 
contiguous states in proportion to the length of the coast lines”.
185
 However, it should not be 
overlooked that this suggestion was an attempt to regard proportionality as one of the 
‘methods’ to be applied in maritime delimitation. 
Subsequently, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the concept of 
proportionality was considered to be one of the factors to be taken into account with regard 
to ‘some particular geographical conditions’ (adjacent coasts, the existence of particular 
coastal configurations (such as concavity or convexity), and quasi-equality of coastal 
lengths).
186
 Although the concept of proportionality was not a distinct method of maritime 
delimitation in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, it was regarded as a useful 
method of dealing with certain geographical conditions. In other words, whilst 
proportionality was an auxiliary method applied to particular geographical conditions, these 
geographical conditions were, in themselves, relevant circumstances. For these reasons, 
Professor Thirlway implies that proportionality as an auxiliary method may be coupled with 
the equidistance method in order to ensure the predictable application of the rules in 
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In the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, however, the function of 
proportionality in maritime delimitation altered: it took on the role of checking the 
equitability of a proposed result.
188
 Later, the role of proportionality was transformed again, 
becoming a relevant circumstance in the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case and the 
1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case.
189
 
In spite of the diverse roles played by proportionality in international case-law 
relating to maritime delimitation, the concept of proportionality is currently employed as a 
method of checking the equitability of a proposed result, rather than as a relevant 
circumstance or an auxiliary method applied to some particular geographical conditions. This 
was confirmed by the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case.
190
 
Indeed, it might be asked why this thesis intends to regard proportionality as an 
aspect of an equitable result. The reason for this is that an equitable result cannot be defined 
as such unless it is proportionate. It is evident that proportionality is an important aim to be 
fulfilled in maritime delimitation, because it is employed to check the equitability of a 
proposed result ex post facto. Furthermore, in the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black 
Sea case, the ICJ invoked the concept of proportionality under the title ‘the 
disproportionality test’. This confirms that an equitable result can only be achieved if it is not 
disproportionate. Consequently, proportionality is neither a relevant circumstance nor an 
auxiliary method applied to particular geographical conditions: instead, it becomes an aspect 
of an equitable result. 
In light of this, it should be recalled that the concept of proportionality is not 
mathematical, as explained above. Therefore, once the disproportionality test has been 
applied, all results which remain ‘within’ limited extents can be regarded as equitable. In 
other words, whilst proportionality (as a method) promotes the indeterminacy of a result, 
because it is not mathematical, proportionality in itself (as an aim) also constitutes an aspect 
of an equitable result. 
 
5.2.2.4. Other Examples of an Equitable Result 
Other than the three above-cited aspects of an equitable result (non-encroachment on natural 
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prolongation, an equal division, and proportionality), some aspects of an equitable result can 
be identified as peculiar to certain cases. 
Firstly, one aspect of an equitable result is fulfilled when the maximum extent of the 
territorial sea or the contiguous zone has been guaranteed. Once a 12NM territorial sea or 
24NM contiguous zone has fully been granted, it is considered to be equitable. For example, 
a 12NM territorial sea was secured in the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case,
191
 and a 24NM 
contiguous zone was allowed in the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case.
192
 In addition, in 
the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, the Court of Arbitration aimed at non-
encroachment on a 12NM fishery zone.
193
 Thus, the maximum extent of the territorial sea or 
the contiguous zone granted by the 1982 UNCLOS or customary international law to the 
States concerned can constitute one aspect of an equitable result. 
Secondly, no question of refashioning geography, which the ICJ categorised as an 
equitable ‘principle’ in the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, may also be an aspect 
of an equitable result.
194
 In fact, this aim was first presented in the 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases in relation to the meaning of equity.
195
 In the 2002 Land and 
Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case, the ICJ went on to say that “[t]he 
geographical configuration of the maritime areas that the Court is called upon to delimit is a 
given”.
196
 In later cases, refraining from refashioning geography has repeatedly been 
confirmed as part of the content of an equitable result. In the 2006 Maritime Delimitation 
(Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago) case, for example, Trinidad and Tobago understood ‘Point 
A’ as the turning point of a provisional equidistance line.
197
 However, the Arbitral Tribunal in 
this case did not find any justification for Point A,
198
 which in fact seemed to distort the 
geographical circumstances of the case.
199
 Consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal indicated that 
the avoidance of geographical refashioning constituted an aspect of an equitable result.
200
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Likewise, in the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, the ICJ did not count 
Serpents’ Island as part of Ukraine’s coastlines because the inclusion of the island may result 
in a judicial refashioning of geography.
201
 
Thirdly, the equitable access to the capelin fishery resources at the heart of the 1993 
Greenland/Jan Mayen case was considered an aspect of an equitable result.
202
 This indicates 
that the protection of economic interests which might be threatened by a provisional line 
drawn in a concrete case can also form part of the content of an equitable result. 
 
5.2.2.5. A Concluding Remark 
Rosalyn Higgins emphasises that “[w]e are never told, in any of the Court’s shelf 
jurisprudence, what constitutes an equitable result”.
203
 She goes on to say that “those ends 
[justifiable and desired ends] must be articulated, and cannot be hidden behind the term 
‘equitable result’”.
204
 In short, Judge Higgins argues that the content of an equitable result 
must be stipulated. However, the nature of an equitable result achieved through the process 
of taking account of all the relevant circumstances in a concrete case cannot be 
predetermined, since ‘all’ relevant circumstances must be considered before an outcome is 
produced.
205
 An equitable result does not appear until the rules governing maritime 
delimitation have been applied in a flexible manner. In brief, the concept of a singular or pre-
determined equitable result is not valid. In his Dissenting Opinion of the 1982 Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, Judge Oda stated that: 
 
“[N]o line which could have been suggested by the Court would have been an absolute line 
in the sense of being the only possible legal line, deviation from which would mean 
encroachment upon the rights possessed ab initio by one party or the other”.
206 
 
Judge Oda also supported the concept of an equitable result, not the equitable result. The 
concept of an equitable result includes various kinds of equitable results achieved on a case-
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Concrete examples of an equitable result can be presented, as shown above. By 
examining such examples, we can reach a clearer understanding of the meaning and content 
of an equitable result – the aim of the rules governing maritime delimitation. While an equal 
division may prove an equitable result in one case, non-encroachment on natural 
prolongation may constitute an equitable result in another. In this sense, an equitable result 
reached is indeterminate in a concrete case. 
With respect to the indeterminacy of an equitable result, two points must be noted. 
Firstly, the content of an equitable result is not limited, allowing for the possibility that a new 
kind of an equitable result may appear in the future. Secondly, the order of priority governing 
the aspects of an equitable result is not predetermined. This is likely to increase the 
indeterminacy of a result in maritime delimitation. In short, these two points indicate that an 
equitable result varies from case to case. An equitable result for a certain case cannot be 




6. A Concluding Remark 
 
The research carried out on the process of applying the rules governing maritime 
delimitation demonstrates the leading role of relevant circumstances in order to reach an 
equitable solution. The three phases involved in the process of taking into account relevant 
circumstances have been presented. These phases show how international courts and 
tribunals produce an actual delimitation line through the consideration of relevant 
circumstances. As the application of the current delimitation rule is not guaranteed to be 
predictable, the ways involved in applying the rules are various in each phase. 
In addition, the three possible decision-making processes reflect the diverse 
application of the rules in maritime delimitation, relied on the concept of relevant 
circumstances. The choice of a certain decision-making process belongs to the discretion of 
international courts and tribunals. 
It is clear, therefore, that the flexible application of the rules in the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries, dominated by the concept of relevant circumstances, results in the 







relevant circumstances on a case-by-case basis in maritime delimitation. Insofar as the 
achievement of an equitable solution acts as the current rule governing maritime 
delimitation, it is logically impossible for a result to be determined in advance. 
One point to note is that the indeterminacy of an equitable result does not allow 
international courts and tribunals to exercise an unfettered discretion. Rather, international 
courts and tribunals have further enhanced the equitability of a result achieved by linking the 
content of an equitable result (such as the concept of proportionality) with an established 
decision-making process (such as three-phase decisions). In other words, the aspects of an 
equitable result or predictable decision-making processes function as the constraint on an 
arbitrary decision. Therefore, the emphasis on the consideration of relevant circumstances 










Delimitation Achieved by Taking into Account 
Relevant Circumstances (1): 





This thesis has demonstrated that, in applying the delimitation rule that is the achievement of 
an equitable solution, the consideration of relevant circumstances plays a lead role in 
producing the final result. Because the relevant circumstances of one case are different from 
those of another, and the ways to consider relevant circumstances are chosen on a case-by-
case basis, the rules governing maritime delimitation are flexibly applied in the delimitation 
of maritime boundaries. This chapter will examine the dominant role of relevant 
circumstances in relation to the establishment of an SMB. 
The construction of an SMB is the most ‘typical’ pragmatic solution in maritime 
delimitation. International courts and tribunals have adopted a flexible approach in 
establishing an SMB. In particular, this chapter will get rid of a possible misunderstanding 
that the relevant circumstances of an SMB case are confined to ‘neutral factors’ common to 
both the EEZ and the continental shelf. 
In brief, the various ways in which international courts and tribunals take into 
account relevant circumstances for drawing an equitable SMB reflect the rise of relevant 




2. A Single Maritime Boundary 
 
2.1. Emergence 







Continental Shelf and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone) 
showed that two separate lines may be constructed to delimit maritime spaces beyond the 
territorial sea.
1
 According to the rules established by the two Conventions, for example, the 
final delimitation line dividing the continental shelves of the States concerned may, under 
special circumstances, depart from an equidistance line, whereas the delimitation line 
dividing their contiguous zones must remain identical with the equidistance line.
2
 However, 
this situation is little more than hypothetical, as no practical example exists of divergence 
between continental shelf and contiguous zone delimitation lines. 
Since the 1970s, when a number of States began actively to lay claim to the concept 
of the EEZ or the EFZ, the high seas over each continental shelf have been designated as 
either an EEZ or an EFZ. This outcome led to the real possibility of a State’s having two 
legally separate areas beyond its territorial sea, up to the maximum distance of the EEZ or 
the EFZ. As a result, the issue of an SMB was raised in the context of maritime boundary 
delimitation. The significance of this issue is evident from the fact that the Special 
Agreement between Canada and the United States requesting the establishment of an SMB 
was concluded as early as 1979. 
The 1982 UNCLOS clarifies two points. First, it clearly articulates the concept of the 
EEZ; second, it decrees that the legal claim to the continental shelf up to a distance of 
200NM must be based on ‘geographical adjacency’ to the coastlines concerned. According to 
the UNCLOS, two legal maritime areas may coexist from the maximum distance of the 
territorial sea up to the limit of the EEZ, and the legal basis for claims to both maritime 
spaces is identical up to 200NM. At this point, it is worth noting the difficulty of ascertaining 
the legal ground for an SMB, since the relationship between the EEZ and the continental 
shelf is not fully clarified. Nevertheless, it can be said that the UNCLOS indirectly supports 
the concept of an SMB, because there is no rule for managing the two separate delimitation 
lines. 
In 1984, the Chamber of the ICJ made the first international decision regarding the 
establishment of an SMB. The case involved was the 1984 Gulf of Maine case between 
Canada and the United States. Both Parties requested the Chamber to establish an SMB 
dividing their continental shelves and fishery zones, under Article II(1) of the Special 
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 However, neither Party aimed to materialise a novel 
concept (that is, an SMB) at that time. As Donald M. McRae points out, the issue of an SMB 
per se was not important to either Canada or the United States.
4
 Rather, the two States 
requested the establishment of an SMB in order to avoid the inconvenience of undergoing 
separate court proceedings to delimit their continental shelves and their fishery zones: one 
for the EFZ and the other for the continental shelf.
5
 In other words, the establishment of an 
SMB was a ‘pragmatic’ solution. Interestingly, however, almost all of the decisions made by 
international courts and tribunals since the 1984 Gulf of Maine case have provided for the 
establishment of an SMB – with only one exception, the Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) 
case decided by the ICJ in 1985. 
 
2.2. The Legal Ground for an SMB 
In fact, in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, both Canada and the United States seemed 
unconcerned as to whether or not the concept of an SMB yet existed under the international 
law of the sea.
6
 The President of the Chamber, Judge Ago, queried this legal issue as follows: 
 
“In the event that one particular method, or set of methods, should appear appropriate for 
the delimitation of the continental shelf, and another for that of the exclusive fishing zones, 
what do the Parties consider to be the legal grounds that might be invoked for preferring 
one or the other in seeking to determine a single line?” 
 
Both Parties found it difficult to reply to the President’s question,
7
 as they were unable to 
pinpoint the legal basis for an SMB. In fact, the two States simply presumed that it was both 
legally and materially possible to establish an SMB.
8
 In his Dissenting Opinion, Judge Gros 
argued that the Chamber itself had failed to provide an adequate answer to Judge Ago’s 
question, which had come to the heart of the matter.
9
 According to Judge Gros, therefore, 
neither the Parties in the case nor the Chamber itself identified any basis or precedent for an 
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SMB in international law. 
The research on the legal basis of entitlements to the EEZ and the continental shelf 
offers a useful starting point in determining the legal ground for an SMB. The matter of title 
will be addressed before the legal basis for an SMB is explored. Is the legal basis of 
entitlement to the continental shelf the same as that to the EEZ? Would the legal basis of an 
SMB be more easily established if the ground for entitlements to the two maritime zones was 
identical? Seeking to provide adequate answers to these questions, some scholars have 
examined the legal basis of title to each of these two maritime zones. For instance, L. H. 
Legault and Blair Hankey argue that the same legal basis exists for claims to the EEZ and the 
continental shelf alike; namely, ‘geographical adjacency measured by the criterion of 
distance’ ‘within’ 200NM.
10
 Likewise, it is meaningful that the 1985 Continental Shelf 
(Libya/Malta) case judged by the ICJ based the legal entitlement to the continental shelf on 
the criterion of distance: up to a distance of 200NM.
11
 Jonathan I. Charney also implies that 




At this point, we should look for an answer to the second question: is the legal basis 
of an SMB more easily established if the basis of title to the continental shelf is the same as 
that to the EEZ within a distance of 200NM? The answer would be in the negative. There is 
no logical reason why the two lines should coincide simply due to an identical legal basis of 
titles to maritime areas that they enclose. If the boundaries of the two maritime areas must be 
single, this would be incompatible with the significance of each maritime zone that the 1982 
UNCLOS acknowledges. The fact that the rights of a State relating to its EEZ are not 
identical with those relating to its continental shelf indicates that the extent of one State’s 
EEZ may be different from that of its continental shelf. The distinctive characteristic of each 
maritime area may give rise to a ‘grey area’ (which is beyond 200NM from the coast of one 
State but within 200NM from the coast of the other State, however on the former State’s side 
of the delimitation line), as in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case.
13
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Is there, then, no legal basis for an SMB? In the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the 
Chamber of the ICJ stated that “there is certainly no rule of international law to the contrary, 
and, in the present case, there is no material impossibility in drawing a boundary of this 
kind”.
14
 Conceding that there is no rule of international law against an SMB, and that it may 
be possible in practice to draw a single line of this kind, the Chamber raised no opposition to 
the implementation of an SMB to divide both Canada and the United States.
15
 
Both Parties considered the legal basis of an SMB to lie in their (Special) 
‘Agreement’ to the construction of a single line dividing the continental shelves and fishery 
zones of the two States.
16
 However, Judge Gros believed that such an agreement could not 
elevate the concept of an SMB to a legal concept.
17
 He assumed that, despite their 
Agreement in this instance, the Chamber could have refused to draw an SMB because a legal 
reason to authorise the construction of an SMB had not been found.
18
 
Judge Gros wondered how both Canada and the United States had been freed from 
Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
19
 He advanced an 
interesting argument that the established regime of the continental shelf was ignored by the 
new regime of the EEZ.
20
 Finally, arguing that an SMB would not be justified if it proved 
inequitable for either a State’s EEZ or its continental shelf rights,
21
 Judge Gros concluded 
that the establishment of an SMB was not directly authorised by the relevant law.
22
 
However, L. H. Legault and Blair Hankey identify the logical and functional 
foundation of an SMB within the concept of the EEZ.
23
 According to their research, a 
‘partial’ integration of the EEZ and the continental shelf has been achieved,
24
 with the 
identical legal basis for the two regimes up to a distance of 200NM. For Legault and Hankey, 
this justifies the establishment of an SMB.
25
 Nevertheless, the partial integration of the 
maritime areas cannot be the sufficient legal basis for an SMB. The notion of partial 
integration, contingent on the criterion of distance within 200NM, does not deny some 
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distinctive elements of the continental shelf, and is thus inadequate as the legal ground for a 
single line. Indeed, Judge Gros’s argument is theoretically flawless. The fact that the limits 
of both the EEZ and the continental shelf are determined by the criterion of distance up to 
200NM does not necessarily authorise the establishment of an SMB. 
Therefore, the establishment of an SMB is no more than a delimitation ‘practice’, 
permitted on the assumption that there is no rule against it.
26
 This point was reasoned by the 
ICJ in the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case. The 
Court stated that: 
 
“[T]he concept of a single maritime boundary does not stem from multilateral treaty law 
but from State practice, and that it finds its explanation in the wish of States to establish one 
uninterrupted boundary line delimiting the various – partially coincident – zones of 
maritime jurisdiction appertaining to them”.
27 
 
Might international courts and tribunals therefore be freely released from such a practice? 
Turning to the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, it seems that, on the contrary, international 
courts and tribunals intend to retain the practice of drawing an SMB. At the outset of this 
case, Denmark unilaterally filed an application instituting proceedings against Norway, 
because both Parties had already accepted the ‘compulsory’ jurisdiction of the ICJ.
28
 This 
meant that no agreement to construct an SMB between both Denmark and Norway existed 
before this case was referred to the Court. During the proceedings of the case, Denmark 
asked the ICJ to draw an SMB, while Norway argued that two separate lines should be 
constructed.
29
 In favour of Norway’s argument, the Court decided to draw two, albeit 
coincident, lines, concluding that the establishment of an SMB was not relevant to this 
particular case.
30
 In this regard, it must be noted that, in the 2006 Maritime Delimitation 
(Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago) case, the Arbitral Tribunal (which was constituted pursuant 
to Article 287, and in accordance with Annex VII, of the 1982 UNCLOS) established an 
SMB when arriving at its decision based on the ‘compulsory jurisdiction’ of the Tribunal.
31
 
How were the rules governing maritime delimitation applied in the 1993 
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Greenland/Jan Mayen case, in which no agreement was made to establish an SMB? The 
Court’s decision was to draw a provisional median line ‘between opposite coasts’, 
irrespective of the nature of each maritime area.
32
 Despite the fact that the delimitation of the 
States’ fishery zones was different from that of their continental shelves, the starting line was 
identical. Furthermore, the two delimitation lines coincided along their ‘whole’ lengths, even 
though the relevant circumstances of the three delimited zones differed.
33
 Evidently, 
therefore, the ICJ had constructed a de facto SMB in this case.
34
 
Since the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the establishment of an SMB has become a 
common delimitation practice, featuring regularly in the decisions made by international 
courts and tribunals. The flexible application of the rules governing maritime delimitation, 
designed to ensure an equitable result in each case, has influenced the identification and 
weighing-up of relevant circumstances related to an SMB. In short, international courts and 
tribunals have exercised their discretion in favour of more convenient and pragmatic 
solutions, despite the lack of the legal ground for the establishment of an SMB. 
 
2.3. Definition 
Beyond the territorial sea, the concept of an SMB exists only up to the maximum distance of 
the EEZ or the EFZ, because two legal maritime areas coexist within the extent of the EEZ 
or the EFZ.
35
 The delimitation of the territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond 200NM 
should conceptually be excluded from the definition of an SMB. However, this definition 
rarely suits the actual requests made by States in delimitation cases. 
In the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, the Arbitral Tribunal stated that: 
 
“It is not disputed by the Parties that the maritime territories concerned are the territorial 
sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf; that these territories must be delimited 
by a single line”.
36 
 
Furthermore, in the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case, the Court of Arbitration described 
a situation in which “the object, as in this case, is to establish a single, all purpose 
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delimitation both of the sea-bed and the superjacent waters” [emphasis added].
37
 These two 
arbitral cases added the delimitation of the territorial sea to the concept of an SMB, which as 
a result took on a rather different complexion from its use in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case. 
The concept of a ‘single all-purpose boundary’ started to emerge, and was consolidated by 
the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen case heard by the Arbitral Tribunal. 
In the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen case, the Arbitral Tribunal stated that “the international 
boundary shall be a single all-purpose boundary” [emphasis added].
38
 The Tribunal also 
authorised the use of a single all-purpose boundary to delimit an area of overlapping 
‘territorial sea’.
39
 A single delimitation line was employed to delimit all of the territorial sea, 
the EEZ and the continental shelf (if appropriate, including the continental shelf beyond 
200NM). While the original concept of an SMB was predicated on a ‘vertical’ line beyond 
the territorial sea up to the maximum distance of the EEZ or the EFZ, the definition of a 
single all-purpose boundary describes instead a ‘horizontal’ line extending from the 
coastlines concerned. In other words, a single all-purpose boundary combines the territorial 
sea boundary, the original SMB, and, if necessary, an outer continental shelf boundary. In 
this respect, Professor Evans regards a single all-purpose boundary as a ‘composite’ 
maritime boundary, as exemplified in the Arbitral Tribunal’s 1999 decision to draw two 
separate sets of boundaries and combine them into a single line.
40
 
Here, one of the key issues is whether or not a single all-purpose boundary has its 
own implications for the development of the law of maritime boundary delimitation. If the 
concept of a single all-purpose boundary considerably influences the application of the rules 
for drawing a single delimitation line, it should be differentiated from the original concept of 
an SMB. Might the development of the concept of a single all-purpose boundary affect the 
delimitation of the territorial sea or of the continental shelf beyond 200NM? The answer is in 
the negative. 
In fact, the end point of a territorial sea boundary can be the starting point of a ‘pure’ 
SMB existing beyond the territorial sea up to the maximum distance of 200NM. It follows 
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that circumstances relevant to the delimitation of the territorial sea can determine the starting 
point of a pure SMB. Likewise, if the concept of a single all-purpose boundary must be 
accepted, the end point of a pure SMB is the starting point of an outer continental shelf 
boundary. However, it should be noted that circumstances relevant to the delimitation of the 
territorial sea only affect the drawing of a territorial sea boundary, while circumstances 
germane to the EEZ or the inner continental shelf only have an effect on establishing a pure 
SMB. For example, in the 2007 Maritime Delimitation (Guyana/Suriname) case, the 
circumstance (the 10° line established between the Parties) relevant to the territorial sea only 
influences the construction of the territorial sea boundary.
41
 Since the direction of a territorial 
sea boundary does not need to be the same as that of a pure SMB, a single all-purpose 
boundary is nothing but the combination of two boundaries (three boundaries including an 
outer continental shelf boundary, if appropriate). 
To summarise, circumstances relevant to the delimitation of the territorial sea or the 
outer continental shelf do not influence the drawing of a pure SMB. In addition, 
circumstances pertinent to the establishment of a pure SMB do not have any priority over 
those relevant to the delimitation of the territorial sea or the outer continental shelf, in 
relation to the construction of a territorial sea boundary or an outer continental shelf 
boundary. In other words, the concept of a single all-purpose boundary in itself does not 
affect the construction of a territorial sea boundary or an outer continental shelf boundary. 
The single all-purpose boundary is not a novel concept; it does not affect the 
flexibility of application of the rules governing maritime delimitation. Conceptually, it is no 
more than the horizontal extension of a single line. However, in accordance with States’ 
desire to extend a pure SMB to encompass a territorial sea boundary (including an outer 
continental shelf boundary, if necessary), the concept of a single all-purpose boundary has 
replaced the original concept of an SMB in maritime delimitation. Consequently, in the 2001 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case, the ICJ defined a 
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2.4. The Importance of Two Separate but Coincident Lines 
One interesting question is raised by the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case of the ICJ. Despite 
the fact that the ICJ regarded the establishment of an SMB as irrelevant to this case,
44
 it is 
unclear whether or not the Court actually drew an SMB. There is no practical difference 
between an SMB and two separate but coincident lines. However, the concept of the latter 
has an impact on taking into account relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation. 
Working on the assumption that the ICJ did not construct an SMB in the 1993 
Greenland/Jan Mayen case, it is worth noting, first, Judge Shahabuddeen’s agreement that 
circumstances relevant to only one of the two maritime zones should also be taken into 
account.
45
 He implied that the ICJ cannot ignore circumstances pertinent to only one 
maritime area unless both States ask the Court to draw an SMB.
46
 At this point, Judge 
Shahabuddeen added that the coincidence of two separate lines would occur 
‘exceptionally’.
47
 However, the Court did not clarify why these two separate lines coincide 
along their ‘whole’ lengths.
48
 According to R. R. Churchill, the ICJ’s reasoning on this matter 
was hardly convincing.
49
 Why did the Court regard the delimitation line of the fishery zone 
as that of the continental shelf in the first zone – thereby only taking into consideration the 
equitable access to the capelin fishery resources? 
At this stage, we need to assess the case from a different angle. Was there any 
practical benefit to the decision not to draw an SMB in the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case? 
The most important reason why the Court preferred to use two separate but coincident lines 
is that this method allowed non-neutral relevant circumstances to be taken into consideration. 
By taking account of circumstances relevant to only one maritime space, the Court was able 
to disregard the primacy of neutral circumstances mandated by the Chamber of the ICJ in the 
1984 Gulf of Maine case – despite drawing a single line. Therefore, it is submitted that the 
use of two separate but coincident lines offers international courts and tribunals a useful 
means of taking resource-related factors into account, if they intend to include economic 
factors among the relevant circumstances to be taken into account. 
Judge Shahabuddeen argued that international courts and tribunals should be subject 
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to the application of equitable principles, even when both States request the establishment of 
an SMB.
50
 The decisions of international courts and tribunals cannot be based solely on 
circumstances common to both maritime zones if circumstances germane to only one of the 
two zones are also ‘relevant’ to a delimitation case.
51
 In this situation, constructing two 
separate but coincident lines enables international courts and tribunals to take economic 
factors into consideration at their discretion. In the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case, the ICJ 
thereby exercised its discretion to depart from the constraint of neutral circumstances – 
despite, in practice, drawing a single line. 
 
 
3. The Consideration of Relevant Circumstances for the Purpose of 
    Establishing an SMB 
 
3.1. The Construction of a Provisional Line: An Equidistance Line and Other 
      Provisional Lines 
Defining the ‘fundamental norm’ of general customary international law as the rules 
governing maritime boundary delimitation in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case,
52
 the Chamber of 
the ICJ assumed that it had the discretionary power to choose equitable criteria and practical 
methods capable of ensuring an equitable result, insofar as special international law did not 
impose any binding legal obligations on international courts and tribunals.
53
 The Chamber 
then confirmed that equitable criteria and practical methods can only be chosen in relation to 
the ‘relevant circumstances’ of a given case.
54
 As pointed out in Chapter III, the concept of 
equitable principles or criteria can only be meaningful with respect to the concept of relevant 
circumstances. The issue of relevant circumstances is at the heart of the delimitation process. 
Hence, even the drawing of a ‘provisional’ ‘SMB’ line is determined by the examination of 
relevant circumstances. 
It is worth examining the methods used by the Chamber to construct provisional 
lines in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, as this was the first case to allow for the establishment 
of an SMB. The Chamber of the ICJ warned that: 
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“Nor should one overlook the possibility that, over the whole course of a long delimitation 




Although maritime delimitation could aim at an ‘equal’ division of relevant maritime areas 
as one aspect of an equitable result, as pointed out in the previous chapter,
56
 the Chamber 
found that the construction of an equidistance line was not obligatory. In other words, despite 
the aim to divide relevant areas equally, the drawing of an equidistance line, which seems to 
be the most appropriate method for an equal division, is not compelled. In terms of 
establishing an SMB, moreover, the Chamber added that a ‘degree of simplification’ was 
required to construct the delimitation line for the EEZ or the EFZ, because “[e]xploitation of 
the sea’s fishery resources calls for the existence of clear boundaries of a constant course” 
[emphasis added].
57
 The two key points in the Chamber’s reasoning (that is, the non-
obligatory character of an equidistance line, and the simplicity of a provisional line) were 
illustrated in the first segment of the 1984 Gulf of Maine case. 
The request that an equidistance line be drawn was rejected in the first segment for 
two reasons. Firstly, the equidistance method has the inherent defect that minor geographical 
features might be accorded undue weight.
58
 Secondly, ‘point A’ was not equidistant between 
two basepoints.
59
 In other words, point A could not be the starting point for drawing a 
provisional equidistance line. For these reasons, the Chamber chose another geometrical 
method: the bisector method, which has the ‘advantages of simplicity and clarity’ and can 
produce a ‘result as close as possible to an equal division’.
60
 The bisector line drawn in the 
first segment after relevant circumstances were considered was initially a provisional line, 
but became the final delimitation line in this segment. As no other relevant circumstances 
were found, no adjustments to the provisional bisector line were required. 
At this point, an important question should be addressed with regard to the 
construction of a provisional line. Can a bisector line be no more than a provisional line? 
Whereas an equidistance line can be constructed as provisional unless relevant circumstances 
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indicate its inappropriateness or impossibility, a bisector line is generally constructed in light 
of all relevant circumstances. In this sense, a bisector line is not provisional but final. 
However, in the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case, the ICJ showed that a 
bisector line may be adjusted if the line is drawn around islands.
61
 This means that another 
relevant circumstance can be taken into account after the construction of a bisector line. It is 
thus submitted that a bisector line, like an equidistance line, falls into the category of 
provisional lines for establishing an SMB. 
In the second segment of the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the provisional line employed 
was an equidistance line because the two States had ‘opposite’ coasts.
62
 Why do international 
courts and tribunals prefer to use an equidistance line when the coasts of both States are 
defined as being opposite? As the Chamber pointed out, it would be difficult to envisage a 
better method than the construction of an equidistance line if the relationship between the 
coasts is opposite, and the desired result is an equal division of maritime areas ‘where the 
maritime projections of the coasts of both States overlap’.
63
 Contrary to the ICJ’s reasoning 
in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases which rejected the concept of apportionment 
or division,
64
 maritime delimitation entails the equitable ‘division’ of a maritime area to 
which all of the States concerned are legally entitled. At this point, it should not be 
overlooked that, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases and the 2012 Maritime 
Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case, the drawing of an 
equidistance line might produce an inequitable result.
65
 The reason for this is that the 
relationship between the coasts is ‘adjacent’, and the construction of an equidistance line is 
not an appropriate means for an equal division between the adjacent States concerned. In 
sum, drawing an equidistance line can be the most effective method of delimitation if the 
desired result of a case is an equal division of maritime spaces overlapped between the 
‘opposite’ States involved. However, another provisional line can be drawn if an equal 
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division does not reflect the most equitable result in a particular case. There is no way of 




Does the preference of constructing a provisional equidistance line reduce the 
discretionary power of international courts and tribunals relating to the establishment of an 
SMB in situations in which the maritime projections of the coasts of two States overlap? 
Here, we can account for their discretion in two ways. 
Firstly, international courts and tribunals are relatively free to ‘interpret’ the 
relationship between the coasts concerned and ‘determine’ what coasts are relevant to being 
opposite or adjacent. They determine whether or not the coasts are opposite each other, and if 
so, where their oppositeness begins and ends. For example, in the second sector of the 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case (despite the fact that this case was not an SMB case), 
the ICJ interpreted that the relationship between both Tunisia and Libya is being transformed 
from that of adjacent States to that of opposite States at one point.
67
 In the 2012 Maritime 
Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case, the ITLOS 
determined that Myanmar’s coast south of Bhiff Cape should be regarded as relevant, 
contrary to Bangladesh’s contention.
68
 If Bangladesh’s argument had been accepted, the 
Tribunal could have employed the construction of a bisector line. Since the contention of 
Bangladesh was not admitted, the ITLOS had no choice but to use a provisional equidistance 
line.
69
 In other words, after the Tribunal exercised its discretion, it constructed the 
provisional line. 
Secondly, international courts and tribunals may decide whether or not the maritime 
delimitation of a given area is considered expressive of an equitable division where the 
maritime projections of the coasts of two States overlap. If the main issue at stake is which 
additional maritime area (such as the contiguous zone) must be attached to an island, as in 
the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case, an international court may choose whether or not a 
provisional line is drawn. Furthermore, it should be stressed that it is also at the discretion of 
international courts and tribunals to look upon an equal division as one aspect of an equitable 
result in a given case, even though the aim of maritime delimitation is to divide relevant 
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areas equitably. If non-encroachment on natural prolongation is one dominant aspect of an 
equitable result as in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, an international court or 
tribunal does not need to adopt a provisional equidistance line for an equal division. As a 
result, although a provisional equidistance line is frequently used for establishing an SMB, 
international courts and tribunals have the freedom to draw an appropriate provisional line. 
To continue with analysing the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, it is worth noting that a 
perpendicular line was drawn in the third segment.
70
 As ‘special international law’ to which 
the Chamber referred in paragraph 114 of its Judgment was not found, the Chamber drew 
each provisional line at its own discretion, according to which was deemed the most 
appropriate in each segment. In fact, no special international law exists within either treaty 
law or customary international law with respect to the delimitation of the EEZ or the EFZ. 
Hence, the establishment of an SMB has consistently been governed by ‘general’ customary 
international law for the purpose of achieving an equitable solution. In short, international 
courts and tribunals may still apply the fundamental norm of general customary international 
law at their discretion. 
Since the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the provisional line drawn in most international 
cases has been an equidistance line. At this point, it should be asked whether or not the rules 
which mandate the drawing of a provisional equidistance line exist with regard to the 
establishment of an SMB. In fact, since the drawing of an SMB in itself is simply a 
convenient or pragmatic solution, such rules do not exist. Are there, then, rules for the 
drawing of a provisional delimitation line for each maritime zone, such as the continental 
shelf, the EEZ, or the EFZ? The rules articulated in the 1982 UNCLOS regarding the 
delimitation of the EEZ (or the continental shelf) do not decree that any special or particular 
provisional line be drawn. Likewise, there is no customary international law regulating the 
provisional delimitation line of the EFZ. Except for the fact that the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf accepted the equidistance method with regard to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, we cannot find any rule mandating that an equidistance 
line must function as the provisional line of an SMB. Nonetheless, the construction of a 
provisional equidistance line in establishing an SMB has been prioritised in the first phase 
(of two-phase or three-phase decisions made by international courts and tribunals) of taking 
into account relevant circumstances unless the relevant circumstances indicate the 
inapplicability of an equidistance line as the provisional SMB line. This is an attempt to 
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avoid making an arbitrary decision, as confirmed in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case of the ITLOS.
71
 However, the discretion 
of international courts and tribunals is not restricted regarding the establishment of a 
provisional SMB line, because there is the possibility to draw an alternative provisional line 
by means of taking into account relevant circumstances.
72
 
In light of this, the discretionary power of international courts and tribunals 
concerning the construction of a provisional SMB line can be summarised in four ways. 
Firstly, drawing a provisional equidistance line is not compulsory. An equidistance line is 
nothing but the starting point in the process of reaching an equitable result. International 
courts and tribunals may choose an equidistance line as a suitable provisional boundary, 
resulting in an equal division where the maritime projections of the coasts of both States 
overlap. 
Secondly, even when the maritime projections of the coasts of both States overlap, 
international courts and tribunals are still responsible for considering relevant circumstances 
in drawing a provisional equidistance line. If the equidistance method appears unsuitable in 
light of these circumstances, international courts and tribunals may at their discretion refuse 
to construct an equidistance line. 
Thirdly, when the equidistance technique is rejected, international courts and 
tribunals have the task of looking for another provisional line. The other type of line deemed 
to be the most appropriate in international case-law is a bisector line. In the process of 
constructing a bisector line, international courts and tribunals exercise their discretionary 
power to assess the shape of the coastlines involved (whether convex or concave), and to 
determine their two end points. 
Fourthly, as the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case indicated, international courts 
and tribunals may decide against drawing a provisional line if such a line is considered 
unnecessary. In this case, the Court of Arbitration instead devoted its efforts to determining 
which coastlines should be considered relevant as the starting point when attaching an 
additional maritime area (such as the contiguous zone) to an island. Even when an 
equidistance line is chosen as the provisional one, international courts and tribunals are free 
to determine which coastlines are relevant to being opposite or adjacent. 
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To conclude, the preferred employment of the equidistance method in constructing 
provisional lines does little to reduce the flexible application of the rules treating relevant 
circumstances in establishing an SMB. 
 
3.2. The Weighing-up Process: The Preference of Neutral Factors or 
      Circumstances 
 
3.2.1. Neutral Circumstances and the Discretion of International Courts and 
         Tribunals 
The next phase in the delimitation process, following the construction of a provisional line, 
is usually the weighing-up of relevant circumstances. While a provisional line is drawn 
according to the indicative role of relevant circumstances, the process of weighing-up gives 
these circumstances an ameliorative as well as an indicative role. That is to say, a provisional 
line already drawn may be shifted (ameliorated) as a result of weighing up relevant 
circumstances. In addition, these circumstances may be judged to indicate the delimitation 
line directly, even when a provisional line does not exist. This defines the indicative role of 
relevant circumstances. In the first sector of the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case 
(despite the fact that this case was not an SMB case), for example, relevant circumstances 
indicated that the 26° line should be established.
73
 In the 2007 Maritime Delimitation 
(Guyana/Suriname) case, the relevant circumstances concerning navigation, from the starting 
point to a distance of 3NM, indicated that the 10° line must be drawn.
74
 
This raises the most important question of all: what impact does the establishment of 
an SMB have on the process of considering relevant circumstances? First of all, we must 
examine the concept of ‘neutral’ factors or circumstances advanced by the Chamber of the 
ICJ in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case. The Chamber stated that “preference will henceforth 
inevitably be given to criteria that, because of their more neutral character, are best suited for 
use in a multi-purpose delimitation”.
75
 It then placed the focus on criteria derived from 
‘geography’.
76
 In this context, the term ‘geography’ refers to ‘coastal’ geography.
77
 Although 
the concept of neutral factors or circumstances was originally proposed to assist in seeking 
equitable criteria for the establishment of an SMB, it has in fact played a pivotal role in 
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limiting the list of circumstances relevant to maritime delimitation. 
As mentioned above, the concept of ‘neutral’ factors emerged in the course of 
seeking equitable criteria common to both the delimitation of the continental shelf and that 
of the EEZ or the EFZ. However, as demonstrated in Chapter III, equitable principles or 
criteria do not have a meaning independent of their application. The application of equitable 
principles or criteria entails the consideration of all relevant circumstances. Therefore, the 
issue of neutral factors begs the question of whether or not the term ‘neutral’ has limited the 
list of relevant circumstances with respect to the establishment of an SMB. If this is the case, 
we must ask whether or not the limitation has affected the discretionary power of 
international courts and tribunals. 
 
3.2.2. Geography 
The consideration of geography – specifically coastal geography – is the starting point for 
taking into account relevant circumstances in establishing an SMB. Geography indicates 
which provisional line is appropriate in the first stage of delimitation, as shown in Chapter 
IV. It is the first relevant circumstance to be taken into account, since the emphasis on 
‘neutral’ factors rather than equitable ‘criteria’ makes geography the most important relevant 
circumstance. 
Malcolm D. Evans divides geography into two groups: geographical ‘factors’ and 
geographical ‘features’.
7879
 Despite this distinction, which is used to explain the two roles of 
relevant circumstances (indicative and ameliorative), Professor Evans’s theory reflects the 
importance of the term ‘geography’ in the delimitation process. 
 
3.2.2.1. Geographical Factors 
First of all, we must examine what is understood by geographical factors. Two geographical 
factors have been considered to be of particular importance in international case-law: the 
coastal configuration (either convex or concave) and the relationship of the coastlines 
concerned (either opposite or adjacent). According to Professor Evans, these two factors 
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‘indicate’ which provisional line is appropriate for a given case.
80
 Before the concept of an 
SMB emerged, they had dominated the process of maritime delimitation, including the 
drawing of a provisional line. During the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for 
instance, the ICJ implied that the concavity of the coastlines involved would make the 
equidistance method unfavourable to Germany.
81
 Likewise, in the 1977 Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf case, the Court of Arbitration assumed that the existence of opposite coasts 
is a prerequisite for the use of the equidistance method.
82
 
With regard to the establishment of an SMB, however, international courts and 
tribunals have restrained the influence of the two geographical factors. An equidistance line 
is used as a provisional one, irrespective of the relationship of the coastlines concerned, as in 
the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case judged by 
the ICJ.
83
 Moreover, regarding the issue of coastal configuration, the Arbitral Tribunal 
overseeing the 2007 Maritime Delimitation (Guyana/Suriname) case concluded that 
international courts and tribunals dealing with maritime delimitation must ‘respect nature’ 
rather than simply consider the convexity or concavity of the coastlines involved.
84
 Likewise, 
in the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case, the ICJ stated that: 
 
“The geographical configuration of the maritime areas that the Court is called upon to 
delimit is a given. It is not an element open to modification by the Court but a fact on the 
basis of which the Court must effect the delimitation”.
85 
 
Does this trend of limiting the influence of the two geographical factors affect the 
discretionary power of international courts and tribunals in the process of establishing an 
SMB? Is the provisional use of the equidistance method perpetuated, irrespective of the two 
major geographical factors? Those who answer in the affirmative could subsequently 
contend that maritime boundary delimitation is to some extent predictable. 
In fact, the increased focus on geography has corrected the bias in the equidistance 
method which seems unfavourable to concave coastlines. Moreover, the assumption that it is 
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not equitable to apply the equidistance method when the coastlines concerned are adjacent 
has been overcome.
86
 The equidistance method can be employed even between adjacent 
States. In short, the importance attributed to geography by the concept of an SMB increases 
the provisional employment of the equidistance method. However, a concentrated review of 
coastal geography does not necessarily reduce an international court or tribunal’s 
discretionary power. The power of international courts and tribunals to read nature or 
interpret geography remains unchanged. International courts and tribunals are still free to 
interpret geographical factors when identifying relevant coasts (despite the fact that relevant 
coasts in themselves are not relevant circumstances, as described above). The determination 
of relevant coasts influences both aspects of maritime delimitation. Firstly, identifying 
relevant coasts helps an international court or tribunal to decide whether the coastal 
configuration is peculiar (either convex or concave) or not. In the 2002 Land and Maritime 
Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case, the ICJ did not accept Cameroon’s argument that the 
coastlines of the Gulf of Guinea (from one point in Nigeria to another in Gabon) should be 
taken into consideration.
87
 If Cameroon’s contention had been supported, the coastal 
configuration would have been designated concave. However, in stressing that the relevant 
coasts in this case were limited to ‘part’ of the full coastlines of Nigeria and Cameroon,
88
 the 
ICJ understood there to be no particular concavity.
89
 Secondly, the length of relevant coasts 
can influence the check of proportionality in a given case. For example, in the 2009 
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, the Court excluded some of Ukraine’s gulfs 
from its definition of relevant coasts.
90
 It is submitted that the conclusion reached by the ICJ 
thus affected the check of proportionality. 
In addition, the freedom of international courts and tribunals to interpret 
geographical factors has been extended to the ‘macro-geographical context’ or the ‘general 
(overall) geographical framework’ in certain cases. According to Professor Evans, there are 
no exact criteria to explain their difference.
91
 However, it can be submitted that the macro-
geographical context includes the geography of the region(s) beyond the States concerned, 
whereas the general geographical framework is limited to the wider context of the geography 
of the States involved. 
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In the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, for example, the Arbitral Tribunal took into 
account the general configuration of the West African coastlines from the perspective of 
‘macro-geography’, with reference to the two coastal points of Senegal and Sierra Leone.
92
 
In contrast, the Court of Arbitration paid attention only to the ‘general geographical 
framework’ in the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case. In the latter case, the Court of 
Arbitration confirmed that identifying the general geographical framework was the starting 
point for the delimitation process.
93
 According to the geographical framework set by the 
Court of Arbitration, Saint Pierre and Miquelon are located ‘within’ a concavity shaped by 
Canadian coastlines.
94
 Although Saint Pierre and Miquelon may also be entitled to claim the 
continental shelf and the EEZ up to a distance of 200NM, they are unlikely to be on an equal 
footing with Canadian territories. In other words, although the Court did not consider the 
political status of Saint Pierre and Miquelon,
95
 their geographical location in relation to the 
mainland territory of France seemed to be taken into account.
96
 Thus, the focus of this case 
was on which ‘additional’ maritime areas the two French islands, located within a concavity 
framed by Canadian coastlines, would be accorded other than the territorial sea. It appears 
that the unfavourable interpretation given to the two French islands affected the outcome of 
this case. 
Contrary to the two above-mentioned cases, the ICJ disregarded the macro-
geographical context in the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria) case, 
and the Arbitral Tribunal did not consider the general geographical framework in the 2007 
Maritime Delimitation (Guyana/Suriname) case.
97
 
To summarise, in practice, the provisional use of the equidistance method has 
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increasingly become popular with the emergence of the concept of an SMB. As a result, the 
two major geographical factors (the coastal configuration and the relationship of the 
coastlines concerned) have generally diminished in importance. There are two reasons for 
this development. Firstly, the view that the coastal configuration is a ‘given’ has become 
dominant.
98
 Therefore, in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case, the construction of a provisional equidistance line was 
not rejected, although both States are adjacent, and Bangladesh’s coast is severely concave. 




It is not the case, however, that the priority given to the equidistance method has 
restricted the discretionary power of international courts and tribunals in dealing with 
geographical factors when an SMB is constructed. As proved above, with regard to the 
determination of relevant coasts and the choice of either the ‘macro-geographical context’ or 
the ‘general geographical framework’, international courts and tribunals continue to exercise 
their discretion effectively. The preferential consideration of neutral factors seems to 
dominate the establishment of an SMB; however, coastal geography, a quintessentially 
neutral factor, is also the object of necessary legal interpretation. It follows that the 
interpretation of coastal geography, the most important relevant circumstance, is a source of 
flexibility with respect to the establishment of an SMB. 
 
3.2.2.2. Geographical Features 
As presented above, geographical factors include the coastal configuration (or in connection 
with the definition of relevant coasts), the relationship of the coastlines concerned (or in 
connection with the definition of relevant coasts), and the consideration of the macro-
geographical context or the general geographical framework. What can be regarded as 
geographical features? The most important geographical feature is the existence of an island 
or islands. When an SMB is established, the treatment of an island or islands will affect the 
final result, which must be equitable. This thesis intends to show that the treatment of an 
island or islands in the context of maritime delimitation has an effect on the drawing of an 
SMB. In addition, the issue of low-tide elevations will be examined. 
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3.2.2.2.1. The Consideration of an Island or Islands 
Before turning to the issue of dealing with an island or islands, the difference between two 
types of delimitation should be appreciated. One type regards islands as part of a mainland; 
the other considers them to be the offshore possessions of a mainland. According to the 
former pattern of delimitation, islands must be treated in the context of the general 
geographical framework of a given case. Thus, they cannot be geographical features. 
However, we should not overlook the fact that the ‘size’ of the islands can affect the 
establishment of an SMB, as in the 1992 Saint Pierre and Miquelon case and the 1993 
Greenland/Jan Mayen case. Because the islands of Saint Pierre, Miquelon and Jan Mayen 
are too small in relation to Canada’s mainland or Greenland, the SMBs were constructed so 
as not to divide relevant areas equally. 
In the delimitation process, islands are accorded full effect, half effect, partial effect 
or no effect. Of these effects, above all, the concept of ‘half’ effect mentioned in the 1984 
Gulf of Maine case must be explained. In this case, Canada’s Seal Island was accorded half 
effect.
100
 The method of half effect had already been used in the 1977 Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf case and the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, both of which 
involved the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
However, two significant points should be noted with regard to the attribution of half 
effect in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case. Firstly, the method of half effect employed in this case 
was ‘different’ from that used in the two previous continental shelf delimitation cases. The 
Chamber ‘assumed’ that Seal Island lies halfway between its real position and the Canadian 
coast.
101
 However, the two earlier cases employed the half-effect method to draw the 
delimitation line halfway between one delimitation line (without the use of an island as a 
basepoint) and the other delimitation line (using the island as a basepoint).
102
 In these two 
continental shelf delimitation cases, therefore, the method of half effect fixed the ‘angle’ or 
‘direction’ of the final delimitation line. In contrast to these continental shelf delimitation 
cases, the Chamber adopted the half-effect method in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case to avoid a 
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judicial refashioning of geography.
103
 In addition, according half effect to Seal Island played 
a role in adjusting the division ratio of the closing line of the Gulf. 
Secondly, it is questionable why Seal Island, some 14km (about 7.7NM) off the 
Canadian coast, is a geographical feature incapable of being granted full effect.
104
 The 
Chamber did not clarify a specific reason. In the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, 
in fact, the French island of Ushant, which lies about 10NM off the French coast, was 
granted full effect, although it was assessed in relation to the Scilly Isles of the United 
Kingdom.
105
 In other words, it is doubtful whether the short distance (about 7.7NM) between 
Seal Island and the Canadian coast can result in a refashioning of geography. 
To sum up, in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber demonstrated a new 
application of the half-effect method, and a flexible treatment regarding an offshore island. It 
appears, therefore, that international courts and tribunals still have the freedom to give 
appropriate weight to islands when establishing an SMB. 
With respect to the treatment of small uninhabited islands, there is a significant 
difference between international arbitral and judicial cases. In the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-
Bissau case, the 12NM territorial sea ‘to the west’ of Alcatraz was granted to the island, 
despite the fact that the island was small and uninhabited.
106
 This is a type of full effect.
107
 
The reason why this effect must be defined as full effect is that the Arbitral Tribunal could 
have disregarded the existence of an island, as Qit’at Jaradah was granted no effect in the 
2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case.
108
 While even a 
small uninhabited island has potential to obtain the 12NM territorial sea under the 1982 
UNCLOS or customary international law, the extent of the territorial sea may equitably be 
reduced in relation to the maritime areas of another State when an SMB is constructed. For 
example, in the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, the island of Alcatraz was accorded only 
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2.25NM territorial sea ‘to the north’, because of one relevant circumstance, the southern 
limit of the 1886 Convention.
109
 However, in the same case, the 12NM territorial sea ‘to the 
west’ of Alcatraz was fully granted. 
Along with this analysis of the island of Alcatraz, two other islands should be 
considered. Firstly, in the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, the ICJ 
regarded the small, uninhabited Serpents’ Island about 20NM to the east of the Danube delta 
as irrelevant to the establishment of an SMB.
110
 Why did the Court fail to accord Serpents’ 
Island even half effect? It is questionable whether or not Serpents’ Island accorded half effect 
will result in a refashioning of geography. At any rate, the ICJ’s conclusion in this case was 
opposed to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal in the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case. 
Secondly, it should be noted that the Scilly Isles, taken into account in the 1977 Anglo-
French Continental Shelf case, were accorded only half effect, despite the fact that they were 
‘inhabited’. This is in stark contrast with the attribution of full effect to the small, 
uninhabited island of Alcatraz. Consequently, it is difficult to judge whether a small 
uninhabited island is given full, half or no effect in a given case before all relevant 
circumstances are taken into account. 
Whether islands are ‘part of relevant coasts’ (not relevant circumstances) in the 
context of mainland coastal geography is also dependant on the discretion of international 
courts and tribunals. In the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen case, the Dahlak islands
111
 of Eritrea, 
Kamaran (and its satellite islets)
112
 of Yemen, the islets to the northwest named Uqban and 
Kutama,
113
 and the off-lying islands of the Bay of Assab
114
 were all regarded as part of the 
relevant coasts of each State. However, the island of al-Tayr and the island group of al-
Zubayr were not included within the relevant coasts.
115
 In other words, the Arbitral Tribunal 
had the freedom to choose which effect (ranging from full effect to no effect) would be 
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accorded to each island. This is a type of flexibility demonstrated by the Arbitral Tribunal in 
the course of assessing islands (in connection with the determination of relevant coasts) 
‘before’ relevant circumstances are taken into consideration. Furthermore, the island of 
Zuqar was not granted its full 12NM territorial sea due to the need for a geodetic line joining 
point 13 with point 14.
116
 
Similarly, in the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
(Qatar/Bahrain) case, the ICJ exerted its discretionary power in judging the merits of certain 
islands. For instance, Qit’at Jaradah was granted no effect, as it was felt that anything more 
would be disproportionate to such an insignificant feature.
117
 Moreover, Fasht al Jarim was 
given no effect in the delimitation process, as this would have distorted the maritime 
boundary to be constructed.
118
 In order to achieve an equitable result in the case, the ICJ 
determined the effect to be attributed to each island at its discretion. 
With respect to the concepts of full effect and no effect, an important point should be 
made. Analysis of international judicial and arbitral case-law reveals two kinds of ‘full 
effect’. One designates an island as part of relevant coasts (part of a mainland), and the other 
grants an island its own ‘full’ (that is, 12NM) territorial sea, which may influence the 
drawing of a maritime boundary.
119
 An example of the former concept is that the Dahlak 
islands, Kamaran and its satellite islets, the islets to the north-west named Uqban and 
Kutama, and the off-lying islands of the Bay of Assab were all regarded as part of relevant 
coasts (part of each State’s mainland) in the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen case. By contrast, an 
example of the latter concept is found in the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, which 
granted 12NM territorial sea to the island of Alcatraz, at least to the west of the island. 
Likewise, two kinds of ‘no effect’ can be granted to an island. In the 1999 
Eritrea/Yemen case, the attribution of no effect to the island of al-Tayr and the island group 
of al-Zubayr meant that these islands were not regarded as part of Yemen’s coast. In the 2001 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case, however, granting no 
effect to Qit’at Jaradah and Fasht al Jarim simply indicated that these islands did not have an 
impact on the delimitation process or the final delimitation line. Similarly, in the 2012 
Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case of the 
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ITLOS, the existence of St. Martin’s Island did not affect the establishment of an SMB.
120
 
In conclusion, the treatment of islands as geographical features relies on the 
interpretation of international courts and tribunals. It is not fixed which effect might be 
granted to any given island, among full effect, half effect, and no effect. Two kinds of full 
effect and no effect may be employed, while the half-effect method does not have a fixed 
form of application. The treatment of islands is not stereotyped with regard to the definition 
of relevant coasts even before relevant circumstances are identified and weighed up. 
Furthermore, in weighing up particular islands, international courts and tribunals have no 
choice but to depend on the relevant circumstances of a case. This perhaps represents an 
ultimate flexibility in taking into account the relevant circumstances of a given SMB case. 
 
3.2.2.2.2. The Issue of Low-tide Elevations 
In the 2001 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case, the issue 
of low-tide elevations as a geographical feature was raised. Basically, the ICJ declared that 
low-tide elevations cannot be used as basepoints, stating that “for the purposes of drawing 
the equidistance line, such low-tide elevations must be disregarded”.
121
 Nevertheless, a low-
tide elevation can certainly be regarded as one of the relevant circumstances if the examples 
of both Fasht al Azm and Fasht ad Dibal are taken into consideration. The ICJ concluded that 
it would be inappropriate to cut off Fasht al Azm if it is regarded as a low-tide elevation.
122
 
Moreover, the Court implied that Fasht ad Dibal, which both Parties considered to be a low-
tide elevation,
123
 should not be cut off by the delimitation line.
124
 This meant that each low-
tide elevation must belong in full to one State, even though it could not be used as a 
basepoint. In other words, the existence of low-tide elevations has the potential to influence 
the final delimitation line. 
 
3.2.3. Economic Factors 
 
3.2.3.1. The Meaning of Economic Factors 
In order to draw an SMB, international courts and tribunals prioritise the consideration of 
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neutral factors or circumstances. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that economic factors are 
irrelevant to the construction of an SMB, since it may be necessary to consider other factors 
(including economic issues)
125
 in order to arrive at an equitable result when the rules 
governing maritime delimitation are applied.
126
 With reference to the historical development 
of both the EEZ and the continental shelf, Nuno Marques Antunes stresses that economic 
factors must be considered because “the driving force behind them [both the EEZ and the 
continental shelf] was primarily the exclusive access to natural resources”.
127
 Moreover, even 
Professor Weil, who takes the legal basis of title very seriously in maritime delimitation, 
implies that economic factors cannot be ignored.
128
 
Before whether or not economic factors are relevant circumstances in the 
delimitation process is examined, the term itself should be defined. Economic factors can be 
divided into two broad categories: general and special. The former includes the relative 
economic strength of the States concerned; the need to maintain a ‘level of economic and 
social development which fully preserves their [people’s] dignity’;
129
 and pre-existing 
economic dependence, among others. However, there is a lack of clarity regarding general 
economic factors. Firstly, it is difficult to assess the relative economic strength of a State 
(whether the State concerned is ‘developed’ or not).
130
 Moreover, even if international courts 
and tribunals are able to evaluate States’ wealth, they do not want to carry out distributive 
justice. Secondly, the meaning of the imperative to preserve human dignity referred to in the 
1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case is not clear. It is not predetermined how level of economic 
development we need so as to preserve human dignity. Thirdly, the issue of pre-existing 
economic dependence may rely on the conduct of the States concerned.
131
 For these reasons, 
it is altogether impossible to regard general economic factors as relevant circumstances in 
the delimitation process. 
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‘Special’ economic factors refer to circumstances relevant to either the EEZ or the 
continental shelf. Particular attention has been paid to fishing activities and oil (or gas) 
concessions as special economic factors. This thesis intends to focus on the impact of such 
special economic factors on the establishment of an SMB. 
 
3.2.3.2. (Special) Economic Factors and the Establishment of an SMB 
In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ referred to the unity of any deposits 
as one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration, stressing that “[t]he natural 
resources of the subsoil of the sea in those parts which consist of continental shelf are the 
very object of the legal régime established subsequent to the Truman Proclamation”.
132
 If this 
statement had been prioritised in the delimitation process, a special economic factor, such as 
fishing activities or oil (or gas) concessions, may have become the most important relevant 
circumstance. Its potential to become a relevant circumstance, however, does not mean that it 
was automatically defined as such. When establishing an SMB or delimiting the continental 
shelf, international courts and tribunals must examine whether or not the economic factors 
pleaded by the States concerned are relevant in a given case. In fact, economic factors have 
not widely been regarded as relevant circumstances in international judicial and arbitral case-
law. There are two key reasons for their omission. 
The first reason is that international courts and tribunals have sought to avoid 
carrying out distributive justice when dividing natural resources, as implicated in the 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case heard by the ICJ.
133
 As a result, the presence of 
natural resources in itself must be understood differently from the impact of these resources 
on the population involved.
134
 The second reason is that international courts and tribunals 
have sought to find ‘neutral’ factors or circumstances in the process of establishing an SMB. 
Since a given natural resource is generally relevant to only one of the maritime areas 
involved, the existence or absence of the natural resource cannot be deemed to be a neutral 
circumstance. For example, whereas fishery resources of superjacent waters are obviously 
relevant to the delimitation of the EEZ or the EFZ, mineral resources are directly relevant to 
both the EEZ and the continental shelf. Logically, therefore, fishery resources of superjacent 
waters as one of the economic factors can play no role in establishing an SMB. 
In the first SMB case (that is, the 1984 Gulf of Maine case), however, the issue of 
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economic factors was raised, although it did not affect the final delimitation line. In 
particular, it was put to question whether or not fishing activities pertinent to the EFZ could 
influence the final establishment of an SMB. The Chamber enquired as to whether or not 
there might be ‘catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the 
population of the countries concerned’.
135
 In other words, economic factors were examined 
from a socio-economic perspective. The ruling of the Chamber in the 1984 Gulf of Maine 
case was considered to be restrictive and limited, for two reasons. Firstly, the ‘strict’ 
constraint of ‘catastrophe’ was used as a condition for adjusting the delimitation line 
resulting from the consideration of geographical circumstances. As pointed out by the 
Arbitral Tribunal in the 2006 Maritime Delimitation (Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago) case, 
catastrophe does not mean ‘injury’.
136
 Secondly, economic factors were discussed as simply 
one of the ‘auxiliary’ criteria used to check the equitability of the final delimitation line. In 
other words, the Chamber of the ICJ implied, in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, that the issue 
of economic factors was not one of the relevant circumstances.
137
 
By contrast, in drawing the delimitation line for the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen 
case, the ICJ took into account the ‘equitable access to the capelin fishery resources for the 
vulnerable fishing communities concerned’.
138
 Why did not the ICJ look for ‘catastrophe’ in 
this case, despite directly citing the reasoning of the 1984 Gulf of Maine case? Here, a key 
difference between the two cases should be explained. In the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen 
case, the ICJ confirmed that “the principal exploited fishery resource of the area between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen is capelin”.
139
 Moreover, it noted that some capelin migrate to the 
waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen in summer and autumn, and that the capelin 
fishery was caught in the ‘southern’ part of the area of overlapping claims.
140
 Consequently, 
it can be said that the ‘kind’ and ‘location’ of the disputed fishery resources were both 
identified – allowing these economic factors to be understood as relevant circumstances. In 
the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, however, the Chamber could not verify either the kind or the 
location of the disputed fishery resources. According to the Chamber, the areas in which both 
Canada and the United States had caught some fishery resources were allocated 
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‘respectively’ to each Party by the delimitation line reached.
141
 As a result, there was no area 
in which the two States competed for a specific kind of fishery resource. Broadly speaking, if 
the kind and location of the disputed resources are not confirmed, there can be no 
acknowledged ‘catastrophe’ for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population. 
Thus, international courts and tribunals will only take a ‘specific’ economic factor into 
account if they regard that factor as relevant to the drawing of the delimitation line. In fact, 
in most delimitation cases, economic factors affecting the final delimitation line cannot be 
specified. It follows that international courts and tribunals have no choice but to declare that 
they cannot identify any potential catastrophe for the livelihood and economic well-being of 
the population concerned. 
At this point, an important question should be asked in relation to the existence of 
natural resources. In order to be considered an economic factor, must the existence of natural 
resources be known or readily ascertainable? As observed above, in the 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ presented the ‘unity of any deposits’ as one of the 
circumstances to be taken into account.
142
 In addition, with regard to the consideration of 
natural resources, the Court laid down the condition ‘so far as known or readily 
ascertainable’.
143
 As mentioned above in relation to fishery resources, the kind and location 
of the disputed non-living natural resources should also be identified. In other words, where 
the existence of non-living natural resources is clear, it is generally considered to be relevant 
to the delimitation process. Scholars tend to hold one of two views on this issue. Professor 
Sharma argues that economic factors can be considered relevant in a ‘potential’ sense, as 
implied in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case.
144
 In contrast, Nuno Marques Antunes believes that 
the concept of the ‘equitable access to natural resources’ should be prioritised over economic 
factors, because an equitable result today might be inequitable tomorrow.
145
 According to his 
view, even where the existence of non-living natural resources is clear, it must only be taken 
into account ‘under a strict review’. In fact, a couple of years before the issue of an SMB had 
fully emerged, the late D. P. O’Connell had already pointed out that it is difficult to assess 
the existence of non-living natural resources precisely until they begin to be exploited.
146
 In 
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sum, therefore, although the current trend in international judicial and arbitral case-law is to 
regard the existence of non-living natural resources ‘so far as known or readily ascertainable’ 
as a relevant circumstance, different views on the relevance of non-living natural resources 
can also lead to flexibility in the application of the delimitation rule. 
 
3.2.3.3. A Restrictive View and Flexibility 
At this point, this thesis intends to explain the nature of a ‘restrictive’ view with regard to 
(special) economic factors. The restrictive economic view can be summarised as follows. 
In the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, the ICJ seemed to retain 
the same restrictive viewpoint held by the Chamber in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case.
147
 In 
other words, the Court reiterated the standard of catastrophic repercussions that the Chamber 
had proposed for fishing activities.
148
 According to the ICJ, no relevant circumstances met 
the strict condition of potential catastrophe.
149
 With respect to oil (or gas) concessions, the 
decision made by the Arbitral Tribunal of the 2007 Maritime Delimitation 
(Guyana/Suriname) case reflected the current trend in international judicial and arbitral case-
law. It concluded that oil (or gas) concessions or oil wells are not generally regarded as 




According to this restrictive view, economic factors can be taken into account in the 
delimitation process only if ‘catastrophic repercussions concerning fishing activities’ or ‘tacit 
(or express) agreements concerning oil (or gas) concessions’ exist. This point was confirmed 
in recent case-law. We must ask, therefore, whether or not the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen 
case heard by the ICJ was exceptional. 
The first important question is as follows. Are there predictable patterns in the 
application of the delimitation rule when economic factors are treated? Whereas the 
Chamber stated in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case that the ‘respective’ scale of activities 
connected with fishing cannot be considered to be relevant circumstances,
151
 the ICJ in the 
1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case took into account certain facts pertinent to fishing 
activities. It is thus submitted that international courts and tribunals have not shown a 
predictable pattern in relation to fishing activities. 
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Most judgements declaring that no relevant circumstances can be found have also 
conceded ‘exceptions’, such as tacit agreements or the condition of catastrophe, in order to 
avoid prioritising neutral factors or circumstances. However, it is not always clear what is 
meant by such exceptions. For example, it should not be overlooked that the concept of 
catastrophe has no fixed meaning. The Arbitral Tribunal of the 2006 Maritime Delimitation 
(Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago) case implied that ‘injury’ is not synonymous with 
‘catastrophe’.
152
 By contrast, the Arbitral Tribunal of the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen case stated that 
“[n]either Party has succeeded in demonstrating that the line of delimitation proposed by the 
other would produce a catastrophic or inequitable effect on the fishing activity of its 
nationals or detrimental effects on fishing communities and economic dislocation of its 
nationals”.
153
 By referring to a ‘catastrophic or inequitable effect’, the Arbitral Tribunal 
implied that injury might be equated with, or was at least relevant to, catastrophe.
154
 
These trends in case-law reflect the continued flexibility of application of the 
delimitation rule with respect to taking into account relevant circumstances. That is to say, 
the right to assess what is meant by oil concessions or fishing activities in a given case 
belongs to the discretion of international courts and tribunals. Nevertheless, since 
international courts and tribunals seek to avoid carrying out distributive justice, they advance 
strict standards, such as ‘tacit’ agreements or ‘catastrophic’ repercussions. However, the fact 
that such strict standards exist does not necessarily mean that economic factors cannot be 
taken into account in the delimitation process. In fact, the role of international courts and 
tribunals is not to divide natural resources in accordance with a standard, but to ensure the 
equitable access to the resources for all of the States concerned. For example, if free access 
to resources for the fishermen of both States had not been preserved, the issue would have 
been taken into consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal in the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen case. 
Because free access was guaranteed in the 1998 Eritrea/Yemen case, whose judgement was 
delivered one year before the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen case, this had no impact on the final 
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It is clear, therefore, that the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case submitted to the ICJ 
was not an exceptional case, despite the fact that it did not take a restrictive view. Once the 
kind and location of the disputed resources are confirmed as in this case, the issue of the 
resources can be taken into account in the delimitation process. In fact, as Rosalyn Higgins 
observes, the allocation of resources is a ‘real’ task entailed by delimitation.
156
 Rather than 
identifying catastrophe in a specific area, international courts and tribunals examine the kind 
and location of the disputed resources, and reflect the fact at their discretion. This describes 
the Court’s logic in the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case. 
The restrictive view thus remains relevant to the concept of flexibility. It only 
indicates that economic factors can be taken into consideration on the basis of a stricter 
standard than neutral factors. The discretion of international courts and tribunals to take into 
account economic factors is not frozen by the existence of neutral factors. Therefore, a 
specific economic factor (for example, a special fishing activity) may influence the 
delimitation of a maritime area to which the factor is irrelevant (for example, continental 
shelf delimitation) if international courts and tribunals accept the economic factor as a 
relevant circumstance. This would skew the final result of a delimitation case. 
 
 
4. A Concluding Remark 
 
This chapter has examined the dominant role of relevant circumstances in relation to the 
construction of an SMB. Although treaties do not articulate the rules for the drawing of an 
SMB, international judicial and arbitral case-law has dealt with the issue of an SMB as a 
‘typical’ pragmatic solution. Since the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, all delimitation cases – with 
only one exception of the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case – have drawn SMBs. In 
the course of making an SMB, international courts and tribunals have sought for various 
means to bring about an ‘equitable’ SMB. 
First of all, it is noted that the employment of the equidistance method is not 
mandatory for the purpose of drawing an equitable SMB. Relied on the consideration of 
                                            
155
 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen 
(Maritime Delimitation) (The Hague, 17
th
 December 1999), UNRIAA, Volume XXII, p.361, para.110. 
156
 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford 







relevant circumstances, the bisector method may also be used in relation to establishing an 
SMB. 
Second of all, the most widespread misunderstanding with regard to the application 
of the rules in establishing an SMB must be avoided. The misunderstanding is that the 
preferential consideration given to neutral factors or circumstances makes the application of 
the rules more predictable. As shown above, however, even geography – the quintessential 
neutral factor – is still contingent on the discretionary interpretation of international courts 
and tribunals.
157
 For example, the coastal configuration and the relationship of the coastlines 
concerned are, in a given case, based on the determination of relevant coasts (despite the fact 
that relevant coasts are not relevant circumstances) carried out by international courts and 
tribunals. Likewise, in relation to the interpretation of the ‘macro-geographical context’ or 
the ‘general geographical framework’, international courts and tribunals exercise their 
discretion. Therefore, the interpretation of coastal geography, the most important relevant 
circumstance, is a source of flexibility with respect to constructing an equitable SMB. 
Third of all, the treatment of islands as geographical features depends on the 
discretionary interpretation of international courts and tribunals dealing with relevant 
circumstances. It is not predetermined which effect might be accorded to a particular island. 
In other words, how relevant circumstances are examined in the establishment of an SMB is 
diverse even when geographical features are dealt with. 
Last of all, economic factors may be relevant in order to obtain an equitable result on 
a case-by-case basis. In fact, according to the restrictive view as explained above, economic 
factors can be taken into consideration only if there are ‘catastrophic repercussions 
concerning fishing activities’ or ‘tacit (or express) agreements concerning oil (or gas) 
concessions’. Nonetheless, the existence of these strict standards does not inhibit the 
consideration of economic factors (such as a specific fishing activity) in the delimitation 
process. Catastrophic repercussions or tacit (or express) agreements may also be taken into 
account in a future case. It follows that the rules applied in the establishment of an SMB still 
retain the possibility of taking account of catastrophic repercussions or tacit (or express) 
agreements. By contrast, it is possible that this restrictive view can be denied as in the 1993 
Greenland/Jan Mayen case. In other words, the adoption of the restrictive view is also on a 
case-by-case basis. 
In conclusion, it appears that the consideration of relevant circumstances 
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independent of the application of ascertainable equitable principles is necessary to draw an 
equitable SMB in a delimitation case. The diverse means in which international courts and 
tribunals take into account relevant circumstances for constructing an SMB make their 











Delimitation Achieved by Taking into Account 
Relevant Circumstances (2): 
The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf 
 
 
1. The Continental Shelf Beyond 200NM (The Outer Continental Shelf) 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf stated that the continental 
shelf of a State was dependent on the ‘exploitability’ of natural resources. However, this 
definition of the continental shelf was inappropriate as a legal concept, due to a considerable 
degree of uncertainty:
1
 according to such a limitless definition, more and more of the deep 
ocean floor would disappear as technology evolved.
2
 It was thus necessary for the Third 
Conference to develop a new and unambiguous definition of the continental shelf.
3
 The 
result is Article 76 of the 1982 UNCLOS: a clear legal definition of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, despite its complex wording.
4
 
In Article 76 of the UNCLOS, the continental shelf is defined legally with reference 
to two criteria: distance and natural prolongation. The criterion of distance is the same 
mathematical concept as that used to determine the limits of the EEZ, while natural 
prolongation concerns the physical fact of the continuation of land territory into and under 
the sea. Since Article 76 treats the two criteria together, the institution known as the 
continental shelf can be divided into two kinds: the continental shelf up to a distance of 
200NM (the inner continental shelf), and the continental shelf beyond 200NM (the outer 
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As discussed in Chapter V, the delimitation of the continental shelf up to 200NM 
has, on the whole, been superseded by the establishment of the concept of an SMB. 
However, the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200NM continues to 
arise, as an outer continental shelf claim in the context of maritime delimitation has its own 
characteristics. That is to say, the legal basis of title to the continental shelf beyond 200NM 
differs from the basis of title to the continental shelf up to a distance of 200NM. 
Bearing the characteristics of the outer continental shelf in mind, this chapter will 
deal with the examination of relevant circumstances with regard to the delimitation of the 
outer continental shelf. 
 
1.2. The Difference between the Inner and Outer Continental Shelves 
Under Article 76(1) of the 1982 UNCLOS, a coastal State is entitled to the continental shelf 
up to a distance of 200NM, unless the issue of delimitation arises.
5
 In other words, the State 
holds the 200NM continental shelf even when the outer edge of the continental margin does 
not extend as far as 200NM.
6
 If the outer edge of a State’s continental margin extends 
beyond 200NM, the State may possess the continental shelf beyond 200NM from the 
coastlines involved, with complicated qualifications laid down in Article 76(4)-(7).
7
 These 
qualifications are concerned with determining the outer ‘limits’ of the continental shelf. At 
this point, it should not be overlooked that the limits proposed by a coastal State for the 
continental shelf beyond 200NM become final and binding on the basis of the 
recommendations of the CLCS, although the continental shelf of the coastal State exists ipso 
facto and ab initio.
8
 
However, it should also be noted that the delimitation of the outer continental shelf 
cannot be performed by the CLCS. The basic mission of the CLCS is to make 
recommendations to coastal States regarding the ‘delineation’ of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf.
9
 In order to obtain these recommendations, States must submit information 
on the limits of their respective continental shelves beyond 200NM. As of 15
th
 June 2012, 
sixty-one submissions on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200NM have been made 
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by coastal States (respectively or jointly).
10
 In response to these submissions, the CLCS has 
thus far made eighteen recommendations.
11
 The CLCS does not examine a submission when 
a maritime boundary dispute is already in existence, according to Paragraph 5(a) of Annex I 
of the Rules of Procedure of the CLCS.
12
 It follows that the CLCS will neither formulate nor 
apply the rules governing the ‘delimitation’ of the outer continental shelf, except in the 
context of providing technical assistance in the delimitation process carried out by 
international courts and tribunals.
13
 
In the most recent delimitation case, the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case of the ITLOS, two points were 
corroborated with regard to the functions of the CLCS. First, although the outer limits of a 
maritime zone have not been established by either the States concerned or the CLCS, 
international courts and tribunals can delimit the maritime zone.
14
 Second, the delimitation of 
the outer continental shelf performed by international courts and tribunals does not infringe 
on the rights of the CLCS.
15
 Unless the States concerned reach a delimitation agreement, 
therefore, the delimitation of the outer continental shelf can only be determined by 
international courts or tribunals. This point was well illustrated during Bangladesh’s oral 
argument in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay 
of Bengal case heard by the ITLOS.
16
 
How should the continental shelf up to 200NM and the outer continental shelf be 
differentiated? The biggest difference is that the legal bases of title to these two continental 
shelves are not identical. Since the legal basis of title to the continental shelf up to 200NM 
rests on the criterion of distance, other factors (such as the shape of the sea-bed or the type of 
the subsoil) are meaningless. However, the shape of the sea-bed, and sometimes the type of 
the subsoil, are decisive factors in determining whether or not the States concerned can 
obtain the continental shelf beyond 200NM. Their function depends, therefore, on whether or 
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not relevant circumstances are taken into account. Despite the difference between the legal 
bases of title to the inner and outer continental shelves, one must ask whether the rules 
governing the delimitation of the inner continental shelf are different from those governing 
the delimitation of the outer continental shelf. Jørgen Lilje-Jensen and Milan Thamsborg 
indicate that a different rule could be applied to the delimitation of the outer continental 
shelf.
17
 However, in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 
the Bay of Bengal case, the ITLOS made no distinction between rules applicable to the 
delimitation of the inner continental shelf and those applicable to the delimitation of the 
outer continental shelf. The Tribunal regarded the achievement of an equitable solution 
(Article 83 of the 1982 UNCLOS) as law applied equally to both the delimitation of the 





2. International Case-Law Regarding the Delimitation of the Continental 
    Shelf 
 
2.1. Case-Law Regarding the Delimitation of the Inner Continental Shelf 
Analysis of international decisions regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf up to a 
distance of 200NM will form the starting point in addressing the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200NM. This analysis will allow us to identify certain 
characteristics of the continental shelf on which international courts and tribunals have 
placed emphasis. The instances to be addressed here are as follows: the 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, and the 1985 
Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, all of which were referred to the ICJ; and the 1977 
Anglo-French Continental Shelf case heard by the Court of Arbitration. 
During the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ defined the continental 
shelf according to the terms established by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, while applying customary international law to the given cases. Thus, the criterion of 
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depth to 200 metres was applied to the North Sea.
19
 While the Court acknowledged the 
strong arguments in favour of using the criterion of proximity,
20
 it made the following 
proviso: 
 
“[I]t would seem that the notion of adjacency, so constantly employed in continental shelf 
doctrine from the start, only implies proximity in a general sense, and does not imply any 
fundamental or inherent rule the ultimate effect of which would be to prohibit any State 
(otherwise than by agreement) from exercising continental shelf rights in respect of areas 




Accordingly, the ICJ concluded that the “natural prolongation or continuation of the land 
territory or domain, or land sovereignty of the coastal State […] via the bed of its territorial 
sea” is a principle more fundamental than proximity to the process of delimiting the 
continental shelf.
22
 In other words, a claim based on natural prolongation may provide a 
State with the title to the continental shelf. It follows that the equidistance method is not an 
imperative in the delimitation of the continental shelf.
23
 In the cases cited above, the 
‘extension’ of territory (that is, of territory already possessed) defined the institution of the 
continental shelf. 
In the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, the Court of Arbitration assumed 
that the ‘depth of 200 metres’ criterion was still an important standard in defining the 
continental shelf.
24
 In addition to this criterion, the Court seemed to accept the concept of 
natural prolongation (as the ‘extension’ of territory) summarised by the ICJ in the 1969 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
25
 However, it also stated that the idea of natural 
prolongation alone could not solve delimitation problems.
26
 The Court of Arbitration dealt 
with the concept of natural prolongation in two ways. Firstly, it exerted its discretion to 
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determine whether or not a geomorphological feature, such as the Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep 
Fault Zone, is responsible for disrupting natural prolongation.
27
 Secondly, it placed a 
constraint on the definition of natural prolongation, stating that the existence of this 
phenomenon is dependent on the relevant circumstances and the relevant law of a given 
case.
28
 In short, therefore, the existence and nature of natural prolongation have been subject 
to interpretation by international courts and tribunals. 
In the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case heard by the ICJ, the Court 
implied that identifying natural prolongation does not necessarily lead to an equitable 
delimitation.
29
 Moreover, the Court stated that it is not possible to identify the natural 
prolongation of a State ‘by reference solely or mainly to geological considerations’.
30
 
In the 1985 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case, the ICJ confirmed that the distance 
criterion identifies natural prolongation up to a distance of 200NM, without respect to the 
physical nature of the sea-bed and the subsoil.
31
 In this regard, the Court stated that: 
 
“[A]t least in so far as those areas are situated at a distance of under 200 miles from the 
coasts in question, title depends solely on the distance from the coasts of the claimant States 
of any areas of sea-bed claimed by way of continental shelf, and the geological or 




In light of this reasoning, David A. Colson argued that “[n]atural prolongation in a physical 
sense [...] was dead”.
33
 However, geomorphological and/or geological factors were still 
understood to be decisive in identifying the continental shelf beyond 200NM. In this case, 
therefore, it is evident that the ICJ did not altogether discard the concept of natural 
prolongation, although the distance criterion was made a prerequisite for awarding a State 
the continental shelf.
34
 According to the Court’s reasoning, a State can claim its own 
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continental shelf up to 200NM, irrespective of the physical conditions of the continental 
margin, whereas natural prolongation is still required to obtain the continental shelf beyond 
200NM.
35
 The concept of natural prolongation, first formulated by the ICJ in 1969, thus 
offers a useful starting point in addressing the rules governing the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200NM.
36
 
Earlier case-law regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf raises two 
important points. First, it is necessary to prove the physical ‘continuity’ of land territory in 
order to gain the title to the continental shelf beyond 200NM, because the concept of natural 
prolongation is predicated on the extension of the land sovereignty of a State. The second 
point, however, is that natural prolongation alone is insufficient to provide appropriate 
methods for delimitation.
37
 During the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, the Court 
of Arbitration stated that: 
 
“So far as delimitation is concerned, however, this conclusion [that the continental shelf of 
any State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory and must not encroach upon 
what is the natural prolongation of the territory of another State (I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp.46-




This was corroborated by the ICJ in the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case: 
 
“[W]hile the idea of the natural prolongation of the land territory defined, in general terms, 
the physical object or location of the rights of the coastal State, it would not necessarily be 
sufficient, or even appropriate, in itself to determine the precise extent of the rights of one 




Therefore, it is submitted that natural prolongation is not linked to the choice of a 
delimitation method. 
                                                                                                                           
therefore not opposed but complementary; and both remain essential elements in the juridical concept 
of the continental shelf.” 
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2.2. Case-Law Regarding the Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf 
On 14
th
 March 2012, the ITLOS made the first decision as to the delimitation of the outer 
continental shelf, in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 
the Bay of Bengal case. 
Unless the continental shelf of a State extends beyond 200NM throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory, it cannot have its own outer continental shelf. In this 
respect, ‘newly’ interpreting Article 76 of the 1982 UNCLOS, the ITLOS concluded that 
both Bangladesh and Myanmar are entitled to the continental shelf beyond 200NM.
40
 In 
other words, the ITLOS emphasised the close relationship between Paragraphs 1 and 4 of 
Article 76 of the UNCLOS.
41
 This issue will be addressed in detail in the following section. 
 
 
3. The Consideration of Relevant Circumstances for the Purpose of 
    Delimiting the Continental Shelf Beyond 200NM 
 
3.1. The Construction of a Provisional Line 
The notion of natural prolongation identified and developed in earlier case-law does not 
provide appropriate methods for the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200NM. 
Where all of the States concerned have entitlements to the same outer continental shelf, a 
proper delimitation method can be employed depending on the relevant circumstances of a 
given case. Unless these circumstances preclude the use of the equidistance method, it is 
possible to draw a provisional equidistance line, even in the case of the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200NM.
42
 In other words, it should be noted that the equidistance 
method as a means of constructing a provisional line is still effective in delimiting the outer 
continental shelf. For example, if the distance between two opposite States is more than 
400NM, and uninterrupted natural prolongation is verified by the sea-bed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas beyond 200NM from the coastlines concerned, an equidistance line will be 
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one of the most effective provisional lines.
43
 
Which provisional line should be employed between two adjacent States? An 
equidistance line, as used between opposite States, may again prove useful. However, the 
concept of the ‘200NM opening’ must be examined before the equidistance method is 
proposed.
44
 In other words, it is crucial to determine whether or not the outer continental 
shelf lies ‘in front of’ the 200NM limit line off the States involved. This point is relevant to 
the verification of entitlement to the outer continental shelf, as implied in the 2012 Maritime 
Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case.
45
 If a State has 
no 200NM opening, it cannot hold the title to the outer continental shelf, even if it is closer 
to the shelf beyond 200NM. As a consequence, only one State (of two adjacent States) with 
the 200NM opening can claim the right to the whole outer continental shelf. 
A bisector line can also be employed as a provisional line. If relevant circumstances 
indicate the impossibility or inappropriateness of the use of the equidistance method, as in 
the 2007 Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras) case of the ICJ, it may be necessary to use 
the bisector method instead.
46
 During oral proceedings in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation 
between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case heard by the ITLOS, 
Bangladesh argued that the equidistance method would prevent it from reaching its outer 
continental shelf.
47
 The fact that Bangladesh is characterised by severely concave coastlines, 
may also be of relevance. Citing its ‘geographical’ characteristics – that is, the ‘double’ 
concavity of the coastlines concerned
48
 – Bangladesh argued that the use of the bisector 
method would be most appropriate.
49
 In other words, the combination of natural prolongation 
and severely concave coastlines may provide strong justifications for the bisector method. It 
is thus noted that ‘geographical’ factors can also play a role in the selection of a provisional 
line to delimit the outer continental shelf. 
Ultimately, however, the ITLOS decided to construct a ‘provisional’ ‘equidistance’ 
line in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of 
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Bengal case, despite the strong justifications for Bangladesh’s argument during oral 
proceedings.
50
 The most important reason for this outcome was the Tribunal’s decision that 
Myanmar’s coast south of Bhiff Cape should be considered relevant, against Bangladesh’s 
contention. If the contention had been accepted, the ITLOS could have employed the 
bisector method. However, it should also be noted that the direction of the provisional line 
was diverted to the same azimuth of 215° (from point X) as that of a bisector line suggested 
by Bangladesh. In addition, ‘most’ of the provisional equidistance line was altered by a cut-
off effect of the double concavity of the coastlines concerned. Although the ITLOS drew a 
provisional equidistance line, the line was in practice very similar to the bisector line that 
Bangladesh sought to construct. 
In brief, with respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200NM, 
international courts and tribunals have the freedom to choose an appropriate provisional line 
relying on the relevant circumstances (or in connection with the determination of relevant 
coasts) of a given case. 
 
3.2. Some Issues Regarding the Construction of a Provisional Line 
When international courts and tribunals use the equidistance method to draw a provisional 
line, certain questions arise. Firstly, should an equidistance line be drawn from the coastlines 
concerned? Or can it be constructed from other lines? The ‘foot of the continental slope’, for 
instance, may be suggested as an alternative.
51
 This criterion is highly relevant in 
establishing the outer edge of the continental margin, as laid down in Article 76(4) of the 
1982 UNCLOS. The greater the distance between the foot of a State’s continental slope and 
its coastlines (assuming that the foot of the continental slope criterion is adopted), the more 
likely it is that the State will profit from the use of the equidistance method. For example, if 
the foot of the slope of State A were located 230NM from the coastlines of State A, and the 
foot of the slope of State B were located 170NM from the coastlines of State B (where States 
A and B are opposite and 600NM apart), State A could claim the continental shelf up to a 
distance of 330NM (whereas State B could claim the 270NM continental shelf).
52
 The foot of 
the continental slope criterion is justified by the concept of natural prolongation, which is the 
basis of title to the outer continental shelf. 
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Secondly, in the case of outer continental shelf delimitation for adjacent States, is it 
possible for the direction of a (provisional) equidistance line beyond 200NM to be changed? 
This issue is highly relevant to the direction of an equidistance line from the 200NM limit 
line. In fact, the outer continental shelf boundary should begin from the end-point of the 
inner continental shelf boundary in the case of the delimitation of adjacent States.
53
 This 
indicates that the direction of a provisional line can be diverted.
54
 A useful example of the 
diversion of a bisector line was provided by oral proceedings in the 2012 Maritime 
Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case heard by the 
ITLOS, during which Bangladesh argued that the maritime boundary must turn southward 
from the 200NM limit line.
55
 Thus, although the ITLOS did not accept the direction of the 
delimitation line from the 200NM limit line, it may be argued that the possibility of 
diversion is not entirely eliminated. 
 
3.3. Geomorphological Factors 
Article 76(1) of the 1982 UNCLOS states that the continental shelf of a State “comprises the 
sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend […] throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin”. The legal 
definition of the continental shelf arises from the concept of the ‘continental margin’. The 
late D. P. O’Connell called this definition the ‘continental margin doctrine’.
56
 According to 
Article 76(3) of the UNCLOS, the continental margin (including the sea-bed and subsoil of 
the shelf, as well as its slope and rise) is determined by ‘geomorphological’ factors.
57
 In other 
words, geological concepts, such as crustal type, are viewed by the UNCLOS as hardly 
relevant to materialising the legal continental shelf. 
The ‘foot of the continental slope’ is one of the most important criteria in defining 
the outer continental shelf.
58
 According to Article 76(4)(b) of the UNCLOS, the foot of the 
continental slope is “determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base”. 
The foot of the continental slope is certainly one of the geomorphological concepts.
59
 What 
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is the significance of this particular geomorphological concept? Since the limits of the outer 
continental shelf are determined by geomorphological criteria, it will be useful to examine 
these criteria with reference to the delimitation of the outer continental shelf. Using the foot 
of the continental slope as one of the standards in drawing a provisional line, as described 
above, is a method which ‘respects’ the geomorphology of a given case. 
How does geomorphology – specifically the shape and form of the sea-bed – affect 
the delimitation of the outer continental shelf? It should be noted that a geomorphological 
feature alone is insufficient to indicate an appropriate delimitation method.
60
 Nevertheless, a 
geomorphological feature close to the provisional line established is likely to affect the final 
delimitation line.
61
 Geomorphological features – such as the Norwegian Trough addressed in 
the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases – must be taken into account in order to achieve 
the equitable delimitation of the outer continental shelf. For instance, the ICJ implied in the 
cases mentioned above that the presence of the Norwegian Trough may indicate the 
discontinuity of natural prolongation, although the United Kingdom and Norway had 
disregarded this feature in the process of making their agreement.
62
 By contrast, during the 
1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, the Court of Arbitration ruled that the Hurd 
Deep-Hurd Deep Fault Zone could only be considered a minor geomorphological feature.
63
 
It is worth noting, however, that even such a minor feature may be taken into consideration 
in the process of delimitation. During the 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, the 
ICJ stated that: 
 
“[C]ertain geomorphological configurations of the sea-bed, which do not amount to such an 
interruption of the natural prolongation of one Party with regard to that of the other, may be 




We thus learn from earlier case-law on the delimitation of the continental shelf that a 
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geomorphological feature may have an impact on the final delimitation line, at the discretion 
of international courts and tribunals. 
At this point, one should not overlook the fact that the ITLOS took a ‘new’ approach 
with respect to the concept of natural prolongation in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation 
between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case. Bangladesh argued that the 
landmass of Myanmar and the sea-bed beyond 200NM are geologically discontinuous, and 
Myanmar did not dispute the scientific evidence of this discontinuity.
65
 Instead, Myanmar 
argued that the presence of geological discontinuity in front of Myanmar’s coast is irrelevant 
to the case.
66
 In response, the Tribunal ruled that natural prolongation can be identified by 
establishing the ‘outer edge’ of the continental margin because Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 
76 of the 1982 UNCLOS are closely interrelated.
67
 According to the Tribunal, Myanmar is 
also entitled to the outer continental shelf. In sum, while the ITLOS regarded 
geomorphological factors as important, it interpreted the concept of natural prolongation in a 
new way, by placing stress on the ‘outer edge’ of the outer continental shelf (such as the 
Gardiner line). This novel emphasis on the outer edge of the continental shelf beyond 
200NM also indicates the flexibility involved in taking into account geomorphological 
circumstances to achieve an equitable solution. 
In conclusion, Article 76 of the 1982 UNCLOS (regarding entitlement to the outer 
continental shelf, and the limits of that shelf) is based primarily on geomorphological factors. 
Therefore, geomorphological features cannot be disregarded in the process of delimiting the 
outer continental shelf, in contrast to the delimitation of the continental shelf within 200NM. 
Nevertheless, the significance of such features is subject to the interpretation of international 
courts and tribunals on a case-by-case basis. 
 
3.4. Geological Factors 
Throughout earlier case-law concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf, 
international courts and tribunals assumed that the concept of geology, which concerns the 
composition and structure of the sea-bed, is of little relevance to delimitation. In the 1982 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, for instance, the ICJ stated that: 
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“[F]or legal purposes it is not possible to define the areas of continental shelf appertaining 
to Tunisia and to Libya by reference solely or mainly to geological considerations. The 




In other words, the Court did not attribute a decisive role to geological factors, although it 
did not completely reject the role of geology. Furthermore, the ICJ implied that only the 




However, Article 76 of the 1982 UNCLOS leaves room for the consideration of 
geology, in Paragraph 4(b)’s reference to ‘evidence to the contrary’. This proviso may help 
international courts and tribunals to refine their decisions using geological evidence. If 
geological information were taken into consideration, for instance, the foot of the continental 
slope could be fixed at a ‘different’ point.
70
 Since the foot of the slope may play an important 
role in delimiting the outer continental shelf as shown above,
71
 geological factors might well 
be relevant to the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200NM, on the condition that 
high-quality geological evidence is submitted. This is one way of taking into account 
geological factors in the process of delimiting the outer continental shelf. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that geological factors were not taken into consideration in the 2012 
Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case. 
 
 
4. An Equitable Solution to Be Achieved in Relation to the Delimitation 
    of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200NM 
 
4.1. The 200NM Opening Line and Proportionality 
The most important parameter with regard to the delimitation of the outer continental shelf is 
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the concept of the ‘200NM opening’.
72
 According to Jørgen Lilje-Jensen and Milan 
Thamsborg, however, the possibility exists that a State without the 200NM opening could be 
granted the outer continental shelf.
73
 Another scholar supports their view, arguing that an 
equitable result is of chief importance. According to Nuno Marques Antunes, the 200NM 
opening is not an ‘absolutely overriding fact’, and a provisional equidistance line is the most 
effective starting point in delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200NM.
74
 This is due to the 
fact that Article 83(1) of the 1982 UNCLOS does not differentiate the outer continental shelf 
from the inner continental shelf. However, Antunes’s argument does not answer the question 
of how a State with no title to the outer continental shelf can gain access to the shelf. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the concept of the 200NM opening is a decisive 
parameter. This was illustrated during Bangladesh’s oral argument in the 2012 Maritime 
Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case heard by the 
ITLOS. According to Bangladesh, Myanmar should not be entitled to the continental shelf 
beyond 200NM because it lacks natural prolongation to the outer continental shelf.
75
 
Although the ITLOS did not accept this contention, it favoured the concept of the 200NM 
opening. For example, the Tribunal concluded (without providing the reasoning behind its 
decision) that the provisional line should be diverted to the same azimuth of 215° (from 
point X) as that of a bisector line which Bangladesh had proposed. Bangladesh needed the 
200NM opening line in order to gain access to its outer continental shelf. To this end, 
therefore, the direction of the provisional line must have been changed. If this is not the case, 
it is difficult to explain why the ITLOS chose to adopt the same azimuth as that proposed 
during Bangladesh’s oral argument. The significance accorded to the 200NM opening has 
two implications. First, in order to achieve an equitable solution, international courts and 
tribunals may take account of a State’s access to the outer continental shelf to which it is 
entitled. Second, changing the direction of a provisional delimitation line to secure access to 
the outer continental shelf may affect the delimitation of the ‘inner’ continental shelf because 
the change is made within 200NM. 
Furthermore, if two adjacent States each have the 200NM opening lines, it may be 
worthwhile to consider the relative proportions of the two lines. In other words, where two 
adjacent States both have the legal title to the same outer continental shelf, proportionality 
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can play a role in delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200NM. However, although the 
two States involved in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 
the Bay of Bengal case are both entitled to the same outer continental shelf,
76
 the issue of the 
200NM opening was not raised in the context of proportionality. Instead, the proportionality 




4.2. The Hierarchy of Maritime Entitlements 
There is no doubt that the existence of a maritime entitlement is a precondition for the claim 
to the outer continental shelf. Entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200NM is based on 
natural prolongation. The issue of delimitation only arises if the maritime entitlements of the 
States concerned overlap.
78
 Based on this premise, attention has recently turned to another 
key issue raised by the delimitation of the outer continental shelf: the hierarchy of maritime 
entitlements. This issue has gained a particular emphasis because, thus far, there has been no 
general agreement as to whether or not the characteristics of the continental shelf up to 
200NM are identical to those of the continental shelf beyond 200NM.
79
 From one 
perspective, the two kinds of continental shelf are identical insofar as they are both ‘legal’ 
continental shelves defined as such by the international law of the sea.
80
 The opposing 
argument states that the continental shelf beyond 200NM is no more than a kind of ‘extra’ 
shelf accorded by special conditions.
81
 From the latter perspective, entitlement to the 
continental shelf up to 200NM is prioritised over entitlement to the outer continental shelf. 
In practical terms, the hierarchy of maritime entitlements may raise a critical issue. If 
a common continental shelf is said to exist within 200NM of one State and beyond 200NM 
of the other State (where natural prolongation is verified), how should this continental shelf 
be delimited? It is not clear that the shelf should necessarily belong to the State which holds 
this shelf up to 200NM from its baselines. In particular, if the State retaining the shelf up to 
200NM is a very small island, the outer continental shelf of the other State may be cut off, 
leading to an extremely inequitable result. According to the argument that two continental 
shelves are legally identical, a State can claim its outer continental shelf even when that shelf 
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exists within 200NM of another State. This situation was illustrated in the 1992 Saint Pierre 
and Miquelon case (although this case was not concerned with the delimitation of the outer 
continental shelf). The Court of Arbitration awarded the tiny French islands of Saint Pierre 
and Miquelon only an additional 12NM belt other than the territorial sea in the western 
sector.
82
 Moreover, in the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 
the Bay of Bengal case, this issue of the hierarchy of maritime entitlements was indirectly 
raised with respect to a grey area. In this area, the ITLOS decided that Bangladesh should 
have its outer continental shelf while the superjacent waters belong to the EEZ of Myanmar. 
With respect to the use of the grey area, the ITLOS concluded that the States concerned can 
adopt such measures as they consider appropriate (such as the conclusion of a specific 
agreement or the establishment of a cooperative arrangement).
83
 In short, Myanmar was not 
permitted to have its inner continental shelf in the grey area. It follows that the ITLOS 





5. A Concluding Remark 
 
The rules governing maritime delimitation (‘to arrive at an equitable result’) are still applied 
effectively to the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200NM. In applying these 
rules, international courts and tribunals may take into account the relevant circumstances of a 
given case at their discretion. The discretion affects the whole process of outer continental 
shelf delimitation, from the construction of a provisional line to the consideration of 
geomorphological or geological factors. 
During the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the 
Bay of Bengal case heard by the ITLOS, Bangladesh asked the Tribunal to adopt the bisector 
method to determine its access to the outer continental shelf. It may be said, therefore, that 
Bangladesh called upon the Tribunal to make use of the increased flexibility of application of 
the rules governing maritime delimitation. Although the bisector method was not applied, the 
ITLOS achieved an equitable result through the consideration of relevant circumstances. In 
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other words, as mentioned above, geomorphological (or geological) factors as well as 
geographical factors may be taken into account in order to produce an equitable result. The 
function of geomorphological (or geological) factors, which seemed to disappear with the 
emergence of the distance criterion, is thus revived in the process of delimiting the outer 
continental shelf. 
In the context of outer continental shelf delimitation, therefore, the discretion exerted 
by international courts and tribunals in taking into account relevant circumstances on a case-













This thesis has addressed the demise of the concept of equitable principles and the increased 
significance of relevant circumstances in maritime boundary delimitation. The 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf did not put an end to discussion of the delimitation rule 
in international law; rather, it marked the beginning of an ongoing controversy. Crucially, the 
issue was not settled because the ICJ, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 
declared that the use of the equidistance method was not part of customary international law. 
Attention has also been paid to the conflict between the Equidistance Group and the 
Equitable Principles Group during the Third Conference. The conflict prevented the 
equidistance method from acquiring a mandatory character. 
The tension between the two delimitation rules (the Equidistance-Special 
Circumstances rule and the Equitable Principles-Relevant Circumstances rule) awakened 
scholarly curiosity as to the concepts of the equidistance method, equitable principles, and 
relevant circumstances, as well as to the relationship among these three important concepts 
in maritime delimitation. Nevertheless, the 1982 UNCLOS (the final outcome of the Third 
Conference) concludes only that the delimitation of the EEZ or the continental shelf should 
be carried out ‘on the basis of international law’, in order to ‘achieve an equitable solution’. 
In addition to the fact that the relevant articles of the UNCLOS have fundamental 
implications for the current delimitation rule, this thesis has sought to identify the current 
delimitation rule by focusing on the decisions of international courts and tribunals, which 
allow us to examine concrete delimitation lines. As the thesis has clarified, the current 
delimitation rule can be defined as the ‘achievement of an equitable solution’, despite a lack 
of clarity as to how this rule is applied. 
After the ruling of the ICJ regarding the two delimitation rules in the 2001 Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar/Bahrain) case (in which the UNCLOS was the 
applicable law), Judge Guillaume, the President of the ICJ, confirmed the ‘provisional’ use 












If we accept Judge Guillaume’s statement with respect to the equidistance method, 
what place do equitable principles and relevant circumstances occupy in maritime 
delimitation? Is the concept of equitable principles really necessary to delimit maritime 
boundaries? Can we reach an equitable result despite proclaiming the demise of equitable 
principles? 
Where might the starting point lie in applying the current delimitation rule? Here, we 
must draw attention to the concept of ‘equity’. Equity takes a leading role in maritime 
delimitation, based on the concept of an ‘equitable solution’. In other words, the equitability 
of the ‘result’ produced dominates maritime delimitation. In order to understand the function 
of equity in maritime delimitation, the concept of equitable principles must first be 
examined. As this thesis has clarified, the application of equitable principles as a process in 
maritime delimitation means taking into consideration all of the relevant circumstances in a 
given case. However, this does not mean that the process must also be equitable. Rather, the 
one and only meaningful idea that remains in maritime delimitation is the consideration of 
relevant circumstances. 
The ICJ had sought to enhance the normativity of the rules dealing with maritime 
delimitation by guaranteeing the predictability or certainty of equitable principles. Yet, these 
examples of equitable principles have provoked scholarly controversy. As discussed in this 
thesis, criteria, such as ‘no question of refashioning geography’ and ‘non-encroachment on 
the natural prolongation of another State’, are the examples of the content or aspects 
constituting an equitable result to be achieved. Moreover, the consideration of all relevant 
circumstances does not guarantee ‘equality’ or ‘distributive justice’ in maritime delimitation. 
In other words, there is no need to emphasise that equity is irrelevant to equality or 
distributive justice, as the examples of equitable principles adduced by the ICJ have often 
implied. As a result, only the ‘principle of respect due to all relevant circumstances’ is an 
appropriate example of equitable principles. In brief, the inclusion of the concept of 
equitable principles in maritime delimitation cannot be justified except insofar as it entails 
the consideration of all relevant circumstances. 
Therefore, it is submitted that maritime delimitation should only be carried out by 
taking account of all relevant circumstances. How are these relevant circumstances to be 
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dealt with in a given case? Three phases can be presented: the identification of relevant 
circumstances, the weighing-up of relevant circumstances, and the indication and application 
of practical methods. In the delimitation process, international courts and tribunals exercise 
their discretion to examine all relevant circumstances. Regarding the application of the 
delimitation rule, predictable patterns or interpretations taking into account relevant 
circumstances are irrelevant to the achievement of an equitable result in international case-
law. Rather, international courts and tribunals check and enhance the equitability of a 
proposed result by employing a method, such as proportionality. 
How is the examination of relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation 
illustrated in a practical context? This thesis has examined the consideration of relevant 
circumstances in relation to the construction of an SMB. Although multilateral treaties do not 
stipulate the rules for establishing an SMB, international case-law has typically regarded an 
SMB as a pragmatic solution. The most widespread misunderstanding regarding the 
construction of an SMB is that the theoretical priority accorded to ‘neutral factors’ makes the 
application of the rules in maritime delimitation more predictable. However, even the 
interpretation of geography – the quintessential neutral factor – is subject to the discretion of 
international courts and tribunals. In addition, non-neutral economic factors may be relevant 
to the task of drawing an equitable SMB. The variety of ways in which international courts 
and tribunals take into account relevant circumstances in constructing an SMB make the 
character of these rules far from predictable in order to achieve an equitable solution. 
The rules governing maritime delimitation are also applied effectively to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200NM. In applying these rules, international 
courts and tribunals may take into account the relevant circumstances of a given case at their 
discretion. This use of discretion affects the whole process of outer continental shelf 
delimitation, from the construction of a provisional line to the consideration of 
geomorphological (or geological) factors. During the 2012 Maritime Delimitation between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal case heard by the ITLOS, Bangladesh asked 
the Tribunal to adopt the bisector method to determine its access to the outer continental 
shelf. Although the contention of Bangladesh was not accepted by the ITLOS, the Tribunal 
took into account all relevant circumstances. As this thesis has proven, geomorphological (or 
geological) factors, as well as geographical factors, may be taken into consideration in order 
to produce an equitable result. The significance and function of geomorphological (or 
geological) factors, which had seemed to vanish with the emergence of the distance criterion, 







The conclusion of this thesis is that the concept of relevant circumstances dominates 
the whole delimitation process, without any assistance from the concept of equitable 
principles. In maritime delimitation which aims at the equitability of the result produced, the 
consideration of all relevant circumstances, not the equitability of principles applicable to the 
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